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ABSTRACT
In this study, we examine the process of "late standardization," in which latecomers engage in
standards activities in order to move towards and beyond the technological frontier. Based on
case studies of latecomers in the semiconductor and mobile telecommunication industries in
South Korea and Thailand, we analyze the strategic, organizational, and institutional aspects
of the late-standardization process.
We hypothesize that latecomer firms and states must engage in standards activities to
progress beyond catch-up, because standards are a prerequisite to technological development.
Standards are strategic leverages that allow latecomers to link with and learn from technology
leaders. Specifically, latecomer firms have to engage internally in quality standardization to
take advantage of latecomer advantages. Quality standards help improve production capability,
while enhancing credibility and reputation. Without quality control, latecomers cannot
become part of global value chains and have difficulty in acquiring advanced technologies
from forerunners.
As latecomers become fast followers, they have to participate in external standardization.
The goal is to acquire knowledge about emerging technologies and standards. By linking with
and learning from forerunners, fast followers enhance second-mover advantages derived from
ramp-up capability. Once their R&D efforts bear fruit and they become technology leaders,
advanced "late standardizers" have to lead external standardization efforts. This would enable
them to exploit innovation capability and gain first-mover advantages derived from
proprietary technologies and learning-curve effects. As latecomers move towards the
technological frontier, standards activities become the core of research and development
strategy and policy. They also adjust organizational structures and human resource
management to accommodate standards efforts.
The state plays critical yet changing roles throughout the late-standardization process. It
sets up standards institutions and provides "infratechnologies" for quality control. The state
also mitigates technology and market risks associated with new standards, while facilitating
networking among late-standardizing firms. As late standardizers become technology and
standards leaders, the state pursues "standards diplomacy" for overseas adoption of its
domestic standards, while strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights.
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CHAPTER ONE
STANDARDIZING LATE
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH-UP m RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES .
RESEARCH DESIGN • SKIMMING THE SURFACE: MAIN FINDINGS * STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION
Pessimism abounds regarding the effects of technical standards on technological catch-up. For
many a practitioner and academic, technical standards constitute additional barriers against
firms in developing countries that wish to penetrate into the world market. Such pessimism
carries some truth. Standards determine the forms, functions, and other characteristics of
products, as well as the ways in which firms produce them. Stringent standards may raise
compliance costs, which could be prohibitive to latecomer firms.
This pessimism, however, often undermines the appreciation of the fundamental roles of
standards in catch-up efforts. One basic role of standards is to convey technical information
about products and processes. More publicly available standards mean there is more public
knowledge for latecomers to utilize without investing heavily in research and development
(R&D). Standards thus present both obstacles and opportunities for developing countries.
This study is a response to such pessimism by examining how some latecomers have
managed to turn the obstacles into opportunities and become standards leaders in their own
right. We start by asking the question: What are the implications of technical standards for
technological catch-up by latecomers? In answering the question, we examine the process of
"late standardization", in which latecomers engage in standards activities in order to move
towards and beyond the technological frontier.' Based on case studies of "late standardizers"
in South Korea and Thailand, we develop a conceptual model of late standardization and
technological catch-up. We then analyze the strategic, organizational, and institutional aspects
of the late-standardization process.
The main premise of our research is that latecomers are not the original developers of
standards. Because of limited resources and capabilities, latecomers adopt, diffuse, and
maintain standards in order to produce and sell their products in the world market. They are
standards followers during the technological catch-up process. Yet, some latecomer firms,
such as South Korea's Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics, have in recent years emerged
from being followers to become leaders at the world technological frontier. Not only have
they become technological leaders, but they have also become standards leaders.
We argue that latecomer firms and states must engage in standards activities to progress
beyond catch-up, because standards are a prerequisite to the development of science,
technology, and innovation. Standards are a strategic leverage that allows latecomers to link
with and learn from technology leaders. Specifically, latecomer firms have to engage
internally in quality standardization and control to become fast followers of advanced
technologies. Quality standards enable them to improve production processes, while
enhancing credibility and reputation. Without improving quality standardization and control,
latecomers cannot become part of global value chains and find it more difficult to acquire
advanced technologies from technology leaders.
We further argue that, as latecomers become fast followers, they have to participate in
external standardization. The goal is to link with technology leaders to acquire knowledge
about emerging technologies. By linking with and learning from forerunners, fast followers
enhance their ramp-up capability, the main source of their second-mover advantage.
Standards thus allow fast followers to enhance their production speed and volume.
Finally, once their research and development (R&D) efforts bear fruit and they become
technology leaders, advanced "late standardizers" have to lead standardization efforts. The
standards leadership would help sustain their first-mover advantage derived from proprietary
technologies and learning-curve effects.
Meanwhile, the state plays a critical role throughout the late-standardization process. It
sets up institutions for standards activities and provides infratechnologies for quality control,
such as measurement and reference standards. 2 The state also plays important roles in
mitigating technological and market risks, facilitating networking among late-standardizing
firms, lobbying for expansion of overseas markets, and protecting intellectual property rights.
We conduct this research as a response to the increase in practical importance and
academic interest in standards. Technical standards have increasingly important implications
for technological and economic development of latecomers, both positively and negatively.
Standards are fundamental because they determine the forms, functions, and other
characteristics of products, as well as the ways in which firms produce them. They also play a
fundamental role in conveying the technical information about certain products and processes.
More publicly available standards mean there is more public knowledge for late standardizers
to utilize without investing heavily in basic R&D. However, more standards also provide
firms with more technical obligations to comply with and hence greater barriers against their
technological efforts. Standards present both obstacles and opportunities for late standardizers.
There has been much concern among development scholars and practitioners that standards
negatively affect developing countries' economic development. In this study, we intend to
show how successful late standardizers manage to turn the obstacles into opportunities and
become standards leaders in their own right.
Although standards have always been crucial to technological development, several
factors have contributed to their increased importance in the past few decades. First,
information and communications technology (ICT) industries have become the key engine of
technological and economic change, both in developed and developing economies. In fact,
several successful catch-up efforts by late standardizers, notably Samsung Electronics, have
occurred in these sectors. Second, because of the network and system characteristics of ICT
products, an increasing number of standards are required to ensure their compatibility and
interoperability. Third, increasing complexity of products and services require more standards,
not only for their compatibility but also for their reliability and safety. Finally, the
globalization of trade and investment means that products are produced and purchased in
different locations across the globe than they were 20 years ago. While standards are usually
developed to help facilitate technical and economic transactions across borders, they could be
used as a protectionist measure to nurture domestic industries during the early years of late
standardizers' technological development.
There is now substantial literature on standards and standardization. There is also a large
body of literature on late industrialization and technological catch-up by latecomers.
Surprisingly, however, the literature on the relationship between standards and technological
catch-up is scarce. We know very little, both theoretically and empirically, about how
standards and related efforts affect late standardizers' technological catch-up processes.
WHY STUDY STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH-UP?
The rationale underlying this research is threefold: (1) the increasing importance of
standards in terms of contribution to technological and economic development, especially for
latecomer countries, (2) the recent emergence of some latecomer firms as standards leaders,
and (3) the limited literature on the relationship between standards and technological catch-up.
(1) INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF STANDARDS
Standards have increasingly important implications for technological development.
Technical standards are fundamental because they determine the forms, functions, and other
characteristics of products, as well as the ways in which firms produce them. Standards and
related activities have wide-ranging implications for firms, industries, and nations. As
standards define the general concept of a technology system and its design configuration, they
affect both the generation and the limitation of innovation and technological diffusion.
Standards contain knowledge and product elements, which affect technological change when
they are combined. By reducing technological uncertainty, standards guide the pattern of
technological change in fruitful directions, while permitting variations therein. We discuss
this issue further in Chapter Two.
We explain why three main factors have contributed to the increasing importance of
standards in the past few decades. These factors include: (i) ICT industries as the key engine
of technological change and economic development, (ii) increasing complexity of products
and services; and (iii) globalization of trade and investment.
ICT as the engine of technological and economic development
Information and communications technology (ICT) industries have recently become the
key engine of technological and economic change both in developed and developing
economies. Their important contribution to economic development is evident. As shown by
Jorgenson and Vu (2005), the contributions of ICT investment to economic growth and
productivity have increased in seven regions and 14 major economies in the world during the
period 1989-2003. The impact is particularly significant in industrialized economies and
developing economies in Asia. Similarly, a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) shows that the quality of ICT goods and services
continues to improve, driving prices down and leading to a widening range of new
applications. ICT represents an increasingly substantial part of the added-value of products
and services. Individual consumers are becoming used to ICT, and business-to-consumer
electronic commerce has started to follow the lead that business-to-business electronic
commerce set in the 1990s (OECD 2003). As an example at the national level, the ICT sector
accounted for about 18 percent of South Korea's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2003 and
30 percent of the total export value for the same year (Bank of Korea 2004). The use of ICT
technologies is now prevalent in every sector of the economy. ICT-intensive sectors include
financial services, media and retail, automotive, aerospace, and healthcare (ITU 2003).
Historically, most latecomers focused their early technological efforts on heavy industries,
such as steel, petrochemicals, automobiles, and the ship-building industries (Amsden 2001).
In recent years, however, some successful technological catch-up efforts occur in the ICT
industries. Several latecomer firms have emerged as technological leaders in some segments
of the industry, such as Samsung and LG from South Korea, and TSMC and Acer from
Taiwan (Amsden and Chu 2003).
The increasing importance of the ICT industries consequently raises the significance of
standards. Because of the network and system characteristics unique to ICT products,
standards are required to ensure compatibility between different components and products in
the same systems. Compatibility standards allow producers and users to benefit from
interconnected networks of hardware and software products.
Increasing complexity of products and services
As products and services become more complex, standards play larger roles in facilitating
business and technical transactions among the interconnected systems of hardware and
software, among engineers and managers, and among buyers and sellers. The increasing
complexity of products and services means that the production and distribution along the
supply and value chains become more complex as well. Complex supply chains further need
more co-ordination to secure the compatibility, interoperability, and reliability of all the
elements involved. In various ways, standards function as the connection among the products
and services, as well as the production and distribution processes.
Globalization of trade and investment
The relationship between standards and international trade has changed significantly in the
past two decades. Globalization of trade and investment further demands new standards that
facilitate communications and transactions across borders. As globalization of trade and
investment continues, standards are increasingly viewed as another type of international
regulation that restricts the flows of trade and investment. Although the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations and other trade agreements have substantially reduced tariffs
and quantitative restrictions on products across borders, standards and technical regulations
increasingly appear as the main impediments to international trade.
It is rather ironic that standards are often considered by many trade negotiators as
technical barriers to international trade. Historically, standards were developed as a means to
facilitate trade. For instance, standard weights and measures were used to describe goods
exchanged in the market, as well as to prevent fraud. Standardized electrical voltage allows
consumers to use electrical appliances in different regions (Krislov 1997). Safety regulations
were enforced to protect consumers of imported foodstuffs and other products. Common
currencies, such as the Euro, were developed and are used largely to increase trade among
nations.3 In addition to controlling the quality of imported goods, governments may also use
standards as a means to improve and maintain the quality of the products that they export to
the world market (Krislov 1997; Verman 1973).
Standards may differ across countries because of diverse consumer preferences, income
levels, technologies, or resource endowments (Sykes 1995). However, standards may also be
used as a protectionist tool. In order to develop indigenous technologies, many governments
shield local industries from foreign competition by implementing policy measures that, in
effect, impose a cost disadvantage on foreign firms (Wilson 1995). Standards and the methods
of assessing conformity to standards are among the various measures that are available to
them. This problem is expected to escalate, as globalization of production continues and more
parts and components are sourced from different countries. Standards have thus become a
main issue in international trade policy debates.
(2) THE ASCENT OF "LATE STANDARDIZERS"
The recent emergence of "late standardizers" as standards leaders in the ICT industries is
another rationale for conducting research on late standardization and technological catch-up.
Examples of these "late standardizers' include Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics from
South Korea, TSMC and Acer from Taiwan, and Huawei Technologies and ZTE from China.
As we will show in subsequent chapters, standards leadership is manifested through their
noticeable influence on international standards development. Although the number of such
late standardizers is still small, their recent technological and standards leadership indicates a
significant development, which deserves systematic theoretical and empirical research.
Historically, firms and governments in industrialized countries have always been the main
actors in international standardization efforts, mainly because of their technological leadership.
They produce the majority of the world's voluntary industry standards as well as de facto
standards. Latecomer firms and their governments may develop some technical standards
unique to their domestic markets. But they have limited involvement in developing technical
standards at the international level, and generally adopt standards developed in advanced
economies, including their former colonizers. (United Nations 1964; Stephenson 1997)
The emergence of late standardizers as standards leaders since the late 1990s thus
indicates a significant development. It is true that advanced economies still dominate the
major standardization forums, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). However, an increasing number of
late standardizers have significantly increased their presence in formal standards development
organizations (SDO). Notable examples include South Korean and Taiwanese firms in the
ISO and the ITU. Meanwhile, standardization at the technological frontier increasingly occurs
outside formal SDOs, either in standards consortia or among coalitions of firms (Weiss and
Cargill 1992). As we will show in detail in Chapter Three, an increasing number of late
standardizers from South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China have joined these "informal"
standards forums. They have in effect become part of the standards clubs that often determine
the rates and directions of technological development in their particular industries.
(3) LIMITED LITERATURE ON STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH-UP
Standards have increasingly become a subject of academic enquiry. The literature on
standards comprises work by scholars in various fields, ranging from economics and
management to political science, public policy and law. For instance, within the literature on
the economics of standards, one of the main focuses is on the strategic interactions between
firms regarding standardization strategies for products in network industries. Many of these
studies examine the production and consumption of standards by technological leaders and
the advantages accruing to them (e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1986).
Others focus on the user side, paying attention to the costs and benefits of variety reduction
due to standardization (e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1986). The institutional aspects of standards
and standardization activities have recently been evaluated by an increasing number of case
studies of standardization organizations (e.g., Schmidt and Werle 1998; Loya and Boli 1999;
Werle 2001). A few of these studies deal with governance and political issues of international
standardization (e.g., Krasner 1991; Mattli 2001; Mattli and Buthe 2003; Drezner 2004).
Most analysts writing on standards focus on firms and institutions in industrialized
countries that are standards leaders. We know very little about firms and governments that
engage in various standards-related activities when they do not possess cutting-edge
technologies. Meanwhile, among the authors writing on standards issues in developing
countries, most deal with international environmental and labor standards in the context of
trade agreements (e.g., Busse 2002). There are a few analysts who examine the impacts of
standards on developing-country firms, but their focus has been on the costs and benefits of
compliance with foreign standards mostly in the agricultural sector (e.g., Otsuki et al. 2001;
Wilson and Otsuki 2002). Among studies on standards adoption by latecomers, most analysts
examine the ISO 9000 and the ISO 14000 standards (e.g., Huarng et al. 1999; Calisir et al.
2001; Martinez-Costa and Martinez-Lorente 2003). Again we know little about the impacts of
voluntary technical standards on latecomer firms.
On the other hand, there is now a voluminous literature on technological catch-up and late
industrialization. This includes the pioneer contributions of Veblen (1915) and Gerschenkron
(1962), who focus on the European catch-up prior to the First World War. Their analyses shed
light on the roles of policy and institutions in Germany and other continental European
countries in catching up with Britain. Another subset of the catch-up literature focuses more
on recent cases of late industrialization, such as Japan (e.g., Johnson 1982), South Korea (e.g.,
Amsden 1989;), and Taiwan (e.g., Wade 1990). The central argument of this strand of catch-
up literature is on the roles of developmental states in successful late industrialization.
Another strand of literature on catch-up is led by the work of Abramovitz (1986) whose
macro-level analysis examines long-run, cross-country data on economic growth and the
factors that affect catch-up and convergence.
Recently analysts examine some of the more successful late industrializers in East Asia,
focusing on how they have managed to move beyond technological catch-up (e.g., Mathews
2002; Amsden and Chu 2003). Although these analysts have contributed greatly to the
understanding of the catch-up processes, they have not analyzed an important aspect of
industrialization, i.e., standardization. We know very little about how latecomers deal with
different types and levels of technical standards and related activities, how standards affect
technological development and competitiveness, and how some of them have managed to
move beyond being standards followers to become standards leaders at the technological
frontier. These issues have yet to be assessed systematically via primary empirical research.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
As stated at the beginning, our overarching research question is: What are the implications
of standards for technological catch-up of latecomers? We can paraphrase the question as:
What is the relationship between late standardization and technological catch-up?
Our general hypothesis is that latecomers must engage in technological standardization to
move beyond technological catch-up, to keep up with technological change, to forge ahead of
the forerunners, and to sustain its technological leadership. In other words, standards and
related activities enable firms to move beyond being latecomers to become second movers,
and eventually first movers.
In testing the above hypothesis, we examine four specific aspects of late standardization:
(1) types and sources of standards and related activities that affect technological catch-up; (2)
resources and capabilities for standards efforts; (3) organizational structure for standards
activities; and (4) institutional arrangement and the role of the state that affect standards
efforts. These four aspects lead to the following specific sub-hypotheses.
The first sub-hypothesis is that successful late standardizers develop through distinct
stages of late standardization and technological catch-up. To test this hypothesis, we examine
whether late standardizers progress through a series of discrete stages over time, each of
which constitutes different types of standards activities, possess distinct sets of standards
resources and capabilities, participate in different types of standards forums, and have
different organizational structures for standards activities.
The following sub-hypotheses concern the types of standards activities that affect each
stages of late standardization and technological catch-up. Our second sub-hypothesis is that
internal quality standardization enhances latecomers' production capability. Quality
standards and related activities offer latecomers the opportunities to learn about relatively
mature technologies, as well as new businesses and markets. Particularly, quality standards
allow latecomers to leverage their limited resources and capabilities through internal
standardization and external linkages with technological leaders. Quality is the key to
becoming part of global value chains, which are the main sources of technical and business
knowledge necessary for technological upgrading. By engaging internally in quality
standardization, latecomers can move beyond catch-up and become fast followers
Our third sub-hypothesis is that participation in external standardization enhances fast
followers' ramp-up capability. For fast followers, ramp-up capability is the key source of
second-mover advantage. They generally improve high-volume-production capability by
relying on the knowledge about emerging technologies and superb process technologies.
Standards activities enable them to improve both sources of ramp-up capability. As fast
followers improve technology capabilities through various R&D efforts, they move closer to
the world technological frontier and eventually become technology leaders themselves.
Our fourth sub-hypothesis is that, leading external standardization enables technology
leaders to exploit innovation capability. Generally, first movers are technology leaders that
gain their competitive advantage from various sources, especially technology leadership.
Standards leadership reinforces technology leadership, enabling first movers to reap
technological rents derived from proprietary technologies and learning-curve effects.
Finally, with regards to the roles of the state in late standardization, our fifth sub-
hypothesis is that the role of the state remains important throughout the process of late
standardization. Yet, the state adjusts its roles from being the main developer and enforcer of
standards to become a mediator and coordinator of domestic and international standardization
efforts. In other words, the state and other standards institutions co-evolve as late
standardizers move towards and beyond the technological frontier. The main goal of the state
is to help latecomers increase standards capabilities, such that they can leverage limited
internal resources and capabilities through Linking and Learning mechanisms.
We pay additional attention to three factors in examining the above hypotheses: (1) the
characteristics of the industries in which catch-up occurs, (2) the technological conditions of
such industries, and (3) the degree of backwardness of latecomers compared to forerunners.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
As the conceptual starting point, we develop a staged model of late standardization by
extending the limited set of empirical and theoretical studies regarding standards and
technological catch-up. We draw mainly upon several relevant strands of literature. While all
this literature serves as the foundation of our research, each study contributes specifically to
the discussion on the four different aspects of late standardization mentioned above.
We first start from two strands of literature: one on innovation dynamics and the
technology life cycle (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Utterback 1994) and the other on
late industrialization and technological catch-up (e.g., Gerschenkron 1962; Abramovitz 1986;
Hikino and Amsden 1994). As we incorporate the concept of competitive advantage into the
conceptual framework, we build upon the strategic-management literature, particularly those
studies that focus on competitive advantage and the order of market entry (e.g., Porter 1985;
Teece 1986; Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Christensen et al. 1998) and those on the
resource-based theory of firms (e.g., Penrose 1959/1995; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991).
Our discussion on the role of the state in the late-standardization process is built upon two
strands of literatures: (1) the literature on late industrialization mentioned above; (2) the
literature on standards and technological infrastructure (e.g., Link and Tassey 1988; Antonelli
1994; Tassey :2000). We will review each of these studies in detail in the respective chapters.
Three key ideas form the basis of our conceptual framework: (1) technological catch-up as
a process of improving competitive positions; (2) latecomers as late-movers with additional
constraints in terms of resources and capabilities; and (3) standards as linking and learning
mechanisms for latecomers to leverage limited resources. We integrate the three concepts into
a staged model to illustrate how the three elements play a role over time during the course of
late standardizers' development.
In our staged model, late standardizers develop through three distinct stages: catch-up,
keep-up, and forge-ahead. This model is based on the observation that catch-up is essentially
a process in which latecomers move up on the ladder of competitive positions. They progress
from the position where they are constrained in terms of resources, capabilities, and market
access, to the position where they exploit proprietary technologies and assets. Put differently,
they move from the situation in which market entry is late by necessity to the situation in
which they can choose either to be an early or a late mover (Mathews and Cho 2000).
The first stage of catch-up occurs when late standardizers attempt to overcome
latecomers' unique constraints, such that they progress from being late adopters to being fast
followers in terms of technological adoption. Put differently, in terms of competitive positions,
they develop from being latecomers to being second movers. Once they become fast followers,
late standardizers have already established themselves as key players in mature product
markets. The second stage of keep-up refers to the process in which second movers attempt to
become first movers. They aspire to close the gap with the world technological frontier.
Finally, the forge-ahead stage is when first movers maintain their leadership, not only in terms
of market share and technology, but also in terms of standards.
During different stages of late standardization and technological catch-up, late
standardizers utilize different mechanisms to sustain and gain competitive advantage from
various sources. In this research, we examine how standards and standards activities
contribute to late standardizers' efforts in creating and capturing competitive advantage
through Learning and Linking mechanisms such that they can leverage their limited internal
resources and capabilities. We summarize this conceptual framework in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Late Standardization, Technological Catch-Up, and Competitive Positions
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Our model of late standardization is an evolutionary model, in that it demonstrates a
simplified pattern of a dynamic and historical process. Because the research focus is on the
dynamic process of late standardization in the context of catch-up, the evolutionary
framework is thus appropriate as the analytical approach. By definition, technological catch-
up processes are evolutionary, in that they are dynamic and historical. The model assumes
that the process of late standardization and technological catch-up is path-dependent and
irrevocable. It is path dependent, because the characteristics of an earlier stage determine
those of the following stages. More specifically, the model assumes that technological and
standards capabilities are cumulative and that the capabilities that late standardizers acquire in
an earlier stage establish the basis for capability building in the following stages. In addition,
the process is irrevocable, because it does not repeat itself identically, even though certain
patterns may recur in the historical process. In other words, even though late standardizers
undertake similar standards activities, such as acquisition, implementation, assimilation, and
improvement, the characteristics of the activities are not exactly the same in different stages.
As in any staged models, the underlying assumption is that there is a series of discrete
stages over time, each of which constitutes different activities, capabilities, competitive
positions, organizational structure, and so forth. We argue that in different stages of late
standardization, latecomer firms engage in different types of standards activities. They
possess distinct sets of standards resources and capabilities, participate in different types of
standards forums, have different organizational structures related to standards, and occupy
different competitive positions in the market. In addition, the roles of the state and
institutional arrangements are also distinct in each of the three stages.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
We adopt the case-oriented approach as the primary methodology for exploring the above
research questions. Although the main unit of analysis is the latecomer firm, we also examine
non-firm institutions of latecomer countries, such as research and legal institutions, in order to
test the fifth sub-hypothesis on the role of the state in late standardization.
Specifically, we adopt the prototypical-case-study approach, a type of crucial-case-study
approach, with shadow cases to test the main hypothesis and five sub-hypotheses and to
generalize the findings. The prototypical case is different from a representative case study in
that the case is chosen not because it is representative, but because we expect it to become so.
As Rose (1991) argues, studying an early prototypical example may help us to understand a
phenomenon of growing significance. We study specific prototypical cases, because they
embody or exemplify an archetype of a phenomenon. With regards to theoretical contribution,
a prototypical case-study may eventually lead to theory-generating, or what Eckstein (1975)
calls the "probability-probe" in a situation when there is not yet a theory to be tested or
confirmed. The approach may also be used when there is some sort of 'proto-theory' which
the analyst wants to test and refine (Landman 2000). In our study, the prototypical case-study
also offers practical opportunities for lesson-drawing; other latecomers may be able to learn
from the experiences of successful late standardizers in terms of standards strategies and
policies. In the sections below, we provide the details on the case selection and data collection.
CASE SELECTION
We select South Korean firms as our prototypical cases and Thai firms as our shadow
cases, where 'we use the latter cases to provide a cross-country comparison. We choose firms
in two industries in which the late-standardization phenomenon has been prominent:
semiconductor and mobile telecommunication.
Country: Korean firms as prototypical cases, Thai firms as shadow cases
We select our case studies in a strategic way, such that the selected cases are
"prototypical" to our topic. We select South Korean late standardizers as the prototypical
cases for this research. Among the limited number of latecomer firms and countries that have
emerged as standards leaders, South Korean latecomers are the most prominent. Since the rise
of Japan as a technological and standards leader in the 1970s, South Korea is one of very few
latecomer countries that have emerged from being technological and standards followers to
leaders in recent decades. South Korean latecomer firms have caught up and kept up with the
technological changes introduced by the forerunners in the Triad countries, that is, the United
States., the European Union, and Japan. Some of them, such as Samsung Electronics and LG
Electronics, have already exhibited technology and standards leadership in several technical
areas, notably in semiconductor and telecommunications.
Even though South Korean firms and institutions are unique in many ways, their standards
efforts during their early years of late standardization and their successes in the recent years
make them the best candidates for research on late standardization and technological catch-up.
Taiwan is another potential case study. However, because of its limited diplomatic status,
Taiwan cannot participate in most formal international standards organizations, such as the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Considering that until recent years, most
standardization activities occurred in these forums, and that Taiwan was not part of them,
South Korea thus appears to be the best candidate for the study. By studying its standards
issues, we hope to be able to examine how a latecomer manages to upgrade its status from
being a standards follower to a standards leader, and the implications of standards for
technological catch-up in general.
On the other hand, we select latecomer firms and institutions in Thailand as the "shadow
cases". The purpose of using shadow cases is to improve generalizability of the research
results. While the Korean prototypical cases offer within-case evidence to test the hypotheses,
the Thai shadow cases provide us with across-case evidence to substantiate and refine the
hypotheses. The aim is to identify whether the Thai latecomers are progressing through
similar stages as some Korean latecomers have done during their early years of late
standardization. For the Thai cases, we adopt the same analytical framework as the one we
use to analyze the Korean cases, although we know offhand that none of the Thai firms are
now a world technology leader, let alone a standards leader. From our preliminary fieldwork
in Thailand, we find that Thai latecomers are indeed standards followers with limited
standards resources and capability and little involvement in standardization activities.
Although the Thai latecomers cannot be used as an equal comparison to the successful Korean
late standardizers, they provide insights into how other latecomers' experiences may be
similar or different from those of Korean firms during their early stages of late standardization.
Industry focus: ICT (semiconductor and mobile telecommunications)
Our case studies focus on two information and communication technology (ICT)
industries: the semiconductor and mobile telecommunication industries. There are three main
reasons for selecting the two industries for the research.
First, as mentioned earlier, the ICT industry has, in recent decades, become one of the
most important industries for many latecomer countries in their industrialization and
economic development efforts. The importance of the ICT sector for a latecomer country,
such as South Korea, is evident in its contribution to the country's economy. Semiconductors
increasingly become an important commodity for the modem world economy and society, as
they are the key components of many products that we use in our daily lives. The
telecommunications industry has always been important, but its importance is even more
pronounced now than before as the global economy moves towards information and
knowledge-based economy. Mobile telecommunications services, in particular, are expanding
exponentially in most countries around the globe. According to a market study by Portio
Research (2005), the number of mobile subscribers worldwide grew to over two billion by the
end of 2005, and is predicted to rise to four billion by 2011. In 2005 alone, there was an
increase of 384 million subscribers from the start of the year. Meanwhile, the world
population is likely to increase from approximately 6.5 billion to seven billion. This means
that worldwide mobile phone penetration should pass the 50 percent mark by the end of 2009
(Portio Research 2005).
Second, while standards have always been important in other industries, they are
particularly important for the ICT industry. ICT products tend to be more standards intensive,
because of their systems and network characteristics. Both hardware and software of ICT
products are interconnected. Reliable compatibility between them is crucial to their
functioning. Theoretically, network characteristics of the ICT industry imply that first movers
have tremendous advantages over second- or late-movers. In addition, not only does the
number of standards in these sectors increase rapidly, many of them are revised and updated
frequently as well. This means that it may be more difficult for late standardizers to catch up
with forerunners in the ICT industries, such as semiconductor and telecommunications
industries. Despite that, these are also the two industries in which some late standardizers not
only have caught up with the forerunners from advanced economies, but also have forged
ahead of them. For instance, several mobile telecom technologies developed by Samsung and
LG have been incorporated into standards adopted by firms from advanced economies.
Finally, while the semiconductor and telecommunication industries share several common
features, each industry has distinctive characteristics. The semiconductor industry is
essentially a commodity business and is highly cyclical. Semiconductor companies face
constant booms and busts in demand for products. Demand typically tracks end-market
demand for personal computers, cell phones and other electronic equipment. On the other
hand, for the telecommunication equipment industry, we can not be entirely sure whether the
businesses are cyclical or not. The cross-industry differences allow us to examine whether our
hypotheses hold true under different patterns of demand.
Table 1.1 displays the firms and standards institutions that we have selected for the case
studies of the semiconductor and mobile telecommunications industries in South Korea and
Thailand. As we adopt the prototypical-case-study approach, we have identified through our
preliminary research some late standardizers that have developed from being standards
followers to standards leaders. We base our selection on the level of standards resources and
capability, the level of participation in external standardization, and the organizational
structure for standards activities. In the semiconductor industry, the most "prototypical" case
study of all is South Korea's Samsung Electronics. From our preliminary research, we find
that Samsung Electronics is the most active latecomer firm in external standardization
activities in the industry. South Korea's Hynix is another leading semiconductor firm with
noticeable participation and contribution in standardization activities. Meanwhile, in the
mobile telecommunications industry, Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, and KT are
among the very few latecomer firms that have recently exerted influence on international
standardization of mobile telecom technologies. Because no Thai firms have significant
participation and contribution in international standardization arenas, we have chosen firms
that we think have devoted the most resources and have greatest capabilities among Thai
firms in standardization activities in the semiconductor and telecommunication industries.
With regards to non-firm institutions, we select them according to their level of involvement
in standards activities in the semiconductor and mobile telecom industries.
Table 1.1: Firms and Institutions Selected for the Case Studies
Country Industry Firm Domestic Institution International Institution
South Korea Semiconductor Samsung Electronics; KSIA; KATS JEDEC
(prototypical Hynix
cases)
Mobile Telecom Samsung Electronics; LG KATS; TTA; MIC 3GPP; 3GPP2, APT; CJK
Electronics; KT Forum
Thailand Semiconductor Hana Microelectornics TISI; MTEC; NIMT JEDEC
(shadow cases)
Mobile Telecom TOT; AIS TISI; NECTEC APT
The timeframe for the case studies covers the last three decades, i.e., from the early 1970s
when South Korea started its late standardization efforts. We pay particular attention to the
period since the early 1990s, when a few late standardizers started to become more visible in
international arenas for technological standardization.
DATA COLLECTION
We collect the empirical evidence from four main sources: documentation, archival
records, interviews, and direct observations (Yin 1994). Although most of the information we
use in our case studies is from documents and interviews, archrival records and direct
observations are sometimes useful in obtaining empirical evidence not available through the
other sources. Documents include news articles, trade journals, meeting memoranda,
company reports and brochures, and websites. Archival records include organizational and
corporate records that show quantitative information about latecomer firms.
With regards to interviews, we have conducted semi-structured interviews with managers
and engineers in different firms and standards organizations in the semiconductor and
telecommunications industries, as well as government officers and researchers in standards
institutions in South Korea and Thailand. We conducted most of the interviews in person,
mainly in three locations at three separate times: (1) San Jose, California, at the JEDEX
conference, in which all of major semiconductor firms participated in March 2005; (2) Seoul
and its vicinity in April 2005; and (3) Bangkok in August 2005 and January 2006. These
interviews were followed by telephone interviews, whenever they were considered necessary.
Lastly, we conducted direct observations of latecomers' engagement in standardization
activities during the JEDEX conference. We report the sources of information as appropriate
throughout the dissertation.
SKIMMING THE SURFACE: THE MAIN FINDINGS
Our research is based on the assumption that late standardizers advance through distinct
stages of technological development as they emerge as important players in the global
markets. Unlike first- and late-movers from advanced economies, late standardizers need to
overcome additional technological and resource constraints, as well as distance to lead-user
markets and specialized inputs. They are "late" by necessity, not by choice. They enter the
global market when there is already a dense thicket of standards, to which they have to
subscribe. Yet, successful late standardizers manage to turn these seemingly formidable
obstacles into opportunities for technological catch-up.
We thus examine whether late standardizers like late-industrializers also progress through
distinct stages, and, if so, how these stages are related to technological catch-up. Our ultimate
goal is to investigate how standards and related activities enable these firms to move from one
stage to another, both in terms of technological development and competitive positions. We
pay particular attention to four key aspects: (1) types and sources of standards and related
activities that affect technological catch-up; (2) resources and capabilities for standards efforts;
(3) organizational structure for standards activities; and (4) institutional arrangement and the
role of the state that affect standards efforts.
We first concentrate our effort on building a staged model of late standardization and
technological catch-up. Then, we examine the mechanisms for moving beyond each stage. As
the main analytical framework, we build upon the concept of "resource leverage" as found in
the strategic management literature (e.g., Ghoshal 1987; e.g., Hamel and Prahalad 1993) and
expanded to explain late standardizers (Mathews 2002). Specifically, we focus on the two
apparatus late standardizers utilize as a leverage mechanism to move beyond catch-up:
namely, Linking and Learning. We examine these apparatus, using case studies of the
semiconductor and mobile telecommunications industries in South Korea.
STANDARDS AS MECHANISMS FOR MOVING BEYOND AND AHEAD
The main argument of this study is that latecomer firms must engage in standards
activities to progress beyond catch-up. Only when they engage in technical standardization
can they move beyond catch-up, to keep up with technological change, to forge ahead of the
forerunners, and to sustain technological leadership. In other words, standards and related
activities propel latecomers to move from one stage of technological development to another.
Specifically, they have to engage internally in quality management and standardization to
become fast followers. Quality standards are the key factor for latecomers to improve
production processes, while enhancing credibility and reputation such that they become part
of global value chains. Once they become fast followers, they have to participate in external
standardization activities to improve ramp-up capability, the main source of their second-
mover advantage. Once they manage to become technology leaders, these "late standardizers"
have to lead standardization efforts, such that the standards leadership helps sustain their first-
mover advantages derived from proprietary technologies and learning-curve effects.
Our argument is based on the observation that the extent of technological development is
limited by the underlying standards. However much latecomers improve their technological
capabilities, the extent of development is within the limits imposed by the standards they
adopt. The proposition is particularly true in the standards-intensive industries, such as the
ICT industry. Latecomers' technological catch-up efforts in these industries are thus very
different from those in heavy industries, such as steel and automotive. In those manufacturing
industries, latecomers have to overcome entry barriers due to economies of scale. In the ICT
and other industries in which standards are essential, latecomers face entry barriers due to
"economies of knowledge," which occur when a firm possesses and exploits internal stock of
knowledge while other firms do not. Without engaging in standardization of new technologies,
latecomer finns, such as Samsung Electronics, would not be able to move beyond being
followers to forerunner firms from advanced economies, such as Intel and Sony.
Put differently, without increasing their standards capabilities and engaging in internal and
external standardization activities, latecomers can never move beyond catch-up. As we
discuss in detail in Chapter Four, standards capabilities include the capability to identify the
needs for standards, to search and select appropriate standards, to acquire and assimilate
standards into the production process, to adapt standards according to local conditions, to
modify the standards in response to changing economic environments, and to develop new
standards for internal use and then external use.
During each stage of late standardization and technological catch-up, latecomers derive
competitive advantage from various sources. They capture different types of technological or
entrepreneurial rents and rely on specific mechanisms to capture such rent.4 Late standardizers
concentrate their efforts on different types of standards and related activities during different
stages of late standardization.
Engaging in quality standardization to move beyond catch-up
Specifically, during the catch-up stage, as late standardizers move from a latecomer
position to a second-mover position, they concentrate their standards efforts on internal
standards activities for quality and process control for production processes. The rationale is
that their competitive advantage as latecomers rests mainly on cheap input factors. Because
latecomers, by definition, have no cutting-edge technologies, they compete mostly in mature-
product markets, in which firms compete on the basis of cost and quality, rather than value of
the products. Especially for latecomers aiming to become an original equipment manufacturer
(OEM), quality standards and tools are a crucial key to establishing the credibility and
reputation, such that they can become part of global production and value chains.
Our case studies of Samsung Electronics and other Korean firms show that quality
standards and tools, such as the ISO 9000 series and Six Sigma, are critical to latecomers'
technological catch-up effort. They also develop and accumulate more sophisticated technical
and organizational capabilities and resources for standards activities. As shown in our cases
studies, Samsung Electronics and other successful late standardizers have significantly
increased their resources devoted to external standards activities as they increase their
technological capabilities.
Participating in external standardization to enhance ramp-up capability
As late standardizers improve their internal standards and technological capabilities,
external standardization activities become more important as a source of competitive
advantage. For fast followers, ramp-up capability is the key source of their second-mover
advantage. Ramp-up capability concerns primarily with speed and volume in production.
These two elements can be enhanced by the integration between product development and
production processes. Quality standards and control, therefore, remain crucial at this stage of
late standardization, as a tool to integrate product development and production.
However, implementing quality standards alone is not enough for enhancing ramp-up
capability. What fast followers need is the knowledge about emerging technologies. They
generally improve high-volume-production capability by relying on their knowledge about
emerging technologies and their superb process technologies. Standardization activities
enable them to improve both sources of ramp-up capability.
One important channel for latecomers' external standardization activities is to join
"informal" standards consortia and alliances, in addition to formal standards organizations.
We argue that as late standardizers develop their technological capabilities, they have to be
more involved in international standardization efforts, especially in "informal" standards
consortia and alliances. Through their participation in standards forums, late standardizers
create the leverage for their technological upgrading and market penetration in the world
market. Some late standardizers are active followers, who learn about emerging technologies
through standardization activities. Others are active participants in standards development,
who provide technical inputs that become part of new standards.
Leading standardization efforts to sustain first-mover advantage
Once they have established a second-mover position, late standardizers engage in external
standardization activities in order to keep up with rapid technological change and finally to
move up to a first-mover position. While fast followers continue to improve their quality
management and standardization, they also pay more attention to improving their capabilities
for product design and development. Through various R&D efforts, many of them move
closer to the world technological frontier and eventually become technology leaders
themselves. A few of them become standards leaders, as they influence the directions of
standards to reflect their strategic interests. Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics are now
among standards leaders in several segments of the ICT industries. They focus more on
"interface standards," 5 which affect their strategic planning, and "transaction standards,"6
which affect their market development. As fast followers, their competitive advantage
depends on the ability to learn quickly what emerging products and technologies are, as well
as the ability to ramp up their production. For fast followers, the ramp-up capability has
already been accumulated during the catch-up period. Such capability is closely tied to the
types of standards. Standardization activities on which fast followers focus, therefore, are not
limited to production and quality control, but include external standards activities.
As first movers, late standardizers become even more active in leading and influencing
standards development, so as to keep ahead of their competitors. The focus of their
standardization efforts is on new-product specifications and functions. This is because their
competitive advantage rests mainly upon the value, rather than costs, of the new products.
Standards are an important means by which late standardizers strengthen their foothold as part
of the "standards clubs" that determine the trajectories of future technologies and markets.
As late standardizers move closer to the world technological frontier, the mechanisms they
use to appropriate standards-induced rents also change. As their technological and standards
capabilities develop, intellectual property rights included in standards become more important
as a mechanism to appropriate technological rents from their technological innovation.
Specific channels for capturing such rents include cross-licensing agreements and standards-
based patent pools. Patent pools allow holders of patents included in standards to cross-
license each other without paying license fees. Patent-pool members can also receive royalties
from other firms outside the pools that want to use the standards. A few successful late
standardizers, such as South Korea's Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics, are already
part of important patent pools for mobile communications technologies.
STANDARDS AS STRATEGIC LEVERAGE FOR LINKING AND LEARNING
As a leverage mechanism, standards enable late standardizers to manage the transitions
through two basic apparatus: Linking and Learning. These apparatus allow late standardizers
to overcome their unique constraints as latecomers, that is, inadequate resources and
capabilities and limited access to lead-user markets and specialized inputs (Mathews 2002).
By repeatedly using standards as Linking and Learning apparatus, late standardizers leverage
their internal resources and capabilities for more knowledge and expertise available in the
world market. We argue that standards are an integral part of what Mathews calls the strategy
of "competitive complementarity," in which latecomer firms complement the strategies of
incumbents, rather than competing against them.
As a Linking apparatus, standards connect latecomers with technological leaders in order
to leverage their limited resources and capabilities. By adopting certain standards and
technical specifications, either as part of outsourcing, second-sourcing, or OEM contracting,
latecomers and fast followers establish external linkages with forerunners. Such external
linkages allow latecomer firms to devote their resources to improving manufacturing
processes, without having to invest in R&D for developing standards and specifications.
Quality control and management standards facilitate the efforts by latecomers to improve their
production and project execution capabilities. For instance, ISO 9000 quality standards allow
firms to improve manufacturing and business processes.
By necessity, latecomers start by competing in markets with mature products and
technologies. The basis of such competition is cost. Latecomers' competitive advantage is
hence affected greatly by production costs and quality of products. Quality standards and
standardization are, therefore, critical to their competitiveness. In fact, throughout the process
of late standardization and technological catch-up, quality control and standardization is a key
for latecomer firm to build a basic mechanism to move from one stage to another.
As a Learning apparatus, standards contain technological information, such as technical
specifications, that latecomers firms can utilize without having to "reinvent the wheel."
During the catch-up period, latecomers may learn about market characteristics and consumer
preferences in advanced markets through standards and technical regulations. Through
participation in standards development, fast followers learn about emerging technologies.
They learn what technologies they should expect in the near future, even though they do not
yet have proprietary technologies that they can contribute to standards development. Once
they have established themselves as first movers, successful late standardizers acquire ideas
about competitors' R&D and product development through external standardization activities.
For late standardizers who are already technological leaders, standards enable them to
manage market and technological risks by forming standards alliances with other
technological leaders - often their competitors - in the same industry. Advanced late
standardizers, such as Samsung Electronics, participate in several standards consortia with
other leading firms from advanced economies. Examples include the Joint Electron Device
Engineering Council (JEDEC) in the semiconductor industry and the 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) in the mobile telecommunication industry. Standards also allow
them to capture rents from the stock of proprietary intellectual property generated by their
R&D efforts. A good example is the recent formation of patent pools to manage the Moving
Picture Experts Group (MPEG) technologies, in which Samsung Electronics and LG
Electronics are key partners.
Several exogenous factors affect the late standardization process of late standardizers,
including the characteristics of the technologies, as well as the market structure. Shifting
technological paradigms, for instance, open the windows of opportunity for late standardizers
to catch up with forerunners. In order to capture the opportunities, late standardizers must
have accumulated technological capabilities by adopting various R&D strategies. Although
their engagement in standards efforts may appear in various forms and degrees, engagement
in technical standardization is an essential strategy for latecomers to move beyond catch-up.
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING FOR LATE STANDARDIZATION
As late standardizers advance their technological capability, standards and related
activities are given more attention by management and become an integral part of their R&D
strategies. The increased importance can be manifested through organizational changes. As
latecomers, standards-related activities are given an ad hoc status, with only a few engineers
working on standards issues. However, as they move beyond catch-up towards keep-up and
forge-ahead, specialized personnel and groups are assigned specifically to standards activities.
Standards teams become a core component of R&D activities. Samsung Electronics, for
instance, has established a Global Standards and Research Team within its
Telecommunication R&D Center near Seoul. Similarly, LG Electronics has a team devoted to
standards within its Mobile Telecommunication R&D Center also in the suburbs of Seoul.
Another indicator of increased importance given to standards is the change in human
resource management to accommodate standards activities. As standardization activities in
standards forums involve long-term commitment and personal connections, consistent and
persistent participation is a critical factor. For instance, many technical experts that represent
firms in JEDEC, a semiconductor standards forum, have been involved in its activities for
many years, if not decades. Successful late standardizers, such as Samsung, have adjusted
their internal job assignment and rotation practices for standards activities. The goal is to
allow standards experts to continue working in the same department, while representing the
firms in the same standards forums as long as possible.
CO-EVOLUTION OF INSITUTIONS AND TECHNOLOGIES
The role of the state in standards activities changes throughout the process of late
standardization. Standards institutions co-evolve with technologies, as latecomer firms move
closer towards the technological frontier. As they enhance technological and standards
capabilities increase, late standardizers rely less on the state for developing and providing
product standards. For instance, from our case study of South Korea, we find that the relevant
ministries and governmental institutions, such as the Ministry of Information and
Communication (MIC), become less directly involved in the standards development. Rather,
non-governmental institutions, such as the Korean Telecommunication Technology
Association (TTA), become more active in developing voluntary industry standards.
However, the role of the state remains crucial in the areas of non-product standards that
function as "infratechnologies", such as measurement and reference standards. The more
infrastructural the nature of a technical standard, a more active role of the state is required.
Examples include basic measurement standards and reference materials for weight, time, and
temperature. By deciding on certain infrastructural standards, the state can play a leading role
in pushing the firms and other institutions to develop beyond catch-up. These infrastructural
standards may also function as an institutional "boundary object" (Brown and Duguid 1998)
to encourage mutual technical and organizational learning among latecomer firms and other
institutions. A notable example is the successful collaboration between the Korean
government, research institutions, and a few latecomer firms, including Samsung Electronics
and LG Electronics, in adopting and developing the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)
mobile technologies.
In addition, by setting up domestic institutional arrangements that correspond to the
structure of international standards institutions, the state enables late-standardizing firms to
benefit from such "institutional complementarity". The state also plays a significant role in
creating linkages through "government-led networking" (Amsden and Chu 2003). This
networking serves as the mechanism to align their differences in interests and goals, as well as
resources and capabilities. Standards-related forums organized by the Korean government are
good examples of such state-led networking.
The state also plays a crucial role in alleviating the risks for latecomer firms with regards
to selecting the right technological trajectories and in securing initial market demand for the
firms. The role of government research institutes, such as South Korea's Electronics and
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), are paramount. We demonstrate such critical
roles of the state mainly through our case studies of the semiconductor and mobile
communication industries in South Korea.
STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
This study includes eight chapters. The argument we have put forth so far is fleshed out
through subsequent chapters. In Chapter Two, we first review the basic concepts and
characteristics of standards and standardization activities, as well as the literature on the
relationships between standards and technological development. The review lays the
foundation for our subsequent discussion in the dissertation. We then propose the staged
model of late standardization and technological catch-up. In Chapter Three, we discuss the
emergence of late standardizers in international standardization arenas. We present the
empirical evidence that shows the participation of latecomer firms in technological
standardization. We base our discussion primarily on the cases of Korean late standardizers in
the semiconductor and mobile telecommunications industries. In Chapter Four, we discuss
how standards enable late standardizers to move from one stage to another. We focus on the
Learning and Linking apparatus that latecomers use as a strategic leverage to utilize their
limited internal resources and capabilities. Chapters Five and Six present the case studies of
late standardizers in the semiconductor and mobile telecommunications industries in South
Korea and Thailand. In Chapter Seven, we turn our attention to the role of the state in late
standardization process, particularly the co-evolution of standards institutions in late
standardization processes. Chapter Eight is the conclusion of the dissertation.

CHAPTER TWO
LATE STANDARDIZATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH-UP
OVERVIEW OF STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION *
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 0 CATCH-UP AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION .
A MODEL OF LATE STANDARDIZATION AND CATCH-UP 0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The process of late standardization and technological catch-up is evolutionary, in that it is
dynamic, path-dependent, and irrevocable. 7 We model a late standardizer as passing through a
set of discrete positions, stages, events, and activities. In our model, the positions are the
competitive positions through which a late standardizer progresses: latecomer, second-mover
and first-mover positions. These competitive positions also correspond to the levels of
technological development: latecomers are technology late adopters, second movers are fast
followers, and first movers are technology leaders. The stages refer to the moves from one
position to another. Late standardizers are modeled to pass through three stages, catch-up,
keep-up, and forge-ahead. Catch-up occurs when latecomers attempt to become fast followers
or second movers. Keep-up is when second movers aspire to close the gap from the world
technological frontier and to become first movers. Finally, forge-ahead is when first movers
maintain their leadership, not only in terms of competitiveness and technological innovation,
but also in terms of standards and standardization.
In an evolutionary model, "events" trigger stages, which are the transitions from one
position to another. In our model, events refer to the engagement in internal and external
standards activities. In each of the three stages, late standardizers engage in different types of
standards activities. With distinct sets of resources and capabilities, they participate in
different types of standards forums and have different organizational structures for standards
activities. Such activities include developing, adopting, maintaining, and adjusting standards.
This staged model serves as the foundation for our discussion in the following chapters on
how successful late standardizers move from one stage to another. The model also lays the
groundwork for our discussion in Chapter Seven as to how the roles of the state also change,
as late standardizers develop towards the world technological frontier.
We start our discussion by reviewing the basic concepts and characteristics of standards
and standardization. We then review two relevant strands of literature: one on the relationship
between standards and technological development and the other on technological catch-up
and late industrialization. We pay particular attention to the existing models of technological
catch-up in the context of innovation dynamics and technology life cycle. We then offer our
model of late standardization and technological catch-up, with a general description on
standards activities in which late standardizers engage during each stage of the late
standardization process. We will test the model with empirical evidence from the case studies
of late standardizers in the semiconductor and telecommunications industries in South Korea
and Thailand, discussed later in Chapters Five and Six.
OVERVIEW OF STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION
In this section, we give an overview of standards and standardization. We first review the
definitions and functions of standards, then the economic characteristics of standards.
DEFINITIONS OF STANDARDS
Standards-development organizations, as well as analysts who study standards, define
standards in many different ways. For instance, a standard is defined generally as an approved
specification of a limited set of solutions to actual or potential matching problems (Vries
1999). It has to benefit the party or parties involved, while balancing their needs, and is
intended to be used repeatedly or continuously by a number of parties for whom they are
meant. According to Vries (1999), matching problems are problems of interrelated entities
that do not harmonize with each other, while entities could be any concrete or abstract thing,
including associations among these things, e.g., persons, objects, events, ideas, processes, etc.
Standardization is thus the activity of establishing and recording standards.
A standard is defined more specifically as a specification or a set of specifications that
describes the functions and/or features of a product, process, service, interface, or material
(National Research Council 1995). The specifications may be technical or procedural. They
may relate to size, weight, shape, design, function, or performance. They may relate to the
way the product is labeled or packaged. Standards discussed in our study cover five different
dimensions: namely, (1) standardization process; (2) compliance; (3) sources of standards; (4)
elements for standardization; and (5) design or performance standards. We describe these
dimensions in detail in the following section.
(1) Standardization process: de jure or de facto
The first dimension is the nature of the standardization process. Two types of standards
are broadly classified as de facto and de jure standards (David and Greenstein 1990). De facto
standards may arise ex post in the competitive markets, as a result of the uncoordinated
interactions between firms. These standards are defined largely by consumers' preferences
across the range of products provided by manufacturers. A particular set of product or process
specifications is often considered a de facto standard when it obtains market share, such that it
acquires authority. De facto standards may develop without formal sponsorship, as in the case
of the QWERTY keyboard standard. They could also be developed by formal sponsorship, as
firms promote their products or processes to maximize their technological assets (David 1985).
The IBM-compatible personal computer system is a classic example for de facto standards
with sponsorship. More recent examples of de facto standards with sponsorship include
Microsoft's DOS operating system, Hewlett-Packard's Printer Control Language (PCL) for
laser printers, and Adobe's PostScript page description language for laser printers.8
De jure standards, on the other hand, are developed ex ante either by government agencies,
i.e., mandatory standards, or by standards organizations, i.e., voluntary industry standards.
Mandatory standards are guidelines, rules, and regulations that are promulgated and enforced
by government agencies. These include procurement standards for products supplied to
government agencies, and regulatory standards that set criteria for safety, health, and
environmental concerns. Voluntary industry standards, on the other hand, arise from
coordinated processes in which participants in the market negotiate and seek consensus on
product or process specifications. These standards are voluntary in that participants are not
required to adopt them once the standards have been developed.
There are broadly two types of forums in which voluntary standards are developed:
"formal" standards development organizations (SDOs), and "informal" standards
consortia/coalitions. The degree of "formality" refers to the degree of government
involvement in terms of recognition and enforcement (Krislov 1997). The most "informal"
standards are those developed and used on an ad hoc basis for one or a few transactions
among individuals. Then, there are prearranged standards used in contract exchanges. Less
informal standards include prevailing tacit standards and prevailing articulated standards
respectively. By this definition, standards that are developed by professional and expert
groups, as in the case of voluntary industry standards are "informal". These standards become
"formal" when they are recognized and/or enforced by the state. The most formal standards
are those developed and enforced directly by the state.
Formal standards development organizations (SDOs) include those at the national level,
such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), those at the regional level, such as
the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), and those at the global level, such as the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). De jure standards developed by SDOs
are usually the outcome of formal procedures based on the principles of openness, fairness,
and consensus. The ISO 9000 series of standards, for instance, was the outcome of a long
series of procedures and meetings among standards experts from different standards
organizations from many different countries. The benefit of such standards is that, once
developed, they may become the references for public procurements and the standard of
choice among the supporters. Many governments have used such standards as a basis for
national industrial policies. For instance, the Korean government has developed and enforced
quality standards for products to be exported to the world market. One objective is to improve
the image about Korean products among overseas consumers. We will discuss this issue in
detail in Chapter Seven on the roles of the state.
The second type of standards forums is "informal" consortia, which are groups of firms
that aim to create specifications on a particular topic or technology. In recent years, an
increasing number of standards have been developed by consortia. Some of these
"specifications clubs" were formed to oppose another technical effort, to initiate or complete
an offering, or to make tested profiles possible and available. Consortia increasingly become
the forums for standards development in industries with fast-changing technologies.
Compared with formal standards organizations, consortia generally issue standards at a faster
pace. Their standards often lead to specifications that reflect the market needs and usually
have at least one implementation. While these standards could eventually become industry
standards, they are developed outside formal SDOs and thus do not follow as strict rules and
procedures as formal de jure standards. (Cargill 2001)
Consortium standards are more likely to be implemented than standards developed by
formal SDOs, due to two main reasons (Cargill 2001). First, technical task forces and working
groups in consortia are more likely to proceed according to their mandated schedules.
Because consortia participants have a vested interest in producing standards, their level of
commitment to the successful development of standards is greater than those participating in
formal SDOs. The second advantage of consortia is their ability to set up and run tests for
implementation of their specifications. Because of the contractual arrangement with
participants, many consortia are able to compel their members to adopt and implement their
standards and specifications in preference to other standards. This means consortium
standards are more likely to be quickly adopted by the market than SDO standards.
(2) Compliance: mandatory or voluntary
Standards can also be defined in terms of compliance. As described earlier, de facto
standards are voluntary in that firms are not forced by regulations or laws to adopt them. The
same is true for voluntary industry standards developed by SDOs. However, standards could
become mandatory once they are enforced by governments and/or mandated by laws.
This taxonomy applies to both national and international levels. In the Agreement of
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a standard is
defined as a "document approved by a recognized body, which provides, for common and
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products and processes, with which
compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology,
symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or
production method." (TBT, Annex 1)
According to the TBT Agreement, technical regulations are distinguished from standards.
A technical regulation is defined as "document which lays down product characteristics or
their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative
provision, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product,
process or production method." (TBT, Annex 1) The main difference between standards and
technical regulations thus lies in the required degree of compliance.
(3) Sources: internal or external to firm; domestic, foreign, or international
From a firm's perspective, there are five main sources of standards. The first source is
within the firm itself. Firms may develop their own standards for internal uses, although this
is unlikely for most latecomer firms, which do not have advanced standards capabilities. The
second source of standards is other firms that have developed de facto standards. This source
could be domestic or foreign. The third source of standards is domestic standards
development organizations (SDOs) and other industry consortiums that may develop
standards for domestic uses. The fourth is international SDOs, such as the ISO and the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Last but not least, another main source of
standards is foreign SDOs, especially those in developed countries that are active in
generating standards, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Firms may
acquire standards through various modes, including direct purchase from domestic, foreign, or
international SDOs. They can also acquire standards through suppliers and/or buyers. (United
Nations 1964; Sharpston 1969; Vries 1999)
(4) Elements: product-element or non-product element
Standards can be categorized by the elements subject to standardization. Product standards
specify the characteristics of goods, including physical dimensions and specifications,
performance requirements, and compatibility with other components. Process standards refer
to the conditions and procedures under which products are made. These include conditions
related to products themselves, such as a chemical formulation or rules of production for
wines within certain regions. They may even include broader conditions that are not directly
related to the final products, such as working conditions. Labeling requirements may also be
considered standards, as they require that producers provide consumers with the information
on product characteristics and/or production conditions (Stephenson 1997).
(5) Design or performance
Standards can be specified in terms of design specifications as in design standards or
performance levels as in performance standards. Design standards specify exactly what
elements or dimensions need to be followed. Performance standards, on the other hand,
specify what the levels a product or element has to perform. Design standards are also more
restrictive and may inhibit innovation to a greater extent than performance standards (e.g.,
National Research Council 1995; e.g., Tassey 2000). With performance standards, firms still
have the flexibility in designing products or services, leading to innovative solutions to
production problems. 9
FUNCTIONS OF STANDARDS
Standards have important implications for firms in at least six important ways (National
Research Council 1995). First, standards facilitate economic transactions. As standards are
specifications that define the functions and/or features of a product or process, buyers and
sellers can communicate consistently about the basic elements of the product or process in
question. Standards thus play a fundamental role in conveying technical information about
certain products and processes, reducing the transaction costs for the buyer and seller. In other
words, standards serve as institutions that form the basis for economic transactions.
Second, standards play a critical role in defining the interfaces between products that are
used together. In other words, standards ensure compatibility between various products and/or
product components in a system. Recent technological innovation and diffusion in computer,
telecommunications, and consumer electronics have further raised the importance of
compatibility standards. They allow producers and users to benefit from network externalities
arising from the interconnected systems of hardware and software (Katz and Shapiro 1986).
The third and fourth functions of standards concern production processes and management.
Manufactures can improve production efficiency and benefit from additional economies of
scale in production by standardizing parts, components, and production processes. They can
improve their process management by adopting process standards, such as ISO 9000 series
and Total Quality Management (TQM). These standards help manufacturers improve
production processes by setting up and maintaining a quality assurance management system.
Standardization is indeed the basis for quality control of raw materials, of production
processes, and of final products.
Fifth, from the consumer's standpoint, standards increase the efficiency of product
selection, as products that conform to the same standards can be easily compared. This
effectively increases the competition among producers. However, there is a potential for
excessive standardization, in which consumers have limited range of products to choose from.
Sixth, many standards serve as a mechanism for enhancing social welfare, such as
protection of health, safety, and the environment. These types of regulatory standards or
technical regulations are usually administered by government agencies at various levels.
Finally, standards help reduce the variety of a generic product and/or technology to increase
the economies of scale. We will discuss this function of standards in detail when reviewing
the relationship between standards and technological development.
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STANDARDS
In order to understand how standards affect latecomers' technological development and
catch-up, we first need to understand their basic economic characteristics. There are two
properties of standards that are particularly relevant to this study: (1) public-goods properties
and (2) network externalities.
Standards as public, private, or club goods
Standards can be analyzed in terms of public goods. Standards of measurement, such as
linear, weight, bulk, temperature, and time, are public goods. Once they are created, anyone
can use them, but the use does not reduce the amount available to others. In other words,
standards of measurement are non-excludable and non-rival (Kindleberger 1983).
Although standards generally have some public-goods content, not all standards are purely
public goods. Some standards are used within firms and organizations, while some are
privately developed and used by manufacturers of industrial goods. The latter of these types
of standards are private goods rather than public goods. In many instances, standards are
developed by private entities but then become more widely used by the public. One example
is the Kanban system, a signaling system developed by Toyota, the Japanese automobile
maker, as a means to manage the Just-In-Time (JIT) production system (Sugimori et al. 1977).
If the property rights for standards could be defined, the rents generated by standards
could be privately appropriated. Some standards are collectively developed by a number of
firms, who may or may not license to other firms the proprietary technologies included in the
standards. This makes the standards more like club goods, in that they are jointly produced,
consumed, and benefited by a group of entities (Casella 2001). In this case, the goods are
excludable, but not rival. Characteristics of club goods depend on preferences, endowments,
and technological possibilities and constraints. This means standards could differ across
locations and change over time.
Most standards rely on non-product technology elements, such as interface protocols,
measurement and test methodologies, reference materials, and technical databases. These
technological elements are generally more difficult and expensive for individual firms to
make proprietary. The state thus assumes the role in providing the so-called infratechnologies
that serve as the basis for standards. (Tassey 2000)
Network characteristics of standards
Another characteristic of standards is its potential to increase network externalities, also
known as network effects or bandwagon effects. Direct network effects are formally defined
as the marginal change in the utility of a product for a consumer as the number of consumers
increase (Katz and Shapiro 1986). Network effects are external demand-side scale economies,
in which each consumer enjoys more benefits as more people consume the same products that
are connected. 10 A classic example is fax machines. As more people use fax machines, every
fax machine becomes more valuable as the user has greater use for it.
In addition to direct networks effects of the connected products, consumers may also
benefit from indirect network effects, or complementary bandwagon effects, due to the supply
of complementary products from independent vendors. For instance, a consumer can benefit
more from a product, such as hardware, when there are more complementary products, such
as software, supplied in the market (Rohlfs 2001). These network externalities induced by
standards have important implications for manufacturers.
Standards, particularly those for compatibility and interoperability, generally increase the
network effects of the components, elements, or products that are used together. Depending
on the type of a standard, it could increase either the direct or indirect network effects, or both.
Standards thus have important implications for firms at least in two ways. First, standards
could create pools of labor with user skills, which may reinforce the tendency to stick with
certain standards. Second, standards could increase switching costs on the part of the users, as
they accumulate standards-specific assets, such as equipment, software, and skills. Because of
the high switching costs, standards could potentially create lock-in situations. The network
effects of standards lead many firms to adopt business strategies that aim to capture a large
market share before their competitors. (Shapiro and Varian 1999; Rohlfs 2001)
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The relationships between standards and technological development have been examined
from mainly three approaches. The first approach is within the framework of neo-classical
economics, examining the production and consumption of standards. Some analysts focus on
the producer side, studying the strategic interactions between firms regarding standardization
strategies for products in network industries (e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1985; Katz and Shapiro
1986). Other analysts focus on the user side, paying attention to the costs and benefits of
variety reduction due to standardization (e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1986).
Analysts using the second approach focus on the institutional and organizational aspects
of standards and standardization activities (e.g., Schmidt and Werle 1998). This approach
includes a number of case studies of standardization organizations that are analyzed within the
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) framework (Bijker et al. 1987; Bijker 1995). The
institutional aspects have also been evaluated by an increasing number of case studies of
standardization organizations (e.g., Schmidt and Werle 1998; Loya and Boli 1999; Werle
2001). A few of these studies deal with governance and political issues of international
standardization (Krasner 1991; e.g., Mattli 2001; Mattli and Buthe 2003; Drezner 2004).
Analysts using the third approach work within the framework of evolutionary economics.
From this perspective, standards and technological innovation have a symbiotic relationship
with each other, co-evolving at both firm and industry levels (e.g., Metcalfe and Miles 1994).
In many respects, this is the theoretical paradigm that governs our research. As mentioned
earlier, the aim of our research is to describe and explain the process of late-standardization
and technological catch-up of latecomers. The evolutionary framework is thus appropriate for
us to adopt in examining the process of late standardization and technological catch-up.
According to Witt (2002), an evolutionary theory has to possess three properties. It has to
be: (i) dynamic, such that the dynamics of the processes can be represented; (ii) historical, in
that it deals with historical processes that are irrevocable and path-dependent; and (iii) self-
transformation explaining, in that it includes hypotheses relating to the source and driving
force of the self-transformation of the system.
By definition, technological catch-up processes are dynamic and historical. Although the
terms irrevocability and path-dependency are subject to interpretation, we assume that, even
though certain patterns may recur in the historical process, the process does not repeat itself
identically and, therefore, it is "irrevocable" (Witt 2002). Although innovation often leads to
the development of standards, standards themselves affect the way in which technology
evolves. Standards serve as a coordinating mechanism for technological development. Effects
of standards on technological change occur through three main channels, namely (1) variety
reduction, (2) codification of knowledge, and (3) compatibility/ interoperability (David and
Greenstein 1990; Antonelli 1994; Blind 2004). We discuss these channels in turn.
(1) VARIETY REDUCTION
The first channel through which standards may affect technological change is its variety-
reduction mechanism at the levels of the firm, the industry, and the entire economy. In the
process of standards development, variations of products and technologies are selected and
reduced to certain numbers that are deemed appropriate for standardization. When standards
set the specifications of a product, regarding its design, quality, or interface, any attempt to
produce alternative designs is likely to incur additional costs and time (Blind 2004). This
could affect the rate of technological change, for which the existence of variety is a
prerequisite. Standardization normally occurs when the technology is still immature. Variety
reduction at the early stage may negatively affect technological change by reducing possible
product variations that could become the basis for further product development.
Yet, standards produce positive effects on technological change to counterbalance the
negative ones. This relationship between standards and technological change can be
understood in an evolutionary framework, within which the tension between uniformity and
variety occurs in the process of technical change and development (Metcalfe and Miles 1994).
From an evolutionary perspective, technological progress does not occur in a random, non-
cumulative manner, but happens within the paths and directions found to be productive.
Standards help achieve this by reducing the complexity in combining knowledge for
generating new innovations. They thus contribute to technological development by channeling
technological efforts towards the fruitful directions. Standards also increase potential for the
selected products or technologies to gain economies of scale, which further leads to reduced
costs and prices and large customer bases. They allow firms to focus their research and
development (R&D) on a smaller number of product and technical options. This reduces the
risks inherent in R&D efforts and fosters technological progress. (Metcalfe and Miles 1994)
(2) CODIFICATION AND TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE
Standards may affect the rate in which technological variety is produced within a
technological paradigm or a dominant design (Antonelli 1994). The imposition of uniformity
in the form of standards permits the efficient replication and diffusion of technological
knowledge. Because standards function as carriers of information about products and
processes, they play an important role in the process of technological diffusion. When an
innovation developed by a firm or a group of firms becomes an industry standard, other firms
can benefit by adopting that standard without having to explore all possible options from
scratch or reinventing technologies already developed elsewhere. Standardization makes it
possible for firms without advanced technologies, generally those in developing economies, to
enter the market by imitating standardized products (Stephenson 1997).
The process of technological diffusion through standards can also be analyzed in terms of
knowledge spillover. Standardization processes are, in effect, the processes of codifying some
of the tacit and uncodified knowledge embodied in products and processes. Especially in the
case of de jure standardization, firms and individuals that participate in the process have to
cooperate and share some of their proprietary information and knowledge. Standards thus
convert tacit, localized, and proprietary knowledge into generic, explicit technological and
organizational knowledge that other firms can utilize (Antonelli 1994).
COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY
Compatibility standards can also affect technological change significantly. Analysts have
shown how compatibility standards affect the rate of technological progress and/or the time
when products are introduced to the market. For instance, Katz and Shapiro (1992) model a
situation in which one of the two competing products has been introduced, and the second
firm has to decide on the timing of product introduction and its compatibility with the existing
product. They show that the second firm is generally biased against compatibility, as its
expected utility is to be greater when the two products are not compatible. Regibeau and
Rockett (1996) analyze this issue in a different setting, in which neither of the two
competitors has introduced a product. They find that compatibility accelerates the timing of
introducing the first product, but further delays the introduction of the second product.
In sum, as standards define both the general concept of technology systems and the design
configurations, they affect both the generation and the limitation of innovation and
technological diffusion. By reducing technological uncertainty, standards guide the pattern of
technological change in fruitful directions, while permitting variations therein. Standards may
also affect the timing of product introduction, which, in turn, determines the rate of innovation.
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
Although there is substantial theoretical literature on the relationships between standards
and technological development, the empirical literature is much smaller. Most empirical
studies examine certain standards in certain products and/or industries. Examples include
standards for spreadsheet software (e.g., Swann and Shurmer 1994), for mobile
telecommunications (e.g., Schmidt and Werle 1998; e.g., Pelkmans 2001), for the
broadcasting industry (e.g., Besen and Johnson 1986), among many others." However, most
studies focus on standards development processes and the selection of technologies for
standards. We know little empirically how standards affect technological change in the long
run and how standards affect the production techniques and methods at the firm level.
TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH-UP AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of our study is on the dynamics of late
standardization process in the context of technological catch-up. The most relevant literature
that serves as the foundation for our study is one on technological catch-up and late
industrialization. In this section, we first briefly review the literature on technological catch-
up, as summarized in Table 2.2. We then review three specific models that we use as the
starting point for our model of late standardization.
TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH-UP AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION
There is now substantial literature on technological catch-up and late industrialization.
This includes the pioneer contributions of Veblen (1915) and Gerschenkron (1962), who
focus on the European catch-up prior to the First World War. Their analyses shed light on the
roles of policy and institutions in Germany and other continental European countries in
catching up with Britain. One main argument of this version of the catch-up hypothesis is that
the more backward a country is in technological development, the faster it is likely to catch up
with the forerunners. The explanation for this hypothesis is related to the technology
embodied in a country's capital stock. Latecomers may be able to gain higher productivity
growth than forerunners, as their new capital stocks embodied new technologies and
knowledge. According to Gerschenkron, a successful catch-up requires that the latecomer
target progressive and dynamic industries and invest in the most modem equipment and
facilities. A critical element of the catch-up process is a set of institutional instruments that
would mobilize resources to undertake the necessarily large investment at the plant level.
Another subset of catch-up authors, which we classify under the development-state
approach, focus on the post-Second World War cases of late industrialization, such as Japan
(e.g., Johnson 1982), Korea (e.g., Amsden 1989), and Taiwan (e.g., Wade 1990). Similar to
Gerschenkron's argument, these authors stress the role of latecomer governments in targeting
progressive, dynamic industries that require large investments. Through pro-active fiscal,
industrial and trade policies, latecomer states pursued the development of targeted industries.
Although these analysts focus on the roles of developmental states in successful late
industrialization, they highlight different aspects of the catch-up processes. While Amsden
(1989; 2001) stresses the roles of large business groups in latecomers' technological catch-up
efforts, Wade (1990) pays less attention to technology but more to the disciplinary roles of
the state in governing the market. One distinction between this set of authors and
Veblen/Gerschenkron is that they stress the crucial role of export markets in the catch-up
effort of East Asian late industrializers.
The third set of authors on catch-up is led by the work of Abramovitz (1986) who
conducts a macro-level analysis to examine long-run, cross-country data on economic growth
and the factors that affect catch-up and convergence. According to Abramovitz, the catch-up
processes depend on two groups of factors: technological congruence and social capability.
Technological congruence refers to the factors, such as market and resource constraints, that
prevent a country from effectively utilizing certain technologies, while others are able to, with
equal access to the same technologies. Social capability refers to general features of national
systems that latecomers need to develop, including educational, infrastructure, financial, and
political systems.
Another contribution to the literature on technological catch-up is that of Perez and Soete
(1988). Their main argument is that during the early stages of techno-economic paradigms,
entry barriers are relatively low and knowledge is more publicly available for latecomers to
utilize. The shifting paradigms thus create windows of opportunity for latecomer countries to
enter the new technological systems and eventually the new markets. For latecomers to
capture the windows of opportunity, they need to have the requisite technological capability,
which includes the ability to predict technological trajectories and the ability to identify their
competitive advantages vis-a-vis the forerunners and other latecomers. One criticism of this
argument, however, is that it remains unclear as to how latecomers can actually capture the
opportunity. In Table 2.1, we summarize the different sets of authors and the main factors
distinguishing their studies.
Table 2.1: Comparison of Studies on Technological Catch-Up
Studies Methodological Main Focus Main hypotheses regarding Industries in Technological Central concepts
approach catch-up which catch-up Conditions
takes place
Abramovitz Aggregate Internal Inverse relation between Overall Technological
(1986) approach conditions initial levels of economic economy congruence and
(comparison development and its (labor social capability
across a large growth rates across productivity, constitute potential
group of countries income level) for catching up
countries)
Gerchenkron Disaggregate Internal Latecomers could catch up Heavy Technological Roles of institutions
(1962) approach conditions with forerunners by industries trends moving in mobilizing
(individual or a undertaking more capital- towards resources
small group of intensive investment increasing
latecomers) capital
intensity
Perez & Disaggregate External Technological General Systemization Latecomers gain
Soete (1988) conditions development is a of advantages when
cumulative and continuous technologies technological
process within a techno- paradigms change,
economic paradigm, but a and are able to
discontinuous process catch up and forge
across paradigms. Catch- ahead of
up can occur during the forerunners.
shifts of paradigms
Amsden Disaggregate Internal The later a country Heavy Shorter Roles of the
(2001) conditions industrializes, the more industries, product life developmental state
dominant foreign textiles, cycle and large business
ownership electronics groups in catch-up
This study Disaggregate Standards Latecomers could catch-up Information Technological Stage model of late
with, keep up with, and technology trends moving standardization
finally forge ahead of, (semiconductor towards
forerunners only by and telecom) increasing
undertaking network
standardization efforts intensity
Although these analysts have contributed greatly to the understanding of the catch-up
processes, none of them have analyzed an important aspect of industrialization, i.e.,
standardization. From their analyses, a reader can learn little about how latecomers deal with
different types and levels of technical standards and related activities, how technical standards
affect their technological development and competitiveness, and how some of them have
managed to move beyond being standards followers to becoming standards leaders at the
world technological frontier. These issues have yet to be assessed systematically using
primary empirical research.
MODELS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CATCH-UP
Many existing models of technological catch-up are staged models. The assumption
underlying a staged model is that there is a series of discrete stages over time, each of which
constitutes different activities, capabilities, competitive positions, organizational structures,
and so on. While firms in reality are diverse and evolve along different paths, staged models
allow us to understand conceptually the evolutionary process over time. The criteria for
dividing a staged model could be developed from the existing models in the literature, or by
observing the actual cases.
The proposed model of late standardization and technological catch-up is also a staged
model. It combines elements from three existing models of technological development and
catch-up: that is, (1) Abernathy and Utterback (1978)'s dynamic model of innovation; (2)
Linsu Kim (1980; 1997)'s staged model of technological development; and (3) Lee, Bae, and
Choi (1988)'s model of technological development processes. Figure 2.1 summarizes the
relationship between the dynamics of innovation and technological catch-up by latecomer



























Lee. Bae. and Choi (1988)
Time
Abernathy-Utterback's dynamic model of innovation
Our starting point is the innovation dynamics model by Abernathy and Utterback. They
hypothesize that the rate of major innovation for both products and processes follows a general
pattern over time. As Figure 2.1A indicates, the rate of product innovation in an industry or a
product class is the greatest during its early period. During this so-called "Fluid Phase,"
experimentation with product design and operational characteristics results in a large number of
product innovations. Firms give much less attention to the processes by which products are made.
The period of fluidity is generally followed by the "Transitional Phase" in which the rate of
product innovation decreases while the rate of process innovation increases. During this period,
product variety is replaced by designs that have become de facto standards of the industry as
dictated by the market, or designs that have been dictated by accepted industry protocols or
regulations. As the "dominant designs" are settled, producers are able to manufacture their
products more quickly. More attention is given to process innovation.
Finally, the industry or product class enters the "Specific Phase." The rates of innovation for
both products and processes decrease. Firms shift their focus onto cost, volume, and capacity,
rather than on product and process innovation. In our case studies, the semiconductor industry
has arguably passed its Fluid and early Transitional Phases. As semiconductors are now being
commoditized, the industry is arguably approaching the Specific Phase of the Abernathy-
Utterback model. The mobile telecommunications industry, on the other hand, is probably in the
Transitional Phase. Table 2.2 summarizes the main characteristics in the three phases of
innovation dynamics.
Table 2.2: Main Characteristics in the Three Phases of Innovation Dynamics
Fluid Phase Transition Phase Specific Phase
Innovation Frequent major product changes Frequent major process changes Incremental for products and with
induced by rising demand cumulative improvements in
productivity and quality
Source of Industry pioneers; product users Manufacturers; users Often suppliers
innovation
Products Diverse, customized designs Stable, dominant designs with Mostly undifferentiated, standard
significant production volume products
Production Flexible and inefficient, major Becoming more rigid, with Efficient, capital intensive, and
processes changes easily accommodated changes occurring in major steps rigid
R&D Focus unspecified because of great Focus on specific product features Focus on incremental product
technical uncertainty once dominant design emerges technologies; emphasis on process
technologies
Equipment General purpose, requiring skilled Some sub-processes automated Special purpose, mostly automatic,
labor with labor focused on tending and
monitoring equipment
Plant Small-scale, locating near users or General-purpose with specialized Large-scale, highly specific to
sources of innovation sections particular products
Cost of process Low Moderate High
change
Competitors Few, but growing in numbers with Many, but declining in numbers Few, classic oligopoly with stable
fluctuating market shares after emergence of dominant market shares
design
Basis of Functional product performance Product variation; fitness for use Price
competition
Organizational Informal and entrepreneurial Through projects and task groups Structure, rules, and goals
control
Vulnerabilities of To imitators, patent challenges, To more efficient and higher- To technological innovations that
industry leaders and successful product quality producers present superior product
breakthroughs substitutes
Source: Utterback (1994)
Linsu Kim's and Lee, Bae and Choi's models of technological development
In Linsu Kim's model of technological development, latecomer firms develop
technologically through three distinct stages, namely, (1) acquisition and implementation (2)
assimilation, and (3) improvement of imported foreign technology. During the first stage,
latecomer firms import relatively mature technologies from technological leaders in
industrialized countries. By implementing these technologies, they accumulate knowledge and
know-how in product design and production operation. These experiences provide the basis for
the second stage of technological development in which latecomers gradually improve
indigenous capability to assimilate imported technologies. Finally, latecomers enter the third
stage when they slowly but surely improve foreign technologies for new products and production
processes. Driven by increased competition in domestic and international markets, latecomers
upgrade their indigenous technological capability through efforts to assimilate foreign
technologies by focusing more on R&D. Linsu Kim has shown that this staged pattern is evident
not only in the history of manufacturing industries in Korea but also in other countries.
Lee, Bae, and Choi extend this model by relating it to the Abernathy-Utterback model of
dynamics of innovation. The main idea of the extended model is that latecomers start their catch-
up process by first adopting and assimilating mature technologies developed by technological
leaders. This corresponds to the Specific Stage in the Abernathy-Utterback model in which the
rate of product innovation is already low and product designs have matured. Competition at this
stage is based on incremental-process innovation rather than product innovation. As latecomers
accumulate their technological capability, they are able to compete against the leaders with
production-related technologies that are indigenously improved and developed. Once latecomers
reach the advanced stage, they are able to generate their own product innovations and design
concepts. At this stage, latecomers have caught up with the existing leaders, and compete against
them in new technological fields in the Fluid Phase of the Abernathy-Utterback model.
A MODEL OF LATE STANDARDIZATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CATCH-UP
Combining the key elements from the three models above, we propose a model of late
standardization and technological catch-up. In building the model, we consider several factors
related to standards and standardization, including (1) standards capability at the
firm/industry/national levels, (2) participation in standards forums, (3) internal organizational
structure for standards activities; (4) competitive positions and environment, and (5) roles of the
state. Based on the empirical analysis of latecomer firms in South Korea and Thailand, we divide
the process of late standardization and technological catch-up into three stages, according to its
relationship with the dynamics and technological catch-up process of latecomer firms and their
competitive positions.
We categorize firms into three groups, according to the level of technological development.
The first group is late adopters or latecomers, which are firms that operate mostly within the
domain of the Specific Phase in the Abernathy-Utterback model. The second is fast followers,
that is, firms in the Transition Phase. The third group is forerunners or technology leaders that
operate mainly in the Fluid Phase of the innovation dynamics model.
We can also think of these three groups of firms in terms of competitive positions and order
of market entry. Forerunners are first movers, while fast followers are second movers or late
movers. Latecomers are not just late movers but also face additional difficulties in terms of
market access and availability of specialized skills and other production factors. Although
forerunner or first-mover firms may have products and services with various degrees of
technological maturity, the main difference between them and fast followers, not to mention
latecomers, is that they have strategic options and capabilities to choose which products at what
levels of technological maturity to focus on.
In the process of late standardization and technological catch-up, successful late
standardizers progress through the three distinct stages before they reach the point where they
become a standards leader at the technological frontier. They progress initially from the
latecomer position where they are constrained in terms of resources, capabilities, and market
access, finally to the first-mover position where they exploit their technology and other
proprietary assets. Put differently, they move from the situation in which their market entry is
late by necessity to the situation in which they can choose either to be an early- or a late mover.
The three stages of late standardization are: (1) catch-up, (2) keep-up, and (3) forge-ahead.
The first stage of catch-up occurs when late standardizers attempt to overcome latecomers'
unique constraints, such that they become fast followers or second movers. As they become fast
followers, late standardizers establish themselves as key players in mature product markets. The
second stage of keep-up refers to the process in which second movers attempt to become first
movers. They aspire to close the gap from the technological frontier. Finally, the forge-ahead
stage is when first movers maintain their leadership, not only in terms of market share and
technological capability, but also in terms of standards capability.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the process of late standardization corresponds to Abernathy-
Utterback's innovation dynamics (Figure 2.2A) and Linsu Kim's and Lee et al.'s models of
technological catch-up processes (Figure 2.2C). The proposed model of late standardization
(Figure 2.2B) shows that latecomer firms progress through three distinct stages of late
standardization. They start from the first stage of catch-up, then move onto the second stage of
keep-up, and onto the third stage of forge-ahead. The three stages apply not only to latecomer
firms but include institutions and governments in latecomer countries. At this level of focus, the
unit of analysis could be a country, an industry, or a firm.
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Standards Capability .3) Forge-Ahead..................................................
During different stages of late standardization and technological catch-up, late standardizers
not only occupy different competitive positions in the market, but also engage in different types
of standards activities. They possess distinct sets of standards resources and capabilities,
participate in different standards forums, and have different organizational structures related to
standards. The roles of the state are distinct in different stages. In Table 2.3, we summarize the
relationships between each of the three stages of late standardization and the corresponding
standards activities, capabilities, and organizational structures. In the following section, we


















































































































































CATCH-UP: FROM LATECOMERS TO FAST FOLLOWERS
At the beginning of their technological effort during the catch-up stage, latecomers are
faced with limited resources and capabilities. Compared to first- and second movers from
advanced economies, they have to overcome additional barriers, including limited knowledge
about lead-user markets and limited access to specialized inputs.
During the late-standardization process, firms may engage in five broad kinds of standards
activities: namely, (1) identifying the needs for standards to solve "matching problems" (Vries
1999); (2) searching, selecting, and acquiring standards appropriate to their needs within or
beyond the firm; (3) implementing and assimilating acquired standards into the production
process and enforcing the use of standards such that the adopted standards are rigorously
adhered to; (4) adjusting the standards according to local conditions or modifying them in
response to changing economic conditions, and (5) developing and diffusing new standards.
The main activities for latecomer firms during the catch-up period are generally from the
first to the fourth step. 12 The phase of standards adjustment in the late standardization model
is similar to the stage of technological improvement in Kim (1980)'s model. However, while
technological-improvement efforts lead to changes in the content of imported technologies,
standards-adjustment efforts affect only the ways in which standards are implemented within
firms, but not the content of the actual standards adopted in the market. As latecomer firms
develop more sophisticated technological and standards capabilities, they become more
engaged in external standards development.
During the catching-up stage, latecomer firms acquire and adopt existing standards mostly
developed by technological and standards leaders. They go through three major phases:
namely, (1) acquisition and implementation, (2) diffusion and maintenance, and (3)
adjustment and improvement. In the process of standards acquisition, latecomer firms first
identify the need for standards, then search for available standards either within or beyond the
firm. After implementing the standards, latecomer firms then engage in diffusing the
standards and maintaining them within the firm, such that the adopted standards are
rigorously followed. Latecomer firms may have to adjust the adopted standards according to
their capabilities and constraints. As in anything, some latecomers are more active than others;
passive adopters just adopt whatever standards are available and can be easily acquired.
Active adopters, on other hand, spend more effort and time in searching and acquiring
appropriate standards and may put some effort into adjusting them for their products and/or
production processes.
The three steps of standards acquisition, maintenance, and adjustment may appear similar
to the staged models of technological catch-up proposed by Kim (1980) and Lee et al. (1988).
However, as in the proposed model of late standardization, technological improvement in the
catch-up process eventually reaches the technological limits imposed by the existing standards
(catch-up limit in Figure 2.2C). Latecomers may develop technologically by acquiring,
assimilating, and improving foreign technologies, and their technological capability may
increase. But the extent of their technological development is still within the limits of
standards capability. In other words, technological development is limited by the extent of the
standards.1 3 As forerunners continue to push the limits of technological frontiers, they keep
generating new standards to sustain their leadership. However much latecomers improve their
technological capabilities, the extent of development is always within the limits imposed by
whatever standards they adopt. Accordingly, without increasing their standards capabilities
and engaging in standardization activities, latecomers can never move beyond catch-up.
During the catch-up stage, latecomers focus their efforts on internal standards activities,
rather than external ones. Quality control and management standards are the main focus of
latecomers' standards activities during this stage. In fact, as we show later in Chapter Four,
quality control and management standards are the main mechanism that enables latecomers to
move from the catch-up stage to the keep-up stage. This is because latecomers' competitive
advantage relies greatly not only on low-cost factor inputs, but on quality and reliability of
products. Good-quality products and reliable delivery would allow latecomers to become part
of global supply chains, in which firms from advanced economies dominate. Similarly, during
the catch-up stage, governments may also use quality standards as a means to improve and
maintain the quality of the products that they export to the world market.
Although in reality firms are situated along the wide spectrum of capability levels, it is
necessary for analytical purposes to categorize them according to the firms' standards
capability. Among latecomer firms in the catch-up stage, some could be categorized as
passive adopters of standards. The specifications, practices, and products that these firms
adopt as standards are not from internal development efforts, but mostly imitated from
external sources (Refer to Figure 4.2: sources of standards). The factor that distinguishes
latecomer firms in this group from one another is their operational capability, i.e., the ability
to implement and comply with the acquired standards effectively and efficiently. Firms with
greater operational capability generally show better performance than those with less
particularly in terms of standards implementation and assimilation.
KEEP-UP: FROM FAST FOLLOWERS TO TECHNOLOGY LEADERS
The second stage of the late standardization process is that of keep-up. Latecomers that
have achieved this stage of technological catch-up are, by definition, no longer "latecomers."
By now, they are fast followers, or second movers, and have overcome some of the barriers
that latecomers normally face.
Broadly speaking, fast followers undertake standards activities that are similar to those in
the catch-up stage. They search and acquire existing standards from external sources. Then,
they implement and assimilate the standards into their products and processes. As their
standards capability improves, they adjust and modify the standards to better fit their unique
technical and business conditions. In addition, fast followers start to engage in more
sophisticated standards activities, including external standards activities that involve
participation in standardization forums.
First and foremost, the main difference between latecomers and fast followers lies in the
standards-acquisition process. While latecomers in the catch-up stage are less active about
standards acquisition, fast followers participate directly in standards development activities at
the international level. By directly participating in technological-standardization activities,
latecomers move beyond the first stage to the second stage of late standardization.
Participation in international standardization is thus the event that triggers a stage transition,
which is a condition required for an evolutionary model. Even though fast followers'
standards capabilities are not strong enough to influence the directions and outcome of the
standardization efforts, they can keep up with technological changes by learning about
standards and the associated technologies before latecomers that are outside the
standardization clubs. By participating in standards forums, fast followers acquire knowledge
not only about new technologies but also other important information, such as access-to-
market and legislative and regulatory development that may affect technological trajectories
in their industries.14
We will discuss this important learning effect of standards in detail in the following
chapter. For the time being, suffice it to say that fast followers in the keep-up stage could reap
second-mover advantages and the resulting above-normal profits when the forerunners start
the production of relatively mature products overseas. 15 But the ability to reap the rapidly
declining profit margins depends greatly on two important sets of skills and capabilities
(Amsden and Chu 2003). One is project and production capabilities that allow them to deliver
the products quickly to the market at the lowest cost. The other is the ability to acquire
technological knowledge about new products even before they mature, so that once the
products reach maturity they can be commercially produced quickly. While latecomers may
tap into advanced technological knowledge through various means, such as technical
communities (Saxenian and Hsu 2001) and overseas research labs and "listening posts"
(Amsden and Chu 2003), standardization forums and communities may indeed be one of the
most important. The participation in standardization efforts is thus an important factor that
enables latecomer firms to become second movers in high-tech industries that are approaching
their mature stages. In the model of late standardization, this is the main criterion that
distinguishes latecomers in the catch-up stage from fast followers in the keep-up stage.
In the Abernathy- Utterback model, the change from the Fluid Phase to the Transitional
Phase is characterized by the emergence of a dominant design, which propels further
standardization of related components and products (Figure 2.2). While standardization
efforts may start before the dominant design emerges, the standardization of other technical
features of the dominant design may continue for quite some time. By participating in
standardization efforts even in the later stages of the technology life cycles, fast followers are
still able to acquire new technical knowledge, which helps to increase their standards and
technological capabilities beyond the catch-up stage.
FORGE-AHEAD: FROM TECHNOLOGY LEADERS TO STANDARDS LEADERS
Late standardizers move from being fast followers to first movers when they are
technological leaders. But being technological leaders does not guarantee their status as
standards leaders. Late standardizers enter the forge-ahead stage of late standardization and
technological catch-up when the standards that they develop or co-develop are adopted by
other firms. The main strategic concern that late standardizers have in this stage involves
strategic standardization management that regards standards activities as part of the core
corporate strategy.
Similar to latecomer firms in other stages, late standardizers in the forge-ahead stage are
also engaged in three broad types of standards activities: that is, standards acquisition,
maintenance, and adjustment. Yet, the modes and sources for standards acquisition are likely
to be different. What makes late standardizers at this stage different from those in earlier
stages is their focus on standards development, both internally and externally. Participation in
standards development at the technological frontier becomes the main activity for its overall
standards efforts. In fact, standards become a core strategic issue for late standardizers in this
stage. Once late standardizers have reached the forge-ahead stage of late standardization, they
are already technology and standards leaders. Not only do these firms actively participate in
standards development, but they also strive to influence the directions and outcome of
standardization efforts. They may also co-found standards consortia with existing standards
leaders in new technological fields to capture the leadership positions. 16
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our model of late standardization and technological catch-up consists of three stages:
catch-up, keep-up, and forge-ahead. Catch-up refers to the stage in which latecomers attempt
to become second movers or fast followers in terms of technological and standards
development. Keep-up is the stage in which fast followers engage in various technological
and standards activities to keep up the technological change brought about by the
technological and standards leaders. Forge-ahead is the stage in which first movers sustain
their competitive advantage not only through technological leadership but also standards
leadership. In the following chapters, we will show empirical evidence on different aspects of
late standardization to support the proposed model of late standardization, including
participation in external standardization activities, adjustment of organizational structure for
standards activities, and the roles of the state in late standardization.
CHAPTER THREE
THE ASCENT OF LATE STANDARDIZERS
CONTINUOUS DOMINANCE OF FORERUNNERS * EMERGENCE OF LATE STANDARDIZERS .
LATE STANDARDIZERS AS STANDARDS LEADERS * LATE STANDARDIZERS IN SEMICONDUCTOR .
LATE STANDARDIZERS IN MOBILE TELECOM E CONCLUDING REMARKS
A small, yet increasing, number of latecomers have emerged as standards leaders at the global
level. This is a significant phenomenon, considering that these latecomers were just
manufacturers of low-technology products not very long ago. Their active participation in
international standardization is an important indicator of their improvement in efforts and
capabilities in late standardization and technological catch-up. As latecomers develop their
technological capabilities, they become more involved in international standardization
activities, especially in "informal" standards consortia and alliances. Through participation in
standards forums, latecomers create the leverage for their technological upgrading and market
penetration in the world market. Some latecomers are active and fast followers, who learn
about emerging technologies through standardization activities. Others provide technical input
that becomes part of new standards. A few of them have even become standards leaders, as
they influence the direction of standardization to reflect their strategic interests.
In this chapter, we discuss latecomers' recent emergence in the international
standardization arena. Our discussion first focuses on the general pattern of participation of
latecomer firms in formal standards development organizations (SDOs). Then, we turn our
attention to the participation in standards consortia, where an increasing number of standards
for new technologies are developed. Our focus then shifts to the emergence of late
standardizers in the semiconductor and telecommunications industries respectively. The
discussion in this chapter lays the groundwork for the following chapter where we use the
case studies of leading Korean firms to illustrate how latecomers' engagement in international
standardization serves as a mechanism for them to move beyond catch-up to become
technological and standards leaders at the world technological frontier.
CONTINUOUS DOMINANCE OF FORERUNNERS
As with the case of technological capabilities, standards capabilities vary across firms and
countries. A general observation is that firms and governments from industrialized countries
have more sophisticated standards capabilities than those from developing economies. As
shown in Table 3.1, developed economies have produced far more standards than latecomer
countries. The United States alone has almost 100,000 standards in stock, as of 1997. The
number is likely to be much greater in recent years, due to the increasing need for
compatibility and interoperability standards in the ICT industry. Former socialist countries,
such as Russia and China, also have a large number of standards. This is not surprising,
considering that standards were used as part of the tools of the state to direct the centrally
planned economy (Krislov 1997). Not only do industrialized countries have more standards
in stock, they also have standards facilities, institutions, and resources that constitute more
sophisticated national standards systems than those of developing countries.
Firms and governments from industrialized countries are active in standards activities not
only at the domestic level, but also at the international level. They produce the majority of the
world's de jure standards as well as de facto standards, primarily due to their technological
leadership. Although there is no information available on the number of de facto international
standards, it is probably valid to assume that developed economies produce most of the
world's de facto standards, at least those that are used in international transactions.
Developing-country firms and governments have limited involvement in developing standards
at the international level and mostly adopt standards developed elsewhere.
Table 3.1: National Standards in Select Industrialized and Latecomer Countries
Industrialized Country Number of GDP Annual Latecomer Country Number GDP Annual
[Foundation year,. Public (Billions Budget [Foundation year, of Public (Billions Budget
private (P) or Standards USD) (Million private (P) or Standards USD) (Million
Government (G)] USD) Government (G)] USD)
U.S.A. (1918 P) 93,000 11668 30.0 China (1957 G) 17,000 1649 2.3
Germany (1917 P) 37,000 2714 110.0 India (1987 G) 16,000 692 n.a.
Russia (1991 G) 22,000 582 5.5 Taiwan (n.a.) 13,000 305 n.a.
France (1926 P) 19,500 2003 80.0 Turkey (1954 G) 12,600 302 41.3
Japan (1949 G) 18,000 4623 14.6 S. Korea (1961 G) 9,400 680 2.3
Italy (1921 P) 15,000 1672 14.5 Brazil (1940 P) 8,000 605 7.5
U.K. (1901 P) 13,700 2141 225 Argentina (1935 P) 7,900 152 4.0
Sweden (1922 P) 12,100 346 37.0 Mexico (1943 G) 6,028 676 0.3
Spain (1985 P) 11,900 991 25.0 Colombia (1963 P) 4,000 97 4.5
Belgium (1946 P) 8,545 350 0.5 Indonesia (1984 G) 3,600 258 0.4
Finland (1924 P) 7,670 187 13.7 Venezuela (1973 P) 3,241 109 4.0
Austria (1920 P) 7,500 290 19.5 Philippines (1964 G) 3,200 86 0.9
Netherlands (1916 P) 6,000 577 31.0 Malaysia (n.a., P) 2,000 118 n.a.
Canada (1970 G) 5,500 980 11.2 Thailand (1968G) 1,500 163 15.3
Australia (1935 P) 5,400 631 10.7 Singapore (1963 G) 713 107 2.3
Source: Adapted from National Institute of Standards and Technology (1997)
Notes: i) n.a.= data not available. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
ii) Budget figures are for the main national standards organizations, e.g., the U.S. budget figure is for ANSI only.
iii) Correlation coefficient between the number of public standards and GDP (R2) is 0.93.
However, as trade between developed and developing countries grows, standards become
even more important for developing countries. Many of the emerging markets have become
the battleground of competing standards from developed countries. In the mobile
communications industry, for instance, leading firms from developed economies compete
against each other, such that their preferred standards are adopted by firms and governments
in developing countries (Funk 1998).
Without advanced technologies and innovations, developing-country firms have no
capability and power to determine de facto standards at the international level. At the national
level, local firms that monopolize domestic markets may have been the sources of domestic
de facto standards of sorts. However, with the growing trade liberalization in recent years,
local firms have to compete directly with multinational corporations even in the domestic
markets. They may not command enough market shares to push for their standards.
Particularly in the markets with new products and/or technologies, multinational firms tend to
become the sources of de facto standards. As we show later in our case studies of Thai firms
in the semiconductor and telecommunications industries, latecomer firms just adopt standards
already available in the developed markets.
This is also true for de jure standards at the international level. Firms and governments in
developing countries increasingly adopt international standards or standards developed by
standardization bodies in advanced economies. As shown in Table 3.1, as great as 90 percent
of Indonesia's standards are adopted from international standards. The figure is also high for
Turkey, where 85 percent of domestic standards are international in origin. Similarly,
according to our interviews with officials at the Thai Industrial Standards Institute, most of
the new industrial standards adopted in the country are translated or adapted from
international standards, such as ISO and IEC standards.
As a matter of course, latecomers do not have any influence on standard-setting processes
in developed economies. National standard-setting is usually an internal affair. Foreign firms
and organizations are sometimes allowed to become members of other countries' domestic
standards organizations. But their influence on the outcome is likely to be negligible, unless
their presence is very large in the country.
Developing countries also have limited involvement in standards development at the
regional and global levels. They may be members of various international standardization
bodies, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
They may also be members of regional bodies, such as the Pacific Area Standards Congress
(PASC) or Pan American Standards Commission (COPANT). But their involvement has not
been very active.
For instance, in the case of the ISO, developing countries do not actively participate in the
technical committees and working groups, where standards are proposed, drafted, negotiated
and formulated, or in the elaboration of internationally agreed standards. The numbers of
secretariats in the technical committees and subcommittees from developed countries far
exceeds those of developing countries. The top three countries, namely, the United States,
Germany, and the United Kingdom, account for more than half of the total secretariats. This is
also true at the level of working groups, in which the three countries hold almost 60 percent of
the total convenerships. As secretariats and conveners are responsible for leading the work on
standards development, the number of secretariats and conveners indicates the level of
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participation in the ISO. It is clear that developing countries have very limited roles in
international standards development (Table 3.2).























































































































































































Source: Adapted from ISO Annual Report 2002
Note: TC - Technical committees, SC - Sub-committees, WG - Working groups.
EMERGENCE OF LATE STANDARDIZERS
Despite the continuous dominance of developed-country firms and governments, a small,
yet increasing, number of latecomers have recently emerged as important players in the
international standardization arena. Some of these firms have also shown leadership in
NUEConshit
standardization processes, as their technologies are adopted as part of standards used by other
firms, even the forerunners from advanced economies.
Due to the increasing complexity and systems characteristics of information and
communication technologies, successful de facto standardization by a single firm is rare. For
instance, complexity increases for at least an order of magnitude for each new generation of
communications standards (Woodward 2005). As a result, the cost of standards development
has increased in most cases beyond the level that an individual firm would be able to bear,
even for large corporations from advanced economies. The growing size and complexity of
standards also increases the demand for the specialized skills required in standards
development. In addition, because of economic globalization, international markets are now a
target of most standards. Involving companies from different countries and regions may also
increase regulatory and market acceptance for new standards and products.
As de facto standardization is extremely difficult for advanced firms, it is thus almost
impossible for latecomer firms to establish de facto standards for the world markets. De jure
standardization becomes the main, if not only, process in which late standardizers expend
their efforts and resources on participating.
Late standardizers participate in standardization activities in all types of standardization
forums, ranging from formal standards development organizations (SDOs) and "informal"
standards consortia and alliances. Broadly speaking, there are four groups of forums in which
latecomers participate: domestic SDOs, domestic consortiums, international SDOs, and
international consortiums. Late standardizers do not limit their geographical reach either,
participating in domestic, foreign, regional, and global forums. In this section, we pay
particular attention to their participation in international SDOs and consortia. Each of them
has distinctive relationships with the three stages in our proposed model of late
standardization and technological catch-up
LATECOMERS IN INTERNATIONAL SDOs
Latecomer firms and governments participate in various types of formal standards
development organizations. Some SDOs, such as the ISO and the IEC, are non-governmental
organizations, although their standards often become law through treaties or national
standards. Other SDOs are established by international treaties, such as the ITU and the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, which promotes international standardization for food
safety. Different standards organizations have different rules and regulations regarding
membership. In some organizations, only one national entity can represent each country as a
voting member. In others, there could be several representatives for each country, from either
the private or public sectors. Most countries participate in international SDOs that adopt the
one-country-one-representative membership system, such as the ISO and the IEC
Although firms and governments from advanced countries retain their influence on
international standardization, there is increasing evidence supporting the emergence of
successful late standardizers. One indicator is late standardizers' increasing participation in
technological standardization at the international level. In recent years, an increasing number
of latecomers have significantly increased their presence in standards development efforts in
both formal and informal forums at the international level.
Meanwhile, there is an increasing gap among developing countries in terms of standards
capabilities and participation in standards development. A small number of latecomer firms
are entering the forge-ahead stage in our model of late standardization. Others are either in the
keep-up stage or still further behind in the catch-up stage.
With a quick glance at the membership structures of international SDOs, the participation
of latecomers in formal standardization forums may not appear to have increased. This is
because most key international standardization organizations, such as the ISO and the IEC,
still restrict the membership to only one member per country. This rule is important,
especially when a draft standard is being voted on for approval. While the voting process is
important in determining whether a draft will be approved as a standard, the actual
standardization activities occur at the lower levels, that is, at the levels of technical and/or
working committees and subcommittees. It is at this level that the increasing participation of
latecomer firms is more noticeable.
As an illustration, let us look at the cases of South Korea. In a formal international SDO, a
member country normally designates one standards organization to represent the country.
This "member body" could be a government agency or a private non-profit organization. In
case of South Korea, the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards (KATS) under the
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE), represents as the national member
body in the ISO and the IEC. On the other hand, the Ministry of Information and
Communication (MIC) represents South Korea in the ITU. These governmental organizations
have represented South Korea in both international SDOs from the beginning of the country's
membership and remain to be the sole representatives. However, the seemingly constant
membership level belies the increasing participation and contribution of other Korean
institutions and firms in the ISO, the IEC, and the ITU.
As mentioned earlier, it is at the level of technical committees/subcommittees (TC/SC) or
working groups (WG) where the detailed standards are actually proposed and drafted. To
participate in standardization activities of the technologies of interest, the member body that
represents the country normally designates a local secretariat institute/organization for each of
the technical or working committees that the country wants to participate. The secretariat
institution could be a research institute or a semi-public organization. These secretariat
organizations then set up domestic working groups that correspond to the TC/WG at the
international level. The domestic working groups generally comprise representatives from
research institutes, government agencies, private firms, and sometimes individual experts.
Individuals or firms may present their standard drafts at international standards
organizations through the secretariat organizations, which review and then approve the
proposals. Representatives from private firms can also join international standardization
activities at the TC/WG levels as the representatives of the countries. The level of a country's
contribution to standardization processes can be judged, to some extent, by its contribution
and leadership as the secretariats of technical committees/subcommittees and/or as the
conveners of the working groups for each committee.
As shown in Table 3.3, South Korea and China are the most notable among latecomers, in
terms of participation in ISO standardization activities. South Korea, in particular, has made
significant progress in recent years in leading and contributing to the international
standardization efforts in the ISO. While the numbers are still very small compared to
developed economies, it is evident that South Korea has substantially increased its efforts in
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the past decade. There was only one Korean representative as the Convener of an ISO
Working Group in 1998. By 2004, there were as many as 21 of them participating as the
Conveners of working groups or the secretariats of technical committees/subcommittees.
On the other hand, the number of ISO secretariats and convenerships held by other
latecomers has not changed as much. China and India are two of the most active participants
among latecomer/developing countries. Yet, their leadership and contribution in 2004 remain
almost at the same level as in the late 1990s. One possible explanation is that the types of
standards and technologies to which latecomers channel their efforts and resources are not
covered by the ISO.






































E Brazil 4 2 4 5 4 5 2 6
Colombia 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 3
B Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Turkey 4 0 3 0 3 0 3 0
Sources: Adapted from ISO Annual Reports, various years
Note: TC/SC = technical committee/subcommittees, WG = Working groups










particularly concentrated their efforts in recent years. We can thus expect their active
participation in telecommunications standards forums. In the ITU, for instance, the
participation of some latecomer firms and governments has been noticeable in recent years. In
addition to the participation as designated institutions by member states, a number of
latecomer firms have joined the ITU as sector members. Generally, major domestic
telecommunications service providers in developing countries participate in the ITU as sector
members. These service providers are often state-owned enterprises. What distinguishes
successful latecomer countries from others is that, even domestic firms that are not service
providers, such as equipment manufacturers, participate in the standardization processes of
the ITU. As with the case of forerunner firms from developed economies, these latecomer
firms participate actively in the ITU so as to influence the standardization outcome at the level
of Study Groups. It is at this level where the actual standards are discussed, drafted and
contested by technical experts.
As shown in Table 3.4, South Korea is again the most active latecomer country, in terms
of its participation in the ITU. The country has 16 members in the ITU, 9 of which are sector
members. India and China are second and third, with totally 13 and 9 members. Although
these figures are less than one-tenth of that of the United States, their presence at the ITU is
more noticeable than before.
Table 3.4: Participation of Latecomers in ITU, 2004
Country Membership # of Sector Examples of Sector Members
Size Members
South Korea 16 9 Samsung Electronics; LG Electronics; LG Telecom; KT
Corporation; SK Telecom; ETRI; DACOM; NIDA; KADO
India 13 9 BSNL; COAI; Data Access; MTNL; Reliance Infocomm;
Sasken Communication Technologies; TDSAT; TRAI; TCIL
China 8 7 Huawei Technologies; ZTE, China Unicom; China Telecom;
China Netcom; Alcatel Shanghai Bell
Malaysia 8 6 Cape Range Wireless; Celcom (Malaysia); Digi Telecom; Maxis
Communications; Telekom Malaysia; TIME dotCom
Singapore 5 2 Starhub; Singtell
Thailand 4 2 TAC; AIS
Brazil 6 3 Embratel; D&D International; Telemar Norte Leste
Mexico 7 4 TELECOMM; SATMEX; TELMEX
Cf.
United States 162 117 3Com; Microsoft; AT&T
Japan 58 46 NTT; NEC; Canon
United Kingdom 41 31 Vodafone; British Telecom
Source: Adapted from ITU membership report on website, www.itu.org
Notes: (1) ITU membership includes ITU-R (Radio standardization), ITU-T (Telecom standardization), and ITU-D (Telecom development)
(2) There are three types of membership: member states, sector members, and associates. Sector members include private firms and scientific
or industrial organizations approved by the Member State
STANDARDS CONSORTIA AND ALLIANCES
The increase in participation of latecomers in international standardization is more
noticeable in standards consortia and alliances in fast-changing fields of technologies. In fact,
standardization activities of new technologies are now occurring more outside than inside
formal SDOs. One reason for this is speed. Standardization processes in formal SDOs usually
take many years before standards are finally approved. For instance, some ISO standards
make it from start to finish within four years or less, but many standards take as many as nine
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years (Eicher 1999). The average development time for ISO standards improved from 92.1
months in 1988 to between five to six years in 1997 [Hesser (1992) and ISO (1998) cited in
Vries (1999)]. But it is still a long period of time. By the time of the approval, many
technologies and standards, especially in fast-changing fields such as ICT, may already be
outdated. Latecomer firms that aspire to be become standards leaders, therefore, cannot be
content with the situation. An increasing number of latecomer firms have already participated
directly in international standardization consortia and alliances, in which candidate
technologies are more fluid yet closer to the world technological frontier.
As Cargill (2001) argues, informal consortia and alliances are more suitable to developing
standards in rapidly-changing fields of technologies than formal SDOs for two main reasons:
their commitment and the ability to implement the standards outcome. First, technical task
forces and working groups in consortia are more likely to proceed according their mandated
schedules. Because consortia participants have a vested interest in producing standards, their
level of commitment to the successful development of standards is greater than those
participating in formal SDOs. The second advantage of consortia is their ability to set up and
run tests for implementations of their specifications. Because of the contractual arrangement
with participants, many consortia are able to compel their members to adopt and implement
their standards and specifications in preference to other standards. This means consortium
standards are more likely and quickly adopted by the market than SDO standards. Therefore,
latecomer firms that join these standards consortia are likely to have more knowledge about
what standards are to be adopted in the marketplace than those who do not join.
The advantages of participating in standards consortia and alliances are not limited to the
101
knowledge about the technologies used in standards and the information regarding market
access. Latecomers can also gain the knowledge as to which technologies are likely to be
adopted by other firms and eventually by the future market. This knowledge is critical for
latecomers, especially during the time when even technological leaders have to form alliances
to stay competitive. We will discuss this issue later in Chapter Four where we examine the
learning benefits that latecomers gain from participating in standardization efforts.
Consortia-based standards development is not without problems. By its very nature,
standards development in consortia, especially for communications standards, requires an
agile approach; every time a standard consortium adopts a change, models must be updated
and re-run. More consortium members may also mean more changes required, which in turn
affect the speed and costs of development.
STANDARDS FORUMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES/REGIONS
Late standardizers have also become more active in participating in standardization
activities in countries and regions outside their own. This phenomenon is significant because
it indicates latecomers' efforts to overcome two main disadvantages of being a latecomer: that
is, being distant from the lead-user markets and being distant from the sources of specialized
knowledge. By participating in standardization activities in developed markets and regions,
latecomers acquire the opportunities to overcome the latecomer disadvantages.
One example is the participation of Samsung Electronics of Korea in SELETE
(Semiconductor Leading Edge Technologies), a Japanese R&D consortium established and
managed jointly by 10 Japanese semiconductor manufacturers. While Samsung participates in
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the group only as a non-voting member, the participation indicates its efforts to be part of a
R&D consortium to acquire advanced manufacturing technologies, which could become de
facto standards of the industry. As early as 1997, SELETE made a contract with Samsung for
the evaluation program of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials for 300mm
wafers. The purpose of the evaluation program aimed to encourage the 300mm wafer
manufacturing as well as to reduce the R&D cost, since the technology of manufacturing
equipment and materials is pre-competitive for semiconductor manufacturers today. As the
leader in DRAM manufacturing, Samsung was important for the Japanese consortium, not
only as a future client but also the "tester" of new technologies and standards.
Late standardizers have become more active in participating in standardization activities
even in the regions outside their own. One good example is latecomers' participation in the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the official standardization
organization for information and communication technologies in Europe. While full
membership of ETSI is limited to only firms and institutions from countries within the
European Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) area, latecomer firms and
research institutes from Asia and other regions can participate in ETSI as associate members
in the standardization meetings. China and Taiwan are particularly active in ETSI, having
more associate members than other latecomer countries. South Korea is less active in ETSI,
having only the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) as an
associate member (Table 3.5).
The reason that South Korea has limited representation in ETSI may be attributed to
Korean firms' market-access strategies for new products and services. According to our
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interviews with Korean executives and government officials, Korean firms naturally focus
first on the domestic market, where they can test new products and services. Once they have
improved their capabilities in terms of technology and other complementary assets, such as
marketing and distribution channels, they move onto the export markets. The first overseas
market that they focus on is the U.S. market, which is the largest market for many Korean
latecomers. 17 The European market tends to come after that. To many Korean firms, the
Japanese market appears the most formidable. Such step-by-step market-access strategy may
partially explain why there is limited representation of Korean firms in European
standardization forums. They first focus their efforts and resources on standardization
activities in the United States before other countries and regions. A Korean government
official indicates further that many Korean firms consider the United States to be more















Source: ETSI website: www.etsi.
Participation of Latecomers in ETSI, 2004
Examples of associate members
Huawei, HYT, RITT, ZTE, Wuhan Tianyu, Shenzhen Mingwah
Aohan, Sandmartin Electronic
ASUSTeK, CCL/ITRI, CGC, Chi Mei Communication, CHTTL,
GoldKey Technology, Quanta Computer
Flextronics, HCL Technologies, Saske Communication, Tata
Consultancy
I'M Technologies, Institute for Infocomm Research
ETRI
CMC





LATE STANDARDIZERS AS STANDARDS LEADERS
Although still limited in number, some latecomer firms have moved beyond being
standards followers to become standards leaders at the world technological frontier. In the
semiconductor and mobile telecommunication industries, for instance, a few late standardizers
have moved successfully into the forge-ahead stage in our model of late standardization and
technological catch-up. One indication of being a standards leader is that their proprietary
technologies are included in international standards that are adopted by other firms. Table 3.6
highlights some examples of late standardizers from South Korea that have become not only
market and technology leaders, but also standard leaders in the semiconductor and mobile
telecommunications industries.
Table 3.6: Examples of Korean Standards Leaders in Semiconductor and Mobile Telecom
Sector Examples Leading Firms
Semiconductors DDRII, DDRIII Samsung, Hynix
Mobile WiBro Samsung, LG
Telecommunications Terrestrial digital multimedia MBC, Samsung Electronics,
broadcasting KBS, LG Electronics
In the following section, we discuss the case studies of successful Korean late
standardizers in the semiconductor and telecommunications industries. We examine how
these Korean late standardizers manage to transform themselves from being latecomers into
fast followers, then into technology leaders, and finally into standards leaders.
LATE STANDARDIZERS IN SEMICONDUCTOR
Standards have become more and more important in all segments of the semiconductor
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industry. One indication of the increased importance is the number of standards required for
newer generations of semiconductor products (Table 3.7). For instance, in the early 1990s,
there were only about 10 technology standards for command and package for DRAMs and
other memories operated at a speed of 33MHz. However, as the speed of memories increased
to 100MHz by the late 1990s, the number of technology standards jumped substantially. The
second generation DDR DRAM (DDR2) alone has about 330 standards (Shin and Jang 2005).
Table 3.7: Technological Standards for DDR2
Major Items Number of Standards
Function Circuit, Addressing, Logic, Read/Write, etc. About 100
Specification Power, Test, Temperature, etc. About 200
Package Pin-out etc. About 10
Module UDIMM, RDIMM, SODIMM etc. About 20
Source: Shin and Jang (2005)
Similar to the telecommunications industry, it is now believed that no single company in
the semiconductor industry today-not even a large company, such as IBM or Intel-has
enough power to automatically drive de facto industry standards. Companies are thus
cooperating in standardization and R&D efforts now that OEMs and integrated circuit (IC)
design houses are outsourcing more and more of their manufacturing, assembly and
development.
While semiconductor manufacturers all desire to have their own competitive edges, the
buyers want standardization. From the buyers' perspectives, standardization leads to low
prices and broad supply. Uniformity in terms of technical terms and definitions contribute
significantly to the consistent quality and reliability of products. Standardization also means
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interchangeable multiple supplier solutions. From the manufacturers' perspective, standards
create large demand and pre-sold customer base.
The increasing number of standards includes not only the specifications for
semiconductors themselves, but also the technical requirements for manufacturing processes.
This means equipment manufacturers also need to be involved in standardization activities.
For instance, semiconductor manufactures try to utilize their manufacturing capacity more
efficiently by introducing more automated manufacturing systems. As the industry is
preparing itself for e-Manufacturing and e-Diagnostics, more standards are being developed
to accommodate the new manufacturing technologies. Because de facto standardization is
extremely difficult, if not possible, standards organizations become critical in providing
forums for firms in the semiconductor industry to jointly develop de jure standards.
SEMICONDUCTOR STANDARDS ORGANIZATIONS
There are a number of standardization organizations in the semiconductor industry,
covering various aspects of the products as well as fabrication and packaging processes.
Compared to other sectors with more rapidly changing technologies, such as mobile
telecommunications, the number of standards organizations for semiconductors is relatively
stable and consolidated. This is because, after four decades of technological development, the
industry is maturing and approaching the Specific Phase of the Abernathy-Utterback Model.
Semiconductor SDOs vary significantly, in terms of membership size, areas of
standardization, and influence on the market (Table 3.8). For instance, the Semiconductor
Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) has a membership of more than 2200 firms,
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making it the largest industry group for the semiconductor industry. SEMI standards cover
every aspect of semiconductor manufacturing: equipment automation (hardware and software),
facilities, gases, materials, microlithography, packaging, process chemicals, and traceability.
Another important standards organization for the industry is the Joint Electron Device
Engineering Council -Solid State Technology Association (JEDEC), with a membership of
about 300 finns. While both SEMI and JEDEC deal with a wide range of standards, often
overlapping with one another, each organization has its main focus. While SEMI is strong for
its "front end processing" standards, JEDEC is known for its "back-end processing" standards.
Major semiconductor manufacturers therefore participate in both organizations.
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) is
another globally recognized standards-setting body that covers, but is not limited to, the
semiconductor industry. IEEE-SA develops consensus standards through an open process. It
has a portfolio of more than 870 completed standards and more than 400 standards in
development. Its focus on nanotechnology standards is part of a greater effort by the IEEE
Nanotechnology Council, a multidisciplinary group formed to advance nanotechnology.
Meanwhile, there are also a few other smaller standards organizations dealing with software
for semiconductor fabrication processes, such as Accellera and the Open SystemC Initiative
(OCSI).
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Table 3.8: Examples of Standards Development Organizations in the Semiconductor Industry
Examples of SDOs Main Areas of Standardization Membership Examples of Leading
Size Members (Latecomers in bold)
SEMI: Semiconductor Equipment and Wide range, but focus on "back-end"* 2,230 All major semiconductor firms
Materials International standards for packaging,
JEDEC: Joint Electron Device Engineering Wide range, but focus on "front-end"* 270 Intel; Samsung; Micron
Council -Solid State Technology Association standards for fabrication of chips and Technology; Microsemi;
components, especially memory Texas Instruments; Amkor;
Hynix
ISQED: International Symposium on Quality Silicon manufacturing, circuit design, 269 AMD; Synopsys; Texas
Electronic Design and electronic design automation (EDA) Instruments; IBM; Hitachi;
Samsung; TSMC
OC-PIP: Open Core Protocol International Open Core Protocol (OCP) 120 Texas Instruments;
Partnership STMicroelectronics; Toshiba
Semiconductor; Nokia
EDAC: Electronic Design Automation Electronic Design Automation 100 Synopsys; Cadence Design
Consortium Systems; Mentor Graphics
IEEE-SA: Institute of Electrical and Wide range of information technology 70 Intel; Infeneon; IBM; Sun;
Electronics Engineers Standards Association and telecommunications (corporate) Panasonic; Sanyo; Freescale;
Cadence; Synopsis
SIA: Semiconductor Industry of America International Technology Roadmap for 33 Intel; AMD; Rambus; IBM;
Semiconductors (ITRS) (charter) Micron; Freescale; TI
Accellera Hardware-description languages (HDL) 26 Intel; IBM; Sun; NEC;
Toshiba
OSCI: Open SystemC Initiative SystemC language (an HDL) 23 ARM; Mentor Graphics;
Royal Philips Electronics;
STMicroelectronics; Synopsys
APiA: Advanced Packaging and Interconnect Advanced packaging and interconnect 15 August Technology; Ultratech;
Alliance technologies Unaxis; Ebara
SEMATECH Advanced manufacturing techniques 12 AMD; Freescale; IBM
Infineon; Intel; Panasonic;
Samsung; TSMC
Sources: Websites of the standards development organizations
LATE STANDARDIZERS IN SEMICONDUCTOR CONSORTIA
The participation of latecomers is increasingly noticeable in semiconductor standards
consortia. As an example, Table 3.9 shows a recent membership breakdown of SEMI, a major
standards consortium for semiconductors. While a large majority of the members are from
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North America, Japan, and Europe, latecomer firms from Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore
constitute a significant proportion of the overall membership. Members from the three
latecomer countries account for 15 percent of the overall SEMI membership.
Table 3.9: SEMI Membership, 2003
Region/Country Number of Firms %
North America 1,032 46
Japan 583 26
Europe 263 12




Rest of the World 15 0.6
Total 2,231 100
Source: Adapted from SEMI website: http://wps2a.semi.org
Latecomers are also present in other semiconductor SDOs. Samsung of Korea and TSMC
of Taiwan are two members from latecomer countries in the International SEMATECH
Manufacturing Initiative (ISMI). ISMI is a global consortium of leading semiconductor
manufacturers, including AMD, Freescale, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Infineon, Intel, Panasonic,
Philips, Samsung, Spansion, TSMC, and Texas Instruments. Another important
semiconductor SDO is the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association, which is the main
forum that we use as our case study in examining late standardizers' participation in
standardization activities.
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Brief description of JEDEC
The JEDEC Solid State Technology Association or JEDEC in short, is the leading
developer of standards for the solid-state industry. JEDEC was founded in 1960 as a joint
activity between the Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA), a trade organization for electronics
manufacturers and the US-based National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA).
JEDEC is now officially the semiconductor engineering standards body of the EIA, which is
accredited by American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to help develop standards on
electronic components, consumer electronics, electronic information, telecommunications,
and Internet security. There are about 270 company members in JEDEC, including some of
the world's largest semiconductor and electronics companies.
Almost 2400 participants, appointed by some 270 member companies, work together in
50 JEDEC committees to develop standards and technical guidelines for every segment of the
semiconductor industry. As companies have diverse interests and committed resources for
standards activities, not all company members participate in JEDEC committees and the
number of companies associated with each committee is not the same. These committees,
subcommittees, and task groups are the working groups responsible for developing standards
documents under formal charters approved by the JEDEC Council. Each committee has a
clearly-defined scope of activity in order to avoid overlap of responsibilities among
committees and the resulting confusion. The differences in scope require that committees
cooperate with one another so as to complete their deliberations. JEDEC is notable for its
development of standards for memory products, which are one of the most important
segments of the semiconductor industry. JEDEC is accredited by the American National
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Standards Institute (ANSI) as the source for the U.S. national standards for the semiconductor
industry.
Table 3.10: JEDEC Membership 2005
Region/Country Number of Firms %
North America 181 68
USA 175 66







Rest of the World 3 1
Total 267 100
Source: Adapted from JEDEC website: http://www.jedec.org
As mentioned earlier, there are a significant number of latecomer firms in JEDEC (Table
3.10). As of 2005, there are about 40 latecomer firms from Taiwan, Korea, China, Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand participating in various activities of the standards organization.
Among these latecomer firms, Samsung is arguably the most prominent member, not only an
active participant but also as an active leader in standards development activities. Other
prominent late standardizers in JEDEC include Hynix (Korea), VIA Technologies (Taiwan),
and Hana Electronics (Thailand).
In Chapter Four, we will discuss in detail how late standardizers gain from participating in
semiconductor standardization activities. We use the case study of Samsung Electronics'
participation in JEDEC as an illustration of how engagement in external standardization
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activities is an important part of technological catch-up efforts and how a latecomer has
managed to move beyond catch-up and keep-up and forge ahead of the forerunners.
LATECOMERS IN MOBILE TELECOM STANDARDIZATION
The telecommunications industry, broadly defined, is another industry in which late
standardizers have emerged as important players in recent years. Standardization has always
played a critical role in the telecommunications industry. As individual information and
communications technologies (ICT) become more advanced, the whole ICT systems
themselves become complex and diverse. Their technical and commercial success critically
depends on interoperability and compatibility that guarantee the quality and reliability of the
information exchanged. Standardization is the means to achieve such interoperability and
compatibility. Our main focus is on the mobile telecommunication, one of the fastest-growing
and largest segments of the telecommunication industry today.
Standardization activities in telecommunications have traditionally occurred in prominent
international standards organizations, such as the Geneva-based International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ITU-Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-
T) is one of the three sectors in the ITU and is the main forum for telecommunications
standardization among its 189 member states, 650 sector members, and 50 associates.' 8
There are also regional standardization bodies that focus on telecommunications
technologies. One important example is the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI), Based in Sophia Antipolis, France, the ETSI is the main organization for
telecommunications standardization within Europe.
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Although the ITU and the ETSI are still prominent forums for telecommunications
standardization, an increasing number of mobile telecommunication standards have been
developed outside the traditional, formal SDOs. An increasing number of consortia and
alliances of firms have been formed to facilitate the efforts to increase interoperability and
compatibilities among telecommunications products and services. According to a database
compiled by Consortiuminfo.org, a website devoted to information on standardization
consortia, there are about 70 international consortia and alliances working on various areas of
telecommunication standardization. Many of these consortia focus on mobile and wireless
communications technologies.
LATECOMERS IN MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION
A few latecomers have become active in mobile telecommunication standardization in
these international consortia. As Table 3.11 shows, latecomers participate in standards
development in some of the major consortia in various degrees. It is noticeable that the a few
latecomer fin:ns, such as Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics from South Korea, and
ZTE and Huawei Technologies from China, are active in many of these consortia. In fact,
these well-known latecomer firms participate in these consortia not merely as observers or
passive participants, but as active developers of new standards.
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Table 3.11: Examples of Standards Development Organizations in the Telecommunications Industry
Examples of SDOs Areas of Standardization Membership Size Examples of Members (Asian Latecomers)
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China: Beijing Capitel, China Unicom,
Huawei Technologies, Ningbo BIRD, ZTE,
Shenzhen Morlab Communications
Technology, RITT
Korea: Hyundai Syscom, Samsung
Electronics, LG Electronics, LG Telecom, SK
Telecom, KT Freetel
Indonesia: PT Indosat Pdk.
India: Tata Teleservices, Reliance
Taiwan: APBW
7 firms from China and 9 firms from Korea
(see Table 3.12)
5 firms from China and 7 firms from Korea
(see Table 3.13)
Leading Korean firms, e.g., Samsung, LG,
KT, SK Telecom, participate in IETF
meetings and standards activities
Korea: Samsung, SK Telecom (sponsors), KT,
LG Electronics, LG Telecom (full members)
China: China Mobile Communications, China
Telecom, China Unicom, Huawei
Technologies, ZTE (full members)
Taiwan: BenQ (sponsor)
Korea: KT, Samsung (board) SK Telecom,
LG (principal)
China: ZTE (board) Huawei Technologies,
Shenzhen Powercom (principal)
Sources: Websites of the standards development organizations
One of the most important and fast-changing areas for standardization in the
telecommunications industry is mobile communications. While there are already many
standards consortia for mobile communications and the number is increasing, two of the most
important standards consortia in mobile communications in recent years are the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and its sister forum, 3GPP2. We discuss these two
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prominent standards consortia with the focus on the involvement of latecomers.
3GPP and 3GPP2
Arguably,, 3GPP and 3GPP2 are currently two of the most important standardization
consortia for mobile communications. When the discussions on the Third Generation
standards for wireless communication started in 1998 under the ITU's International Mobile
Telecommunications (IMT-2000) initiative, it became evident that traditional standards-
setting processes were too slow given the speed of technological change. The concept of a
"Partnership Project" was pioneered by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) with the proposal to create a Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) focusing on
Global System for Mobile (GSM) technology. The main objective of 3GPP is to produce
globally applicable standards and technical specifications for a 3rd Generation Mobile System
based on evolved Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) core networks and the
related radio access technologies. At the same time, a parallel Partnership Project 3GPP2 was
established, focusing on the CDMA technology. 3GPP2 is thus the standardization group for
CDMA2000, a set of 3G standards based on earlier 2G CDMA technology.
Based on the collaboration agreement in December 1998, 3GPP and 3GPP2 bring together
a number of leading telecommunications standards bodies, which are known as
"Organizational Partners". There are currently six Organizational Partners in 3GPP and five
in 3GPP2, as shown below. These "Partnership Projects" enjoy the benefits of a collaborative
effort, including speedy working methods/procedures and faster delivery of output. They also
receive the recognition as a specifications-developing body. The status provides them easier
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access of the outputs after transposition of the specifications into a standard and submittal via
the national process into the ITU.
Table 3.12: Organizational Partners and Member Companies of 3GPP, 2005
Organizational Partner Home Number of Examples of Member Companies
Country/ Individual
Region Members
ETSI: European EU 211 Nokia, Alcatel, Ericsson, Vodafone, Motorola, IBM, Agilent,
Telecommunications Standards Nortel, Siemens, Thomson, Docomo Europe, Freescale
Institute Semiconductors, Orange, Texas Instruments, Oracle
ARIB: Association of Radio Japan 23 Anritsu Corporation, Dai Nippon Printing, Fujitsu, Matsushita
Industries and Businesses Electric Industrial, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, NTT, NTT
DoCoMo, Panasonic Mobile Comm., Seiko Epson, SHARP,
Sony Ericsson Mobile, Toshiba, Yokogawa Electric
ATIS: Alliance for USA 16 Cingular Wireless, Digital Fountain, Kineto Wireless, Lucent,
Telecommunications Industry National Communications System, NextWave Telecom, Nokia
Solutions Telecomm., Nortel Networks, Polaris Wireless, SBC
Communications, Telcordia Technologies, T-Mobile USA
CCSA: China Communications China 9 Alcatel Shanghai Bell, CATT, China Mobile Com., HuaWei
Standards Association Technologies, Nanjing Ericsson Panda, RITT, Shanghai
Research Center, TD Tech, ZTE
TTC: Telecommunication Japan 8 Fujitsu, KDDI, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC Corporation, NTT
Technology Committee DoCoMo, Oki Electric Industry, Panasonic Mobile
Communication, SOFTBANK BB
TTA: Telecommunications Korea 7 ETRI, KT Freetel, LG Electronics, LG TeleCom, Nextreaming,
Technology Association Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom
Source: Adapted from 3GPP website, www.3gpp.org
Notes: While most company members of the above standards bodies are based in the home country/region, some companies participate in
more than one of the above standards bodies. Conversely, many ETSI members have their headquarters outside Europe.
Table 3.13: Organizational Partners and Member Companies of 3GPP2, 2005
Organizational Partner Home Number of Examples of Member Companies
Country/ Individual
Region Members
ATIS: Alliance for USA 56 Apple Computer, Cisco, Ericsson, HP, Lucent, Motorola, Nextel,
Telecommunications Industry Nortel, Qualcomm, Sprint, Texus Instruments, Verizon Wireless,
Solutions VIA Telecom
ARIB: Association of Radio Japan 7 Comverse, eAccess, Fujitsu, KDDI, Kyocera Corporation,
Industries and Businesses Panasonic Mobile Communications, Tokai
TTA: Telecommunications Korea 7 ETRI, KT Freetel, LG Electronics, LG TeleCom, Nextreaming,
Technology Association Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom
CCSA: China Communications China 5 Alcatel Shanghai Bell,, China Unicom., HuaWei Technologies,
Standards Association Nanjing Ericsson Panda, Research Institute of
Telecommunication Transmission (RITT), ZTE
TTC: Telecommunication Japan 5 Access, Hitachi, NEC, Oki Electric Industry, Openware Systems
Technology Committee Japan
Source: Adapted from 3GPP website, www.3gpp2.org
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As shown in Tables 3.12 and 3.13, two Organizational Partners are standards
organizations from latecomer countries, namely, the Telecommunications Technology
Association of Korea (TTA) and the China Communications Standards Association (CCSA).
Latecomer firms participate in 3GPP and 3GPP2 as Individual Members, under the eligibility
requirement that they have to be member companies/institutions affiliated with one of the
3GPP/3GPP2 Organizational Partners. Their participation in these two prominent consortia
not only indicates their effort in international standardization, but also reflects the acceptance
of their increasing importance by the forerunners, i.e., the United States, the European Union
and Japan. This was confirmed in our interview with an official at Korea's
Telecommunication Technology Association (TTA).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
While international standardization arenas are still dominated by firms from developed
economies, we see in recent years the ascent of late standardizers from emerging economies.
A small, yet increasing, number of latecomers, notably from South Korea, China, and Taiwan,
have emerged as fast followers and even standards leaders at the global level. Their active
participation in international standardization is an important indicator of their improvement in
efforts and capabilities in late standardization and technological catch-up. Some latecomers
are active followers, who learn about emerging technologies through standardization activities.
Others are active participants in standards development, who provide technical inputs that
become part of new standards. A few of them are truly standards leaders, as they influence the
directions of standards to reflect their strategic interests.
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The types of standards forums that late standardizers participate are associated with their
levels of technological and standards capability. As shown in Figure 3.4, latecomers at the
catch-up stage generally do not participate in external standardization activities. They
normally just adopt standards that are developed by technological leaders. Once they develop
their technological capabilities and become fast followers, they become more involved in
international standardization. This is particularly the case in "informal" standards consortia
and alliances, where emerging technologies and standards are discussed and decided.












However, fast followers are not the core members of the standards clubs; they are there to
observe and learn about technological trends and possibly connect with technological leaders.
The actual standardization is driven mainly by the core members, which are usually large
firms with advanced technologies. These technological leaders usually assign their employees
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to participate in standards forums not just as participants, but also as secretariats of technical
committees, or even as board members of the organizations, such that they can influence
standardization outcomes. Late standardizers thus aspire to become part of the elite core
groups. However, such aspiration cannot be fulfilled easily. As we will show in our case
studies in Chapters Five and Six, not every firm is able to become a core member of standards
clubs. It also takes a long time before a newcomer is recognized and accepted by other firms
in the standards club, even if the newcomer's technologies are technically superior. In
addition, core members are likely to hold the "essential" patent technologies that underlie the
standards. These core members increasingly pool their patents together to form "patent pools"
or to establish cross-licensing agreements just among the core members. We will discuss this
issue in Chapter Six.
Despite the difficulty, the efforts are worthwhile. Through their participation in standards
forums, late standardizers create leverages for their technological upgrading and market
penetration in the world market. How late standardizers use standards and participation in




STANDARDS AS STRATEGIC LEVERAGE
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND ORDER OF MARKET ENTRY .
COMPETITIVENESS AND RESOURCE-BASED THEORY .
STANDARDS AS LEVERAGE: LINKING AND LEARNING . CONCLUDING REMARKS
In each stage of late standardization and technological catch-up, latecomer firms enjoy
competitive advantages derived from different sources and mechanisms. The transitions from
one stage to another are in effect the changes in mechanisms and sources of their competitive
advantages. Through case studies of Korean late standardizers in the semiconductor and
mobile telecommunications industries, we argue that standards activities are an important
mechanism that enables late standardizers to move from one competitive position to another.
Using our staged model as the basic analytical framework, we demonstrate how standards
function as a leverage mechanism for late standardizers to develop from being latecomers to
fast followers and finally to first movers. Two specific apparatus function as the leverage
mechanism, namely, Linking and Learning apparatus. The two closely-related apparatus allow
late standardizers to overcome their unique constraints as latecomers, including inadequate
resources and capabilities and limited access to lead-user markets and specialized inputs.
Standards are: an integral part of what Mathews (2002) calls the strategy of "competitive
complementarity", in which latecomers complement the strategies of incumbents rather than
confronting them as part of the effort to upgrade their competitive positions.
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As a Learning apparatus, standards codify and diffuse technological information in the
form of technical specifications, which latecomers firms can utilize without having to
"reinvent the wheel". Standards and technical regulations also contain market-access
information that latecomers can learn in order to export their products to advanced markets.
For fast followers, participating in standards development allows them to learn about
emerging technologies. They acquire information as to what technologies to expect in the near
future, even though they do not yet have proprietary technologies that they can contribute to
the standards. This information is critical to their ramp-up capability, their main source of
competitive advantage. Fast followers then invest heavily in R&D such that they can become
technology leaders even in niche technical areas. Once they have established themselves as
first movers, successful late standardizers acquire ideas about competitors' R&D and product
development through external standardization activities.
As a Linking apparatus, standards allow latecomers to connect with forerunners, so that
they can leverage their limited resources and capabilities for more knowledge and expertise.
By adopting certain standards and technical specifications, either as part of outsourcing,
second-sourcing, 19 or original equipment manufacturing (OEM) contracting, latecomers and
fast followers establish external linkages with forerunners. Meanwhile, quality control and
management standards help latecomers to improve their production and project execution
capabilities and to maximize the value of their internal resources. As latecomers, by necessity,
compete in markets with mature products and technologies, the basis of competition is cost.
Latecomers' competitive advantage is generally determined by production costs and quality of
products. Quality standards are thus critical to their competitiveness. Throughout the process
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of late standardization and catch-up, quality management and standardization is a key to
building a basic mechanism to move beyond catch-up.
Once latecomers produce products with quality and reliability acceptable to the world
market, they become part of global production and value chains. By this time, they have
improved the technological and standards capabilities beyond the catch-up stage. As fast
followers, they often connect with vendors and technology leaders in standardization venues.
Through repeated utilization of standards as Linking and Learning apparatus, latecomers
leverage their limited resources and capabilities to develop further.
As late standardizers progress closer to the world technological frontier, their
standardization efforts focus more on new specifications of products and/or processes. Even
though quality standards remain important, late standardizers give additional effort to
developing new product standards. The reasons are twofold. First, these firms have already
accumulated standards capability related to quality control and management during their
catch-up and keep-up stages. They already have competitive advantage derived from
production capability. Second, as technology leaders, they compete in the market in which the
basis of competition is functional product performance, rather than cost. At this stage, late
standardizers compete on the basis of value, derived mainly from new product functions,
rather than on the basis of costs as in the case of mature products. New standards and
specifications that create market value thus become the sources of competitive advantage.
Successful late standardizers also adjust their organizational structures to accommodate
standards activities. Late standardizers organize their R&D teams in such a way that
standards-related activities are a core part of R&D. They also adjust internal human-resource
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structures, such that standards personnel stay longer in one department, rather than changing
roles from one department to another. The underlying rationale is that standardization requires
constant and persistent external relations with other firms in standards forums. Personal
connections become critical for late standardizers who aspire to establish their foothold in
standardization arenas, such that they become standards leaders themselves.
As late standardizers develop more technological capability, they integrate standards
activities with intellectual-property-related activities. As firms invest more in R&D and are
able to produce more intellectual property than before, they search for ways to generate and
appropriate rents from their proprietary technologies. One important mechanism is to develop
standards that include their intellectual property. Legal capabilities, especially those related to
intellectual property, thus become a crucial part of standards capabilities. In fact, successful
late standardizers have established intellectual property licensing as a separate profit-and-loss
business, not just part of their legal departments.
As late standardizers become technology leaders, standards become an integral part of
strategic technological management. Firms face strategic issues in developing and adopting
the right standards that later become industry standards. This requires insightful and capable
technology management. The importance of strategic standards management is demonstrated
in our case studies of Samsung Electronics and other Korean firms in the semiconductor and
mobile telecommunications industries.
In this chapter, we first review the concept of competitive advantage and order of market
entry. The aim is to set the context for the subsequent discussion on how standards function as
a propelling mechanism for late standardizers to move from one competitive position to
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another. We focus on the roles of standards as Learning and Linking apparatus that latecomers
can employ to leverage their limited resources and capabilities. Our conceptual discussion in
this chapter is followed by the case studies of Korean latecomers in the semiconductor and
mobile telecommunications industries in Chapters Five and Six.
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND ORDER OF MARKET ENTRY
A competitive advantage is defined as a firm's ability to generate higher profits than rival
firms in the same industry (Porter 1985). Competitive advantage is measured by economic
rent, i.e., the profit that is higher than the cost of capital employed in the industry. Thus, the
objective of a firm is to increase its economic rent, rather than its profit as such. Attaining and
sustaining a competitive advantage is a key objective of any firm's business strategy.
According to Porter, there are two basic types of competitive advantages: cost advantages
and differentiation advantages. Cost advantages exist when the firm is able to provide the
same level of benefits as its competitors but at a lower cost. Differentiation advantages, on the
other hand, exist when the firm offers products that have greater benefits than the competing
products. Competitive advantages thus enable the firm to create greater value for its
customers, which result in greater profits for itself.
Firms can create competitive advantages by using resources and capabilities to attain
either a lower-cost structure than the competitor or a differentiated product. They position
themselves in their industry through their choice of either low cost or differentiation. This is a
strategic decision that firms have to make in devising their competitive strategies. They also
have to make decision as to how broad a market segment to target.
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Cost and differentiation advantages are considered "positional advantages", as they
indicate the firm's position in the industry as a leader in terms of either cost or differentiation.
While there are several factors that affect positional advantages, it is widely accepted in the
industrial economics literature that firms could acquire competitive advantages according to
their order of market entry (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). The literature focuses
primarily on two orders, i.e., first-mover and second-mover positions. In the context of
technological catch-up, another order of market entry is possible, that is, latecomers.
We can think of technological catch-up as a process in which latecomer firms develop
from a latecomer position to a second-mover/fast-follower position, and finally to a first-
mover/technology-leader position. Such process is characterized by the changes in
competitive advantages that firms enjoy. While latecomers' main sources are low costs for
various factor inputs, such as labor and labor-intensive materials, second movers gain
competitive advantage from ramp-up capability and high-skilled labor at relatively low costs.
First movers gain their competitive advantage from technological leadership, buyers'
switching costs, network effects, and learning curve effects. Standards and related activities
are important because they serve as the mechanism that propels latecomers to move from one
competitive position to another. Put differently, standards allow firms to capture rents from
different mechanisms and sources of competitive advantage. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
conceptual connections between late standardization, competitive positions, and order of
market entry. Specifically, we discuss the three market-entry orders, the associated
competitive advantages, the general mechanisms to capture such advantages, and how
standards serve a source of competitive advantage in each stage.
127
Figure 4.1: Late Standardization, Competitive Advantage, and Order of Market Entry
Catch-Up Keep-Up Forge-Ahead
Competitive Latecomers ...... Second Movers ...... First Movers ...... .
positions (Late Adopters) (Fast Followers) (Technology Leaders) Standards
Leaders
Competitiv- Cheap labor - Skilled, cheap labor -Technology leadership
- Low sunk costs - Ramp-up capability - Learning-curve effect
- Low organizational - Process innovation - Scarce assets
inertia - Free ride on R&D - Buyer's switching cost
Mechanisms - Control on wages - R&D (applied) 
- R&D (basic & applied)
to increase - echnological T ... - Technological . . IP protection
competitive upgrading upgrading - Branding
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The idea that order of market entry may affect firms' competitive advantage has long
existed in the economics literature. As early as 1934, Von Stakelberg (1934) demonstrated
that a leading firm was able to capture a larger market share and higher profits than a follower.
Since then, many analysts in the fields of industrial economics and strategic management









In their conceptual survey on the issue, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) identified
four types of mechanisms that enable firms to sustain first-mover advantage: (1) technological
leadership, (2) preemption of scarce resources, (3) customer switching costs, and (4) network
effects. We discuss each of these mechanisms with specific reference to standards.
(1) Technological leadership
Firms can capture first-mover advantages through sustained technological leadership. Two
basic mechanisms allow firms to sustain such advantages, namely, learning curve effects, and
R&D and patents. As shown in the standard learning-curve model, average production costs
fall with cumulative output. Early entrants can gain substantial cost advantages if their
learning can be kept proprietary and their leadership in market share maintained. Similar
effects apply to the case of cumulative investment, instead of cumulative output (Gilbert and
Harris 1984). The learning curve thus generates substantial barriers to entry.
First movers can also gain advantages over second movers if technological advantage is a
function of R&D expenditure and technology can be kept proprietary through patents or trade
secrets. The level of first-mover advantage depends significantly on the appropriability
regime. The more difficult it is for other firms to imitate the technology, the greater the
advantage is for the innovators to enjoy. Innovations that induce first-mover advantages
include not only product innovations, but also organizational and managerial innovations
(Chandler Jr. 1977; Teece 1980).
First movers may use standards as a way to sustain its technological leadership. Because
standards are developed by "clubs" of companies, the club members learn beforehand what
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technologies are likely to be the next industry standards. The learning curve effects are thus
derived from their participation in standardization activities. Furthermore, the use of strict
intellectual property protection linked to standards, such as patent pools, helps sustain the
first-mover advantage due to technological leadership.
(2) Preemption of scarce resources
First movers may capture advantages over second movers by preemptively acquiring
scarce assets. Such assets could be naturally scarce resources or other process inputs. Or they
could be positions in "space", including geographic space, product space, shelf space, etc. As
Ricardo (1817/1963) demonstrated using the case of productive land, preemptive acquisition
of scare resources allows first movers to capture greater economic rents than second movers.
Under many circumstances, standardization is closely related to allocation of scarce
resources. One good example is standardization of mobile communication technologies that
use radio frequency. In several ITU committees, advanced economies push for speedy
standardization of certain technologies. In contrast, developing economies want to delay the
standardization process, because they fear that there would be no frequencies left for them in
the future when their technological capability is good enough to utilize the technology. 20
Allocation of a scarce resource - in this case, radio frequencies - would give developed
economies the first-mover advantage through preempting such scarce resource.
(3) Buyer switching costs
Another mechanism that gives rise to first-mover advantages is buyer switching costs.
Late-movers have to overcome additional barriers to attract customers away from the products
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or services offered by first movers. Switching costs arise from various sources. One source is
the initial transaction costs or investments that the customer makes when adopting and
adapting to the first mover's product. Another source is supplier-specific learning by the
customer. As the buyer adapts to the specific characteristics of the product offered by the
supplier, switching to another supplier may appear to be too costly for the buyer. Another
source of switching costs is contractual, in that it was created by the seller when the
transaction was first made, so as to prevent the buyer from switching to other suppliers. Lastly,
imperfect information regarding product quality may prevent buyers from switching to new
products offered by second-mover firms.
Standards increase buyers' switching costs to different degrees, depending on how widely
they are adopted by the market. Once buyers have chosen certain standards, they tend to keep
using the standards until the alternatives become convincingly more attractive.
(4) Network effects
Network externalities add to the advantages of first movers. As discussed in Chapter Two,
when there are incentives for users to adopt products that are interconnected or compatible
with one another, first movers may enjoy advantages over second movers if the installed base
is large enough (Farrell and Saloner 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986). Standards, particularly
compatibility and interoperability standards, add network effects to the products, if they are
used in conjunction with other products/components in the systems under the same standards.
FAST FOLLOWER: SECOND-MOVER ADVANTAGES
Also known as late-mover or late-entrant advantages, second-mover advantages are, in
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effect, first-mover disadvantages. While first movers may enjoy many advantages over second
movers, they are also faced with potential disadvantages of being the first. As Lieberman and
Montgomery (1988) identify, second-mover advantages arise from various sources, as follows:
(1) Free-rider effects
Second movers may be able to free-ride on the first mover's investments in various areas,
such as R&D, buyer education, and infrastructure development. Information and knowledge
spillovers may enable second movers to free ride on first movers' R&D and learning
experiences. Although diffusion of technology may occur through markets in the form of
technology licenses, much diffusion occurs without market transactions between first- and
second movers. Labor mobility, research publications, informal communication, and reverse
engineering are some of the modes through which second movers can learn from first movers
without investing in R&D.
In the case of standards, second movers do not have to "reinvent the wheel" and just free-
ride on first movers' investment in standards development. As standards development
requires a large investment, free-riding could result in substantial advantage for second
movers. The difference between second movers and latecomers lies in the speed of their
learning. Second movers are fast followers, who learn what technologies are emerging. As
these emerging technologies mature and the profit margins fall rapidly, the technology owners
become more willing to license them out. As soon as this happens, second movers jump right
in and use their ramp-up capability to generate revenues from low-margin products.
(2) Resolution in the market of technological or market uncertainty
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Technological and market uncertainty increases the advantage that second movers may
gain from being late to the market. By entering early in an uncertain market, the first mover
has to deal with a high degree of risk, while second movers can wait and see. Second movers
can also learn from the mistakes that the first mover has made in various aspects of the
product, including consumer preferences and regulations involved.
However, as Wernerfelt and Karnani (1987) demonstrate, first-mover firms may gain
advantages even under uncertainty, if they can influence how technological and market
uncertainty is resolved. Setting industry standards, either de jure or de facto, is one way of
influencing such resolution. This makes it even more important for second movers to
participate in standardization activities, even if they do not have proprietary technologies.
This tactics, of course, depends on whether or not first movers realize this tactics and prevent
them from joining the standards clubs in the first place.
(3) Shifts in technological paradigms and consumer needs
Changes in technological paradigms could create opportunities for late-movers to enter the
market and become the new "first movers" themselves (Dosi 1982; Perez and Soete 1988). As
Schumpeter (1942) argues, innovations lead to the "gales of creative destruction" as
innovations caused old inventories, ideas, technologies, skills, and equipment to become
obsolete. Because the new dominant technology often appears when the market for the old
technology is still expanding, first movers may not be able to foresee the threat of the new
technology and respond accordingly (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). Standards forums
are often the venues where possible future technological paradigms are presented and
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discussed. It thus makes sense for both first- and second movers to participate in such forums
to learn about the new technological paradigms.
(4) Incumbent inertia
First-mover advantages may be diluted by the inflexibility incurred by the firm's existing
investment and organizational structure. The firm may be reluctant to divest its fixed assets,
and thus continue using the old technologies. It may also be slow to introduce innovation to
the market, fearing that this may affect the existing product lines that contribute to the firm's
profits and growth. Furthermore, its organizational structure may be too rigid for the firm to
respond to the changing competitive environment. Inter-organizational routines, internal
political dynamics and stable external relationships with other firms are also the factors that
contribute to organizational inertia of the first mover. Second movers may be more
advantageous, if they are able to recognize these issues and avoid falling into the same trap.
LATECOMER ADVANTAGES
Conceptually, latecomers from late-industrializing countries are different from late-
movers from advanced economies in that they have to overcome several additional entry
barriers (Hobday 1995; Mathews and Cho 2000; Mathews 2002). First, latecomers are "late"
by necessity, not by choice. Latemovers may deliberately choose the strategy to enter the
market late, despite having appropriate capabilities and resources. But latecomers have no
choice but to enter the market late, because of their lack of technologies and resources.
Second, latecomers have to overcome the distance to the lead-user markets and the leading
sources of technology, most of which are located in developed economies. Third, they have to
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overcome the lack in specialized inputs, such as high-tech engineers and scientists, as well as
supporting infrastructure for research and development. Fourth, their strategic intent focuses
on catching up with forerunners. The goal of a latecomer firm is thus to graduate from being a
latecomer as fast as possible, and to become a player in the industry, so that eventually it is
able to choose strategically whether to be a first mover or a late mover.
As latecomers are conceptually different from late movers, the sources and mechanisms of
competitive advantages that they enjoy are also different. The main source of advantage that
latecomer firms have initially is low costs for various factor inputs, such as labor and labor-
intensive materials. Other sources include protected markets that allow local firms to nurture
their technology without direct competition against leading firms. Latecomer firms may also
benefit from the technology that advanced firms are willing to transfer in exchange of their
market access to the latecomer firms' domestic markets. Furthermore, latecomer firms may
benefit from the information asymmetry advantage vis a vis leading firms, as information
about their capabilities and sources of technology is less available to outsiders (Wong 1999).
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND RESOURCE-BASED THEORY
Standards contribute to technological upgrading of latecomer firms, as they help improve
firms' resources and capabilities. We can analyze this issue in the context of the resource-
based theory or resource-based view of firms. Pioneered by the works of Penrose (1959/1995)
and Wernerfelt (1984), the literature on resource-based theory is voluminous, including a
wide range of studies on firms' competitive behavior. In a nutshell, the main argument of the
theory is that rare and valuable resources enable firms to create and sustain competitive
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advantage. Firms can sustain such advantage as long as they are able to protect against
resource imitation, transfer, or substitution.
The theory is based on the view of the firm as a collection of resources and capabilities.
Resources are firm-specific assets useful for creating a competitive advantage. Resources are
either tangible or intangible. Examples of such resources range from production equipment,
and proprietary knowledge and know-how, such as patents and trade secrets, to installed
customer base and brand equity. Although each resource may not individually result in a
competitive advantage, the synergistic combination and integration of the resources may
contribute significantly to the firms' competitiveness.
Capabilities, on the other hand, refer to the firm's ability to utilize its resources effectively.
They are generally embedded in the routines of the firm and are not easily documented as
written procedures. Capabilities are thus a form of tacit knowledge that is difficult for
competitors to imitate and replicate.
Firms are also viewed to have "core competence" that determine its competitive strategy
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Differences in firm's performances across time are driven
primarily by their unique resources and capabilities rather than by an industry's structural
characteristics. This perspective is in contrast to other theories on competitive advantage (e.g.,
Porter 1985), which focus on the firm's external competitive environment. The resource-
based perspective focuses on how firms acquire and utilize their internal resources and
capabilities to deal with the external market context in which they operate.
Differences among firms in terms of resources and capabilities allow some of them to gain
above-average profits, i.e., economic rents. A set of criteria characterize the types of resources
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that help sustain competitive advantage (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Barney 1991), including:
* Valuable: when they lead to strategies that improve efficiency or effectiveness;
* Rare: when the valuable resources are not possessed by other firms;
* Non-imitable: when competitors cannot imitate due to unique historical
conditions, causally ambiguity, and social complexity; and
* Non-substitutable/transferable: when there are no equivalent valuable
resources available the market
The resource-based theory emphasizes strategic choices that firms make, pointing to the
important tasks of identifying, developing and allocating key resources to maximize returns. It
stresses that a firm's internal conditions is more critical to determining its strategic action than
the external context. By focusing on its unique resources and capabilities as the basis for a
strategy, the firm can better exploit its core competencies relative to opportunities in the
external environment. Sustainable competitive advantage is achieved by continuously
developing existing and creating new resources and capabilities in response to changing
market conditions.
The resource-based theory is robust in explaining how firms in advanced economies
sustain their competitive advantages. However, the theory is less applicable to latecomer
firms, which face additional entry barriers. The resources and capabilities with which
latecomers have to deal are different from those for advanced firms. Reformulating the
resource-based theory, Mathews (2002) proposes that the latecomers leverage external
resources that are imitable, substitutable, and transferable. Imitable resources are those that
latecomers can replicate through various means, including licensing a product design or
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reverse engineering a product. Substitutable resources are those with strong tendencies
towards product and process technology turnover, as in the case of short product cycles.
Transferable resources are those that latecomers can purchase from independent equipment
vendors, in the form of product licenses or transferable process technologies. We extend
Mathews' proposition and demonstrate in the following section how standards contribute to
latecomers' efforts in leveraging for such resources.
STANDARDS AS RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES
Standards are a type of firm-specific assets, encompassing not only proprietary
technological knowledge codified in written documents, but also human resources and
organizational knowledge related to standards activities, as well as customer base and brand
identity associated with specific standards. Standards as resources, therefore, include more
than just technical aspects of the technologies and products in question.
Standardization allows latecomers to leverage external resources more easily and
effectively, particularly because it increases imitability and transferability of the resources.
For instance, latecomers can acquire new technologies in the form of standardized
specifications from technology leaders or purchase them from independent equipment
vendors. How effectively latecomers can use standards to leverage external resources depends
greatly on their general absorptive capability, specifically their standards capability.
Standards capability is simply defined as the capability of an actor (individual, firm, or
institution) to deal effectively with standards (Vries 1999). The types of standards capabilities
include the capability to identify the needs for standards, to search and select appropriate
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standards, to acquire and assimilate standards into the production process, to adapt standards
according to local conditions, to modify standards in response to changing economic
conditions, and to develop new standards for internal and external uses. While all types of
capabilities are important, their levels of sophistication vary. For instance, the capability to
develop and set standards based on proprietary technologies requires more advanced
capability than the search-and-select capability. It requires not only advanced technological
capability but also the ability to deal with other firms and institutions in the market.
Standards capability is also as a measure of technological capability of a firm or a nation.
However, standards capability is more than just technical capability. It involves additional
organizational, institutional, and legal capabilities. As we will show in the case studies of
Korean late standardizers, as firms move closer the world technological frontier,
organizational and legal capabilities become more critical to successful standardization efforts.
Firms need to be able to organize their workforce and knowledge related to standards, and
protect intellectual property rights related to standards.
STANDARDS AS LEVERAGE: LINKING AND LEARNING
In examining the roles of standards and related activities as a mechanism for latecomers to
move beyond catch-up, we use the analytical framework built upon the concept of "resource
leverage" as found in the strategic management literature (e.g., Ghoshal 1987; e.g., Hamel and
Prahalad 1993) and expanded to explain late standardizers (Mathews 2002). Leverage refers
to the effort by the firm to acquire resources beyond its boundary, while enhancing its
absorptive capability once such new resources are acquired (Hamel and Prahalad 1993;
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Mathews 2002). In the case of latecomers, leverage is an effort to overcome their limitation in
their initial internal resources and capabilities (Mathews 2002).
As indicated by the wide acceptance among the strategic management literature, the
resource-based approach has been successful in explaining how firms sustain their
competitive advantages. However, as Mathews (2002) argues, the theory is less successful in
elucidating how firms with limited resources manage to create advantages in the first place so
that they can overcome incumbent advantages. Mathews points to the strategy of "competitive
complementarity" in which latecomer firms complement the strategies of forerunners rather
than confronting them, so that they can leverage their resources through linkages with the
forerunners. By repeating linkage and leverage activities, latecomers learn and accumulate
various types of knowledge for developing technological and organizational capabilities.
How do latecomers use standards to leverage resources at each stage of the late
standardization process? In answering this question, we use an analytical framework similar
to that of Mathews. In our framework, however, Linking and Learning are the two apparatus
that latecomers employ as part of the leverage mechanism. We argue that late standardizers
use standards and related activities as a way to establish linkages with forerunners and other
firms, and to learn about their technologies, such that they leverage the external sources of
resources and capabilities.
The use of standards as a mechanism to move beyond catch-up is distinct in each stage of
late standardization. First, during the catch-up stage, latecomers use standards as a leverage
mechanism to enter mature industries. As latecomers do not have cutting-edge technologies,
they enter the industries in which standardization has already been achieved. As one function
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of standards is to enhance price competition, standardization makes products more compatible
with one another and further enlarges the market. This benefits latecomers as low-cost
producers. Examples abound in which latecomers enter international markets by selling
standardized products. Latecomer firms can also apply internationally accepted specifications
to the development, manufacturing and marketing of local goods and services to raise their
competitiveness in the export markets. Standardization thus facilitates the integration of
latecomers' manufactured exports into the world market.
However, the benefits of using standards to leverage limited resources do not appear
automatically. Latecomers, in practice, have substantial disadvantages in using specifications
of foreign and international standards, and face high adaptation costs in doing so. Because
they have little influence on the development of such standards, most standards are biased in
favor of the requirements of developed-country firms. The objectives of latecomers are rarely
taken into account in the process of international standardization. More sophisticated
standards also mean that firms in developing countries may find it more difficult to penetrate
the developed-country markets. Latecomers, therefore, have to develop internal absorptive
capabilities that deal with standards so as to reduce the adoption costs. Table 4.1 summarizes
the benefits of standards as a leverage mechanism for latecomers to move beyond catch-up.
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Table 4.1: Standards as a Leverage Mechanism through Linking and Learning Apparatus
Standards as learning
Stage Standards as Linkages
Technical Knowledge Business Knowledge
Catch-up Cost-economizing buyer-supplier Codified mature Consumer preferences
linkages: with technology leaders technologies
OEM, buyers and suppliers
Keep-up Cost-economizing buyer-supplier Emerging technologies Potential future customers
linkages: with technology leaders
OEM, buyers and suppliers
Forge-ahead Strategic linkages: with Advanced future Competitors' development plans
competitors, vendors, suppliers technologies
STANDARDS AS LINKING APPARATUS
Standards constitute linkages for latecomers in various ways. Standards serve as the
linkages through which latecomers may extend their presence and influence into new markets
or new businesses. Standards as linkages also function as a way for latecomer to extend into
new cross-borders activities through interfirm relations, possibly with technological leaders.
The more dense these interfirm relations, the more opportunities there are in the global
economy for latecomer firms to tap into (Mathews 2002). During the stage of catch-up,
latecomers, by necessity, adopt standards developed by technological leaders. The choices of
standard indicate which technology leader or leaders that latecomers firms want to follow.
Latecomers that are OEM suppliers accept specifications and standards required by their
buyers, thereby linking their businesses with those of global players.
The use of standards as a linking apparatus depends on the source of competitive
advantage that latecomers enjoy in their process of late standardization. Firms generally gain
competitive advantage and capture rents either from high value or low cost. In the Abernathy-
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Utterback model of innovation dynamics, during the fluid stage before the dominant design or
standards are fixed, prices are usually determined by product values derived from functional
performance. Once the dominant design or standards are fixed, the competition, and hence
prices, are often determined by costs of products (Table 4.2).




Without advanced technologies as their source of competitive advantage, latecomers
cannot compete in terms of product functions in their early stage of development. They have
to compete in the mature-product markets, where products are made around some dominant
designs. Price competition is fierce and pressure on profit margins is enormous. Firms need to
reduce costs and increase volume of production. In order to compete in such markets,
latecomers have to focus on the costs and quality of products. This gives rise to the important
role of quality standardization and management. Latecomers have to commit to firm-wide
improvement in efficiency from production to distribution. Quality management and
standardization becomes the key for latecomers to go beyond catch-up. As latecomers are able
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to produce mature products with quality and reliability, they become part of global value
chains. This linkage is the first step towards being accepted by the existing leaders and the
first step to be eventually allowed to join the standards club. Late standardizers need to focus
first on quality and reliability in process and production.
Once latecomers develop into fast followers, they establish linkages with technology
leaders not only through adopting the actual standards themselves but also through
participating in external standardization activities. Here, they acquire the opportunity to
connect with forerunners in the industry through common standardization efforts. Standards
allow latecomer firms to "network" with leading multinational companies. As Cho and Lee
(2003) argue, networking capabilities are an important factor for technological catch-up in the
globalization era. Linkages that latecomer firms can establish through standards forums may
be another channel for them to improve their networking capabilities.
Linkages established through common standards and standardization efforts allow firms to
leverage their R&D assets through strategic alliances. Such strategic alliances allow late
standardizers not only to reduce risks and costs of R&D and improve their appropriability of
their innovation, but also to acquire market access and complementary assets and resources
that they do not possess in-house (Narula and Hagendoorn 1999). As Penrose (1959/1995)
and Teece (1980) argue, internal economies of scope arise when there are excess capabilities
in the organization that can be usefully applied to new activities that are similar to the ones in
which the firm has already engaged. Quality standards and tools help create such economies
of scope externally for latecomer firms by linking them with other firms.
Standards and related efforts function as a Linking apparatus slightly differently for late
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standardizers at the forge-ahead stage that have substantial R&D capabilities. As late
standardizers develop internal R&D resources and capabilities, they face an additional
challenge; they have intellectual property that needs to be used in one way or another to
justify the R&D investment. While many standards are eventually open for public use, most
industry standards contain technologies proprietary to firms. One of the main motives behind
firms' engagement in technical standardization is thus to gain control over future generations
of technology, such that their proprietary intellectual property is included in standards.
Advanced late standardizers often build linkages with their competitors, vendors, or buyers in
the form of strategic alliances, for instance, in the form of standards clubs. The main
motivation behind such strategic alliances is not short-term cost economization, but long-term
profit optimization (Narula and Hagendoorn 1999). Therefore, late standardizers at the forge-
ahead stage consider standards as part of their long-term R&D and/or corporate strategies.
STANDARDS AS LEARNING APPARATUS
Standards serve as a Learning apparatus for late standardizers in various ways. Through
standards, late standardizers acquire two general types of knowledge from external sources:
technical knowledge and business knowledge. While latecomers acquire both types of
knowledge during the late standardization process, the levels of complexity and novelty of
technical knowledge vary greatly at different stages of late standardization (see Table 4.18).
During the catch-up stage, latecomers acquire knowledge about mature technologies, as well
as consumer preferences and market-access information, through standards and technical
regulations. Fast followers then learn about emerging technologies, as they participate directly
in external standardization activities. For advanced late standardizers that are technology
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leaders, the knowledge about competitors' technologies as well as product development plans
have important strategic implications for them.
Late standardizers learn from standards through various modes. One is through studying
the written standards themselves, which are in effect a codified form of technical knowledge.
Another mode is through participating in standardization processes, in which technical
knowledge is not yet codified but in the codification process.
Standards as codified technical knowledge
Standards are a form of codified knowledge. By adopting existing standards, latecomers
are able to learn about the technologies codified such standards without having to invest
heavily in R&D. They can avoid the waste of resources by not having to "reinvent the wheel."
Technical specifications described in standards are important sources for technical knowledge
and know-how for latecomer firms. As many standards are often publicly available, or can be
purchased from standards organizations, they can be used, in principle, by any firm. This
means, at least theoretically, that products based on these standards may be produced at any
locations that are not the original source of innovation. Latecomer firms can thus benefit
greatly from knowledge codification that occurs during the standardization process.
Latecomers may learn various subject matters from standards. These include: (1) a set of
nomenclature or definition of terms, (2) specifications for the quality, composition, or
performance of a material, an instrument, a machine, or a structure, (3) sampling or inspection
methods to determine conformity with a specified requirement of a large quantity of material,
(4) testing methods to evaluate specified characteristics of a material or chemical, (5) a
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scheme of simplification of variety of sizes, shapes, or grades, (6) a code of practice for
design, construction, operation, and safety, and (7) a model form of contract or agreement
(United Nations 1964). As in technology acquisition in general, the selection of types, modes,
and sources of standards by latecomer firms is often strategic and depends on the firms'
capabilities and constraints. The standards that latecomers adopt are usually mature standards,
or are based on mature standards established by technological leaders.
Figure 4.3: Sources and Modes of Standards Acquisition
~Iodes of Acquisition
Notes: SDOs stands for Standards Dc\'elopment Organizations.
Sources of Standards
Types of Standards
As shown in Figure 4.2, several sources are possible from which latecomers can acquire
standards. These include formal external sources, such as industry associations and national
SDOs, and less formal external sources, such as consortia and alliances. It is very unlikely, if
not impossible, that latecomer firms would use standards developed by internal sources, e.g.,
their research and development (R&D) departments. Therefore, in the model of late
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standardization, latecomer firms are assumed to start from adopting standards developed by
forerunner firms and/or by SDOs. Latecomer firms may acquire the specific details of
standards through various modes, including direct purchase from SDOs and consortia,
technical assistance from buyers and suppliers, joint venture with foreign firms, expert
consultants, and/or professional publications and conferences. In effect, these sources are
linkages that latecomers utilize for their technological upgrading efforts.
Standards as codified business knowledge
By adopting standards developed by technology leaders, latecomers may acquire not only
technical knowledge but also business knowledge. Business knowledge includes not only
information about consumers' preferences and trends, but also market-access information,
particularly on institutional and regulatory regimes. While many standards and regulations are
mandatory by law, particularly those for safety, health, and the environment, others are
voluntarily adopted by the market. Latecomers often choose to adopt voluntary standards
developed by their major trading partners, so as to facilitate entry in the export markets
(Stephenson 1997).
Another way for latecomers to learn from standards is by proving that their products
comply with certain standards and technical regulations. Latecomers may start from selling
products to domestic markets where regulations are not strict or limited in number. Then they
attempt to export developed markets where standards and technical regulations are stricter and
greater in number. During such process, latecomers have much to gain from learning about
different institutional and regulatory regimes. While standards pose tremendous obstacles to
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latecomers' technological efforts, the process of learning-by-proving is indeed an important
channel for them to learn and benefit from the dense thicket of standards and technical
regulations (Srinivas 2004).
However, as identified in the vast literature of technological transfer, even mature
technologies are not easy for latecomer firms to acquire and adopt (e.g., Lall 1993). The same
is true for standards. Latecomer firms and governments may have substantial disadvantages in
using specifications of mature standards, and face high adaptation costs in doing so. Because
latecomers have little influence on the development of standards at the beginning, most
standards are biased in favor of the requirements of the technological leaders. Their objectives,
capabilities, and constraints are rarely taken into account in the process of standardization.
Learning during keeping-up and forging-ahead
Fast-follower firms acquire technical and business knowledge by participating in
standardization activities. The advantages of participating in standards consortia and alliances
are not limited to the knowledge about the technologies used in standards and the information
regarding market access. Generally, firms that join standards consortia are more likely to gain
knowledge about what technologies to be adopted in the marketplace than firms that do not
join. Particularly, informal consortia and alliances are the places where rapidly-changing
fields of technologies are being discussed and decided. Fast followers gain the knowledge as
to what technologies are likely to be adopted by other firms and eventually in the future
market. This knowledge is critical for fast followers, especially during the time when even
technological leaders have to form alliances to remain competitive.
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There are limited windows of opportunity, within which firms can acquire and decide on
dominant design and standards. After dominant designs are decided, market demand will rise.
As Christensen et al. (1998) empirically show, firms that adopt the dominant design or
standards are able to exploit the rising demand more than firms that do not. We can logically
extend this statement and argue that first-mover advantages are not necessarily about first-to-
the market. Rather it is the first to establish the dominant design and produce products
according to it. Firms that participate in standardization are able to introduce products to the
market more quickly, as they have more knowledge about the future dominant design.
Standards also allow late standardizers to diversify their product lines more efficiently.
Underlying this proposition are two key explanatory variables: that is, product mix and
diversification pattern. As a stylized fact, latecomer firms, such as the Korean firms, have
generally focused on the expansion of capacity and international market share for
homogeneous, mass-produced products. They have adopted the competition strategy that
focuses on product diversification into technologically unrelated areas. Once a latecomer firm
reaches the limits of capacity and market share expansion for a particular product, it moves on
to a new product group that permits rapid market expansion. These products are based on
proven technologies and well-established standards.
However, in the process of upgrading into higher-end and growing market segments for
differentiated products, latecomer firms have to deal with technical features that are still fluid
and uncertain. But they generally lack the broad technological base that would allow them to
gain better competitive positions through technological diversification. Technological
diversification is defined as the expansion of a firm's or a product's technology base into a
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broader range of technological areas (Granstand and Sjolander 1992). Technological
diversification would allow latecomer firms to extend its leadership into other
technologically-related market segments. Participation in standards development hence
becomes critical, as latecomers need to acquire the knowledge on technological trajectories as
well as the generic technologies in standards which generally connect different technological
areas. Late standardizers can acquire such knowledge and information by participating in
meetings and conferences organized by standards consortia, where emerging technologies are
discussed and debated as potential candidates for new technological standards.
Standardization as codification process of knowledge
The standardization process is, in effect, the process of codifying some of the tacit
knowledge embodied in products and processes. Especially in the case of de jure standards set
by standard-setting organizations, firms and individuals that participate in the standardization
process have to cooperate and share some of their proprietary information and knowledge.
Standards thus convert tacit, localized, and proprietary knowledge into generic, explicit
technological and organizational knowledge that other firms can utilize (Antonelli 1994).
As discussed earlier, voluntary standards are non-pure private goods that are created and
shared by members of a club. By participating in the standard-setting processes, each club
member in effect agrees to share technical and commercial information, the use of the same
pool of intermediate and primary inputs, and the resulting market demand for their products.
The use of information is non-rival within the club, thus leading to more efficient production
processes and higher levels of demand. Being a club member, each firm has the power to
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influence the final specification of the standards such that the final outcome is as close as
possible to its current products and/or processes. Meanwhile, firms outside the standard-
setting club would face disadvantages if they were to adopt the standards on which they have
no influence. In fact, firms often use product standards as a strategy to raise the costs of their
competitors (Salop and Scheffman 1987).
These propositions are applicable to the model of late standardization. Technological
leaders are members of standard-setting clubs, while latecomers at the catching-stage are non-
members who have to adopt the standards developed by the clubs. Forerunners enjoy first-
mover advantages from adopting standards that they themselves develop, especially from
learning and reputation effects, which lead to greater market shares at the early stages of
product life cycles. Latecomers, on the other hand, face substantial disadvantages in entering
the market, due to entry barriers and network effects caused by standards.
Standards also allow late standardizers to learn about their competitors' technological
paths and product development plans.21 This is particularly true for late standardizers that are
already in the forge-ahead stage, in which functional product performance is the basis for
market competition and a key factor underlying firms' competitive advantage.
Internal standardization as a way for knowledge accumulation
The knowledge that latecomers acquire through standards and standardization is not
limited to that from external sources. By engaging in internal standardization activities,
particularly those related to quality control and assurance, latecomers learn how to improve
technological capabilities. Standardization allows firms to codify and accumulate various
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types of knowledge and know-how that employees repeatedly experience. Internal standards
activities thus facilitate knowledge accumulation at the firm level.
As Amsden (2001) points out, three types of capabilities are crucial to technological
efforts of any firm: namely, production capabilities, and project execution capabilities, and
innovation capabilities. Standards contribute to the accumulation of all three types of
capabilities. Through quality control and assurance practices, such as the ISO-9000 series and
Six Sigma, latecomer firms learn how to improve their production capabilities. Various types
of project management standards, such as Project Management Institute (PMI) standards,
allow firms to learn and record their experiences, such that they can improve project
execution capabilities. In sum, latecomers cannot improve their technological capabilities
without engaging in internal standardization practices.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Standards activities are an important mechanism that enables late standardizers to move
from one competitive position to another. Specifically, standards function as a leverage
mechanism that firms can use to move from being latecomers to fast followers and finally to
first movers. Two specific apparatus function as the leverage mechanism, namely, linkage and
learning apparatus. These apparatus allow late standardizers to overcome their unique
constraints as latecomers, including inadequate resources and capabilities, and limited access
to lead-user markets and specialized inputs.
Standards constitute linkages through which late standardizers may extend their presence
and influence into new markets or new businesses through inter-firm relations, possibly with
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technological leaders. In a nutshell, adopting others' standards and technologies indicate the
decision for what Mathews (2002) calls "competitive complementarity," in which latecomers
complement the strategies of incumbents rather than confronting them as part of the effort to
upgrade their competitive positions.
As fast followers, firms establish linkages with technology leaders not only through
adopting standards but also through participating in external standardization activities. Here,
they acquire the opportunity to connect with forerunners in the industry through common
standardization efforts. Advanced late standardizers build linkages with their competitors,
vendors, or buyers in the form of strategic alliances. The main motivation behind such
strategic alliances is not short-term cost economization, but long-term profit optimization.
Standards forums are an example of such strategic alliances.
Using standards as a learning apparatus, late standardizers acquire two general types of
knowledge from external sources: technical knowledge and business knowledge. While
latecomers acquire both types of knowledge during their late standardization process, the
levels of complexity and novelty of technical knowledge vary greatly with different stages of
late standardization. During the catch-up stage, latecomers acquire knowledge about mature
technologies, consumer preferences, and institutional and regulatory regimes through
standards. During the keep-up stage, fast followers learn about emerging technologies by
participating in standards development. During the forge-ahead stage, late standardizers
acquire knowledge about competitors' research directions and product development plans
through interacting with them in standards forums, which have important strategic
implications for competitive advantage.
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Internal standardization practices allow firms to record and accumulate technical and
business knowledge. Through quality control and assurance standards, latecomer firms learn
how to improve their production capabilities. Similarly, through project management
standards, latecomer firms learn and record their experiences in capacity expansion and
business diversification through projects. This results in improvement in project execution
capabilities. Latecomers cannot improve their technological capabilities without engaging in
internal standardization practices. We now turn our attention to the case studies of Korean late
standardizers to illustrate how standards serve as a leverage mechanism for them to move
from one competitive position to another.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDIES OF LATE STANDARDIZERS IN SEMICONDUCTOR
SAMSUNG'S LATE STANDARDIZATION IN SEMICONDUCTOR N SAMSUNG AS LATECOMER .
SAMSUNG AS FAST FOLLOWER . SAMSUNG AS STANDARDS LEADER .
OTHER LATE STANDARDIZERS IN SEMICONDUCTOR u CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since the rise of Japan as a technological and standards leader in the 1970s, very few
countries in recent decades have emerged from being technological and standards followers to
leaders. Among the small number of latecomer firms that have emerged as important players
in international standardization arenas, South Korean latecomers are the most prominent.
They have caught up and kept up with the technological changes introduced by the
forerunners in the Triad countries. Some of these late standardizers, for instance, Samsung
Electronics and LG Electronics, have exhibited technological and standards leadership in
several technical areas, notably in the semiconductor and mobile communication industries.
We have selected these firms as our case studies to examine empirically how they engage
in standards and standardization activities, and, as a result, have emerged to become
technological and standards leaders. In other words, we examine how standards and related
activities enable them to move from being latecomers to become fast followers and first
movers. As explained in Chapter One, we select South Korean late standardizers as our core
case studies, so that we can trace their successful efforts in late standardization and
technological catch-up in the past few decades. On the other hand, we select Thai latecomers
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as the shadow cases, from which we refine and generalize the findings from the Korean cases.
For the semiconductor industry, we focus mainly on the Semiconductor Division of
Samsung Electronics, with some references to other late standardizers, such as Hynix of South
Korea and Hana Microelectronics of Thailand. We pay particular attention to their
experiences in JEDEC, a major semiconductor standards forum.
Our case study of Samsung Electronics in the semiconductor industry shows that
standards and related activities play critical roles throughout its technological development
process. Samsung's emergence as an industry leader was first manifested through its market
share, then through its technological breakthrough, finally through its influence on technical
standardization. The focus on quality standards and procedures has always been important
since its early years of technological development. However, as Samsung moves closer to the
technological frontier, external standards activities become a key factor in determining
Samsung's strategy and competitiveness. Our case studies of Samsung, LG, and KT in the
mobile communication industry in the next chapter also suggest that standards activities are at
the heart of these firms' R&D strategies and their competitive advantage.
These successful late standardizers also adjust their organizational structures, so that
standards activities become a core component of R&D strategies and policies. Samsung and
LG both have human resources policies that accommodate the career growth of standards
engineers such that they are continuously involved in standards activities. In the following
sections, we discuss these case studies in detail, starting from Samsung Electronics, followed
by Hynix of South Korea and Hana Microlectronics of Thailand.
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SAMSUNG'S LATE STANDARDIZATION IN SEMICONDUCTOR
In many respects, Samsung Electronics is the most prominent latecomer firm in recent
decades. Just over a decade ago, Samsung was merely a manufacturer of low-end consumer
electronics under a few brand names, including Wiseview, Tantus, and Yepp.22 Now, it is one
of the most respectable companies in the world. According to Business Week's annual survey
of The 100 Top Global Brands in 2005, Samsung is ranked 20 th worldwide, among other top
brands, such as Toyota, Nokia, and IBM. Over the past five years, Samsung has enjoyed the
biggest surge in value of any Global 100 brand, with a 186% increase. In the 2005 ranking,
Samsung has even surpassed Sony (2 8th), which had been the leading electronics firm for a
few decades.
Founded in Daegu, South Korea, Samsung Electronics is part of the Samsung Group. As
the largest and dominant arm of the Samsung Group, Samsung Electronics operates in around
58 countries and has over 208,000 workers. In 2004, Samsung posted full-year net profits of
10.8 trillion won ($10b), making it one of the most successful companies in the world.
As of 2005, Samsung Electronics operates in five business areas: namely (1)
Telecommunication network: Mobile handsets and network infrastructure; (2) Digital and
Home Appliances: e.g., washing machines, microwave ovens, refrigerators; (3) Digital Media:
e.g., camcorders, computers, DVD-players, PDAs; (4) Liquid Crystal Display (LCD): e.g.,
TFT-LCDs for handheld devices, monitors, and TVs; and (5) Semiconductor: e.g., DRAMs,
Flash memory, CMOS. 23 Our focus in this chapter is on Samsung's semiconductor business,
in which the firm has demonstrated strong leadership in technological and standards
development. We first discuss Samsung's history of technological development in the
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semiconductor industry. Then we focus on its engagement in semiconductor standardization,
particularly in JEDEC, a major standards consortium. We examine how such activities enable
Samsung to move beyond being a follower to become a leader in the industry. We pay
particular attention to how standards contribute to the firm's linking and learning efforts.
SAMSUNG'S SEMICONDUCTOR BUSINESS
Among many of Samsung's products and services, the semiconductor has long been its
cash cow, if not golden goose. Semiconductor businesses have been the main source of sales
revenues for Samsung, accounting for 32 percent of the company's turnover in 2004. Only in
the past couple of years has its semiconductor sales revenue been surpassed by its
telecommunication network sales, which in 2004 accounted for 33 percent of the total
turnover.24
Samsung Electronics is now among the largest and most profitable firms in the global
semiconductor industry. As of 2005, Samsung is the world's number two after Intel, and
number one in the memory market in terms of total sale revenues in 2005. As shown in Table
5.1, Samsung's market leadership in the memory market is strong in most major memory
product segments, including Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), Static Access
Memory (SRAM), Flash memory, and Display Driver Integrated Circuit (DDI).
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Source: iSuppli Corp. 2006
Particularly in DRAM, Samsung has maintained the number one position for more than
ten years, since it first surged to become the market leader in 1992 (Table 5.2). It currently
occupies more than 30 percent of the total DRAM market share.
Table 5.2: Samsung's Market Leadership in Semiconductor Industry
Product Market Share Rank Leader Since
DRAM 30% 1st 1992
SRAM 27% 1st 1995
Flash Memory 25% 1st 2003
LDC Driver IC 19% Ist 2002
Total Memory products 25% 1st 1993
Overall Semiconductor 6% 2nd -
Source: Dataquest
Note: Market share data are for 2004.
Samsung is now among the world leaders in semiconductors not only in terms of market
share, but also in terms of technological innovation. The company is now a technology leader














Integrated Circuit for TFT-LCD panels. Samsung's Semiconductor Division has three
business units: Memory, TFT-LCD and System LSI, providing advanced solutions for the
mobile, desktop computing, consumer electronics and industrial markets. Samsung has one of
the broadest portfolios in the industry. This strength lays the basis for Samsung's TFT-LCD
technologies, another product segment in which the firm demonstrates technological and
market leadership. Samsung has also constantly increased its leadership in System-on-a-Chip
devices.
Samsung's timeline in semiconductor and its standards activities
Samsung's entry into the semiconductor industry dates back to 1974 when it started wafer
fabrication. It was not until the early 1980s that Samsung entered into more sophisticated
semiconductor products, such as DRAM. Samsung's path of technological development can
be divided into three periods, corresponding to its relative position to the world technological
leader: catch-up, keep-up, and forge-ahead. The three periods also correspond to the three
stages of our staged model of late standardization and technological catch-up.
As a latecomer, Samsung's catch-up stage started in the late 1970s up until around 1985,
during which the firm was producing memory products with heavy reliance on foreign
technologies. Samsung became a fast follower in the keep-up stage after 1985, when it
managed to close its technological gaps with world leaders within months, not years as before.
Samsung obtained the status of a first mover when the firm became the first in the world to
develop 64K DRAMs in 1991. Samsung's standards leadership, however, did not start until
1996, when the firm became the main force behind Double-Data-Rate DRAM standardization.
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In Table 5.3. we show the timeline of Samsung's leadership in DRAM, not only in terms of
market share, but also in terms of technological and standards development. Figure 5.1
illustrates the sequence of leadership that Samsung progressed through.
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Figure 5.1: Samsung's Leadership Sequence in Semiconductor
Mature Product Technology Leader Standards Leader New-Product
Leader Leader
R&D StandardsActivity Strategic Planning
CATCH-UP: SAMSUNG AS LATECOMER (1974-1985)
Samsung first gained the necessary technologies to enter the semiconductor industry by
acquiring Korea Semiconductor, the first Korean semiconductor firm, in 1974. Korea
Semiconductor was founded by Ki-Dong Kang, a Korean engineer who had a Ph.D. from
Ohio State University and experience in semiconductor design at Motorola (Kim 1997).
Samsung engineers learned greatly from Dr. Kang about semiconductor design and
production. This made it possible for Samsung to start limited-scale production of transistors
and integrated circuits, although with low yield ratios, for its in-house production of consumer
electronics. To enable its technological capability, Samsung established the Semiconductor
R&D Laboratory in 1982. The R&D Lab focused primarily on reverse engineering bipolar
and metal oxide semiconductors (MOS) and assimilating the technologies into Samsung's
production processes (Kim 1997).
Samsung's technological effort expanded greatly in 1983 when it increased investment in
very-large-scale integrated circuits (VLSI) production. Instead of following the existing
technological path of progressing from 1K DRAM to 4K DRAM and to 16K DRAM,
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Samsung entered directly into the development and production of 64K DRAMs. This was
contrary to the position of the government, which argued for Korean firms to start from 1K
DRAMs and move up to more sophisticated memory products (Lee and Lim 2001).
Samsung was able to skip some of the earlier steps in the technological path, partly
because it managed to secure necessary technologies from external sources. In fact,
Samsung's technological development in the 1970s and early 1980s was characterized by its
heavy reliance on foreign suppliers for necessary technologies. This effort was not free of
obstacles. Leading foreign producers, such as Texas Instruments and Motorola in the United
States, and NEC and Hitachi in Japan, refused to license the 64K DRAM technologies to
Samsung. After an extensive search by a task force team, Samsung was able to identify a
number of semiconductor firms, from which Samsung could acquire VLSI technologies.
Eventually, Samsung purchased the design for high-speed MOS process from Zytrex and
licensed 64K DRAM designs and CMOS process technology from Micron Technology
(United States) and Sharp (Japan) (Kim 1997). The licensing agreements included training
programs in which Samsung's engineers were sent to these technology suppliers. These
programs contributed significantly to the firm's capability to assimilate the advanced
technologies into Samsung's design and production processes.
With its extensive experiences for eight years in producing transistor and integrated
circuits, Samsung was able assimilate the new VLSI technologies acquired from the foreign
sources into its production operation with the yield ratio as high as 92 percent, the level
achieved only by leading Japanese firms (Kim 1997). The impressive production capability
was the result of Samsung's relentless R&D efforts. The highlight of the efforts was the two
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R&D teams that worked collaboratively in assimilating and commercializing the 64K DRAM.
One of the two R&D teams was established in 1983 in Silicon Valley, the strategic location
for the semiconductor industry. This R&D outpost allowed Samsung to gain knowledge about
new technologies through various modes, including recruiting experienced engineers from
other semiconductor firms and training of its engineers in Silicon Valley. The other R&D
team was established in Korea, led by engineers who had experiences in LSI and VLSI
technologies at leading U.S. firms. The collaboration between the two groups through training,
joint research, and consulting, facilitated effective knowledge transfer from Silicon Valley to
the team in Korea.
Samsung was finally able to develop its first 64K DRAM in 1983 and started selling the
chips in the market in 1984, about forty months after Texas Instruments, the world pioneer,
and about eighteen months after the first Japanese version. After its success in developing a
64K DRAM, the firm mounted its technological efforts in designing its own design
technology for the next-generation 256K DRAM. Fully utilizing its R&D outposts in Silicon
Valley, as well as the accumulated knowledge on process technologies, Samsung eventually
was able to develop a 256K DRAM in 1984, about 2 years behind AT&T (Western Electric).
The development of a 256K DRAM marked a significant step for Samsung, as the R&D team
in Silicon Valley was able to design a 256K DRAM circuit completely on its own. The
knowledge and experiences became an important foundation for the firm to move onto the
development of subsequent generations of DRAMs, such as 1M and 4M DRAMs. (Kim 1997)
Right after Samsung reached the final stage of developing the mass production system for
256K DRAMs in Korea, its R&D teams, both in Korea and Silicon Valley, started working on
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the development of a IM DRAM. Its technological capability was such that the firm decided
not to acquire technologies from external sources but to develop them in-house. Despite the
significant technological changes from the 256K DRAM, Samsung's R&D teams were able to
develop a IM DRAM in 1986, reducing the gap with the Japanese pioneer from two years for
the 256K DRAM to one year for the IM DRAM. Samsung started its mass production of 1M
DRAM also one year later than leading Japanese firms, including Hitachi and Toshiba. But
this was not too late, as the firm still could enjoy the rapid rise in market demand. (Kim 1997)
Standards activities during catch-up
During the catch-up stage, Samsung acquired a substantial portion of its technical
knowledge from equipment and raw-material suppliers. Technical training programs provided
by these suppliers were an essential source of technical know-how for Samsung. These
suppliers were the main source of technical specifications and standards, which became the
main source for product development and mass production of relatively mature products.25
Samsung's reliance on equipment and raw-material suppliers for standards and technical
specification gradually decreased as the firm accumulated more in-house technological
capability. The relationship between Samsung and its suppliers has also changed to a more co-
working relationship than before. For earlier products, Samsung used the standard models
purchased from suppliers. However, as its technological capability developed, Samsung used
an increasing number of its own specifications for equipment for the suppliers to follow. As
Samsung approached the stages of keep-up and forge-ahead, its relationship with equipment
suppliers has become more collaborative. In fact, Samsung now co-develops some of the most
advanced equipment with its suppliers (Choi 1996).26
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The standards and technical specifications that Samsung acquired during its catch-up stage
were based on relatively mature technologies. As its internal technological capability
developed, it became more difficult for Samsung to acquire more advanced specifications.
The forerunners at the time were unwilling to license their technologies to Samsung. This put
tremendous pressure on Samsung to find other ways to acquire new specifications. This
problem became serious, as Samsung entered its keep-up stage as a fast follower.
Keys to successful catch-up: quality, quality, and quality
Throughout the process of late standardization and technological catch-up, quality control
and standardization is a key for latecomer firms to build a basic mechanism to move from one
stage to another. Quality standards are important throughout the process, although they are
particularly important for the early stages of technological catch-up. The types of standards
that latecomers focus on are also different in different stages of technological development.
For Samsung Electronics, quality control and standards have long played a paramount role
from the early years of its catch-up efforts. Since Samsung Electronics was founded in 1969,
the company has used various tools and techniques for internal quality control and
standardization. These include Total Quality Control (TQC), Total Process Management
(TPM), Product Data Management (PDM), Enterprise Resource Management (ERM), Supply
Chain Management (SCM), and Customer Relationship Management (CRM). Since 1999,
Samsung has adopted and implemented Six Sigma as a core tool to improve its competitive
position in the global market (Yun and Chua 2002).
Table 5.4 highlights the main standardization and quality control efforts at Samsung
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Electronics in three different stages of late standardization and technological catch-up. During
its catch-up stage, Samsung engaged in various aspects of standardization and quality control,
some of which was developed by Samsung itself. For instance, right around 1986, Samsung
adopted an internal standardization program called No Spec No Work (NSNW) policy, which
is a quality standard and procedure for the manufacturing of all Samsung products. In essence,
NSNW controls and audits the status of standard-observance of all manufacturing processes
in the factories. Samsung has continued to implement this standard procedure even to this day
in its domestic and overseas manufacturing operation (Stratton 2002).
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Another important aspect of standardization activities that Samsung has pursued since its
early years of late standardization is international certification. One of the very first
international certification for quality standards that Samsung received was Ford Q-101. Ford
Q-101 is a status that is awarded to suppliers that successfully apply the Ford's Quality
Operating System (QOS). Ford Q101 is an older version (1990) and the current
standard/award is Q1 2002. QOS is an advanced approach to Total Quality Management
(TQM), one of the techniques widely used in implementing the QS-9000 standard. QOS
focuses on continuous improvement via strategic goals based on organizational missions,
customer expectations and competitive benchmarks.
Samsung's standards activities during forge-ahead stage
From the early 1990s, Samsung has devoted significant effort into attaining the ISO 9000
standards series, one of the most important international standards for quality control and
management. The ISO 9000 standards outline the policies and procedures for improving and
controlling the various processes that are expected to result in improved business performance.
Originally developed by the British Standards Institute, the ISO 9000 series has gained
international and formal recognition. The standards are now maintained by the ISO and
administered by accreditation and certification bodies.
Samsung obtained IS09001 for the operation of its plants in Korea as early as June 1993,
becoming one of the first semiconductor firms to acquire such certification (Table 5.5). All of
Samsung's domestic and overseas semiconductor sites have acquired the ISO 9000
certification. The firm prides itself with the industry's most complete portfolio of zero-defect
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semiconductor components and TFT LCD screens. Samsung was also granted the revised
version IS09001: 2000 in 2001. Samsung's System LSI Business Unit acquired QS 9000 in
1999, and switched to the ISO 9001:2000 certified sites in 2002 while upgrading the quality
management system. To date, Samsung has implemented a broad range of quality
management system achievements, such as the ISO9000, TL9000 and the QS9000.27
Table 5.5: Samsung's Quality Certificate Milestones
Certification Site Registration Scope Issued Date
ISO 9000 Domestic Kiheung Design and fabrication of Jun. 1993
memory, SYS-LSI semiconductor
Kiheung, Design and manufacture of LCD Oct. 1995
Chonan Jan.1999
Onyang Assembly and test of memory, Jun. 1993
SYS-LSI semiconductor
Overseas SESS Assembly and test of Jun. 1999
(China) semiconductor
SAS Fabrication of memory Oct. 1999
(U.S.A) semiconductor
QS 9000 Domestic Kiheung, Design, fabrication, assembly & Mar. 2002
Hwasung, test of memory, SYS-LSI
Onyang semiconductor
TL9000 Domestic Kiheung, Design, manufacture, assembly Oct. 2001
Hwasung, and test of memory, S-LSI,
Onyang, AMLCD
Chonan
Source: Samsung's corporate website: www.samsung.com
Samsung acquired international certification for quality assurance and management for
various industries. For instance, Samsung achieved TL9000, the international standard for the
telecommunication industry, in October 2001, and QS9000, the international standard for the
automobile industry, in March 2002. Its quality management system covers all stages, ranging
from order receipt, development, production to shipment.
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KEEP-UP: SAMSUNG AS FAST FOLLOWER (1985-1991)
For the subsequent generations of DRAM, Samsung had to compete directly against
Japanese and U.S. leading firms. As the semiconductor market, especially for DRAM started
to mature, the industry became more consolidated. This means there were few technology
holders that could potentially become the provider of new technologies and designs for
Samsung. The firm responded to this constraint by investing even more heavily in its R&D
activities. The investment and efforts resulted in significant improvement of Samsung's
knowledge base and technological capabilities. For instance, the number of local patents
granted to Samsung rose from only 4 in 1980 to 1,413 in 1994. For technologies related to 4M
DRAM alone, Samsung received as many as 56 patents (Kim 1997).
Samsung's technological efforts for 4M and 16M DRAMs are characterized by its ability
to keep up with technology leaders in developing and mass producing the chips. The firm
completed its design of 4M DRAM in 1988, only six months after the Japanese pioneer,
Hitachi. With its accumulated knowledge in process technologies, Samsung was able to mass
produce 4M DRAMs almost at the same time as the Japanese leaders. Similarly, Samsung
was able to develop a 16M DRAM just three months after the world pioneer, Toshiba. In fact,
with its superior process technologies, Samsung became the first firm to mass-produce 16M
DRAMs in 1991 (Shin and Jang 2005).
Standards activities during keep-up
It was during this period when Samsung started paying attention to standardization
activities in several standards forums.28 One such forum was JEDEC, the Joint Electron
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Device Engineering Council - Solid State Technology Association. Samsung first became a
member of JEDEC in 1988, almost 15 years after it first entered the semiconductor industry.29
It joined the standards organization when it had already emerged as a main player in the
DRAM market. It was also the same year when Samsung entered the licensing agreements
with Hitachi of Japan for 64K and 256K DRAM technologies (Choi 1996), a critical move
that enabled Samsung to acquire necessary technologies for advanced semiconductor products.
In the late 1980s, it became obvious to Samsung executives that it was important and
necessary for the company to join JEDEC. By that time, JEDEC was already the main forum
for standardization of memory technologies. The executives recognized that memory products
were the only "commodity" product left in the semiconductor industry for Samsung to enter
and perform well. It thus seemed sensible for Samsung to join JEDEC. In addition, all major
DRAM manufacturers at that time were JEDEC members. Particularly, leading Japanese
manufacturers were the main actors in JEDEC in the 1980s and early 1990s. Samsung
realized that for the firm to catch-up and keep-up with the new technologies, it would have to
become part of this standards club.30
Another reason for Samsung's decision to join standardization activities at JEDEC was
the pressure from its OEM customers. These OEM customers increasingly demanded that
Samsung's memory chips would have to meet JEDEC standards. This made it necessary for
Samsung to become part of JEDEC.
According to Gil Russell, who represented Samsung at the beginning of its JEDEC
membership, the participation of Samsung during the first few years was limited to
information gathering. Russell himself had been familiar with JEDEC, having worked for
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NEC before joining Samsung. Hired by Samsung Semiconductor, Inc (SSI) to represent the
firm at JEDEC, Russell would attend technical meetings to exchange ideas, while writing
minutes and memos, having them translated and then sent directly to Samsung's R&D
Division in Korea. We discuss the organizational structure of standards-related activities in
Samsung in the next chapter.
One of the main motivations behind Samsung's decision to join JEDEC was the
"curiosity" about what was going on in the industry. Before joining JEDEC, Samsung
recognized that most leading firms in the industry, especially the Japanese, were the main
actors in JEDEC. So the executives of the firm were curious about what was actually going on
in the organization. By participating in standards activities, Samsung not only acquired the
latest technical and market information in the industry, the firm could also meet with big
vendors and buyers in the industry, who were also members of JEDEC. In effect, participating
in standardization activities is a low cost way to meet vendors and customers. 31
During its first few years in JEDEC, Samsung participated mostly as an observer. The
number of committees and subcommittees in which Samsung participated were limited to a
few. Samsung started to become influential in JEDEC around 1993-1994. The firm started to
send more engineers and technical experts to participate in various JEDEC committees. As of
January 2006, Samsung's engineers and executives are chairman or vice-chairman in four out
of fifty-five committees/subcommittees. 32
Quality standards and ramp-up capability
The use of quality standards and methods, such as Six Sigma, underscores Samsung's
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ability to ramp up its production to cope with shorter product- and technology-life cycles. The
use of Six Sigma has enabled Samsung not only to improve and sustain the quality of the
products but also increases the speed to market. The key to the speed to market is not only
merely the improved manufacturing process itself, but includes the implementation of the
standards and tools from the early stage of designing new products and/or processes.
Samsung utilizes the Design for Six Sigma (DFSS) methodology in designing new
semiconductor products/processes to prevent anticipated problems and to collect feedback
data for subsequent mass production. As increasing profits in the semiconductor industry are
usually attributed to downsizing the chip sizes, continuous improvement and development of
process technologies become a critical factor that affects competitiveness (Mathews and Cho
2000). A fast ramp-up capability is, in fact, one of the most important sources for Samsung's
competitiveness (Shin and Jang 2005).
Samsung utilizes the Six-Sigma method extensively and successfully in process
development for new semiconductor products. Unlike products that are made up of many
component parts, such as refrigerators and TV, semiconductors are manufactured by putting
together a set of photos, etches, and deposition processes onto a silicon wafer. This means the
semiconductor manufacturing process relies greatly on a combination of individual procedure
capabilities rather than the quality of the components (Kim et al. 2004). As part of the Six
Sigma program for process development, Samsung prepares a process standard that engineers
responsible for developing individual procedures have to follow. The implementation of
DFSS allows Samsung to integrate its manufacturing processes with the development of new
products. The successful integration results in the success in improving its ramp-up capability.
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FORGE-AHEAD: SAMSUNG AS LEADER (1991-PRESENT)
Samsung became the industry leader in terms of market share for DRAMs in 1991 and for
overall memory products in 1993. Within one decade since it entered the market, Samsung
became one of the market leaders in the semiconductor industry. As of 2005, Samsung still
retains its leadership position in the memory segment of the semiconductor industry.
Samsung's global market share of DRAM has been more than 30% since 1998. In 2002, it
became the world number one in LCD IC market and the world number two in the overall
semiconductor market only behind Intel. Furthermore, in 2003, it became the market leader
for Flash memory. 33 This sustained industry leadership attributes greatly to do the company's
technology and standards strategies and capabilities.
Soon after it became the market leader in DRAM, Samsung became a world technology
leader in that business in 1992, when it became the first to have successfully developed a 64K
DRAM. Since then, Samsung has sustained its technological leadership, being the first in the
world to develop and mass produce the four subsequent generations of DRAMs. These
include the development of 4M DRAM in September 1992, 256M DRAM in August 1994,
1G DRAM in November 1996, and 4G DRAM in February 2001.34
Samsung has remained the leader in developing high-end DRAMs. It introduced the 64M
synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) in 1996, which was four times faster than the normal 64M
DRAM. It also introduced the 256M SDRAM in 1999. Other DRAM manufacturers resisted
the introduction of the Rambus DRAM, fearing that Intel was imposing its standards on
DRAM manufacturers. However, because of its resources and bold strategy, Samsung
developed both the Rambus DRAM and DDR Double-Data-Rate DRAM (DDR DRAM).
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Samsung proposed both standards separately to standards forums (Shin and Jang 2005).
Samsung's technological leadership is not limited to DRAMs, but includes several other
semiconductor products. For instance, the company was the first to develop an ADSL chipset
(2000), 533MHz Mobile CPU/1.3M Pixel CIS (2003), and 8Gb NAND Flash / 80nm 2Gb
DDR2 (2004). More recently in September 2005, the company announced its development of
the world's first 10-chip multi-chip package (MCP) and world's highest density NAND flash,
a 16Gigabit (Gb) NAND memory device. 35 These accomplishments confirm that Samsung
has developed beyond the stages of catch-up and keep-up and become one of the world
technological leaders in the semiconductor industry, particularly in the memory segment.
Samsung as standards leader (1996-present)
Technological leadership alone does not guarantee that firms can sustain first-mover
advantages and forge ahead of the competitors. Technological leadership needs to be
strengthened and sustained by standards leadership. Standards leadership is another important
aspect of Samsung's technological success, which is more recent and less well documented.
As a standards leader, Samsung's participation in standardization activities is increasingly
proactive. Samsung is now a member in several major international semiconductor standards
organizations, including SEMI, JEDEC, and SEMATECH. Our discussion in this section
focuses on Samsung's participation in JEDEC. The main reason is that JEDEC is the key
forum in which standards for memory products have been developed, and that memories,
especially DRAM, are the products in which Samsung has made the most significant progress
both in terms of market share and technological leadership.
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Standards leadership is manifested through a firm's influence in standards development.
One indication of Samsung's standards leadership is that its proprietary technologies have
been adopted as core technologies of new semiconductor standards. Another indication is that
Samsung's employees are assuming leadership positions in standards forums. Such positions
include chairing technical committees and membership in the boards of directors.
Samsung is certainly perceived now as one of the top leaders of the semiconductor
industry. We interviewed a few people at JEDEX, one of the main meetings of JEDEC, who
represented other firms in the semiconductor industry. Representatives from not only
technology leaders, such as IBM and Intel, but also from fast-following firms, such as Hynix
from Korea and Via from Taiwan, all consider Samsung as a leader and that they have to
"listen to" Samsung. In addition, in several semiconductor conferences, especially in the
memory area, Samsung executives often speak as the keynote speakers. This indicates the
recognition of Samsung by other firms in the industry.
Indication of standards leadership (1): Influence on standardization outcome
Samsung's leadership in semiconductor standardization is indicated by its efforts in
influencing the choices of technologies to be adopted as JEDEC standards. Our interviewees
from Samsung and other JEDEC member companies all suggested that Samsung's leadership
became evident with the standardization of Double-Data-Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random
Access Memory (DDR-SDRAM) technologies. Samsung proposed DDR to JEDEC in
December 1996. At that time, there were already a few technologies that could become the
industry standards for advanced synchronous memory products. Yet, Samsung's engineers
believed that their technologies yielded better performance than other technologies that had
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been proposed. They continued to present and persuade other members to consider Samsung's
technologies. Samsung finally demonstrated its leadership in July 1997. Its bi-directional
DDR SDRAM technology was officially considered by the board of directors of JEDEC and
the company demonstrated the world's first DDR silicon in a 64MB device. 36
Simply put, Samsung led the way for standardizing DDR SDRAMs. It proposed, endorsed,
and adopted new DDR standards that it developed jointly with other firms in JEDEC.
Samsung became an early leader supplying to the DDR market in the second half of 1999. It
has since become one of the strong leaders of standardization of synchronous memory
products. Towards the end of the 1990s, semiconductor firms were competing for an
advanced version of synchronous memory chips. The market was divided between the
following three competing standards: namely, (1) RDRAM - Direct RAM developed by
Rambus and supported by Intel; (2) SLDRAM - championed by SLDRAM Inc., a consortium
led by Siemens (in which Samsung was also part of); and (3) DDR-SDRAM championed by a
consortium led by Samsung. SLDRAM lost the standards game and changed its focus to DDR
2, an advanced version of DDR. Meanwhile, Rambus became involved in a prolonged series
of lawsuits against other manufacturers that pursued the DDR approach.3
With the demise of SLDRAM, Samsung pursued both the RD-DRAM and DDR-DRAM
approaches for its product development and production. As Rambus started to claim its
patents were included in the DDR technologies, Samsung started to license. The firm
developed the 64M RDRAM in 1998 and began mass producing 64M, 72M, and 144M
RDRAMs from 1999. Nonetheless, Samsung focused its standardization efforts on DDR
technologies. It finally introduced the 1G DDR SDRAM in 1999.38
179
Samsung started 64MB DDR production in mid-1998. The company started the world's
first mass production of DDR266 in 2000, and started mass production of DDR333 SDRAM
in 128MB, 256MB, 512MB densities in 2001.39 As of 2006, Samsung has the highest number
of industry-validated memory modules available. This broad technological portfolio is
strengthened by its active involvement and leadership in external standards activities.
Indication of standards leadership (2): leadership positions in standards forums
Samsung's active involvement and strong influence in the area of semiconductor
standards are also manifested through its engineers and executives becoming influential in
JEDEC. In fact, some of its personnel are now among the leaders of JEDEC. For instance,
Mian Quddus, the Marketing Vice President at Samsung Semiconductor in San Jose, CA, was
elected Chairman of JEDEC's Board of Directors for a two-year term beginning in January
2004. Prior to his election, Quddus served on the JEDEC Board of Directors for 10 years.40
Similarly, Dr. Dong-Yang Lee, a senior engineer in Samsung Electronics' memory group
in Korea, was honored by JEDEC with the associations' Award of Excellence. The award
recognizes Dr. Lee's leadership in developing and establishing standards for DDR and DDR2
SDRAM technology. Based at Samsung's lab in Korea, he is the lead designer of the world's
first DDR SDRAM memory.
Dr. D.Y. Lee was a key figure in the DDR SDRAM technology development, heading
JEDEC's DRAM specification committee and playing a leading role in multiple task groups.
He is the author of the JEDEC JESD79-2 DDR2 SDRAM specification and several other
JEDEC memory standards since 1996. Earlier in 2002, he was also a recipient of JEDEC's
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Technical Recognition Award for his contribution to developing and standardizing DDR
SDRAM technology. Dr. D.Y. Lee's award marks only the third time that the Award of
Excellence has been presented to a JEDEC member since it was established in 1958. It is
awarded by JEDEC's Board of Directors to honor exceptional contributions to technology
standardization that are critical to the success of the global electronics industry benefiting
both suppliers and end users.4 1
The path for Samsung's emergence as a standards leader at JEDEC was not a road full of
roses. According to an interview with Dr. D.Y. Lee in April 2004, it took Samsung, and Dr.
Lee personally, a few years before their technologies could be considered and accepted as part
of JEDEC standards. When Dr. Lee first presented his ideas and research results for the DDR
technologies in 1996, he received very little attention among JEDEC members. Over the span
of three years, Dr. Lee had presented his ideas five times before the JEDEC Board of
Directors were willing to put the draft standard up for voting.
It was not until July 1999 when the DDR SDRAM standard was finally approved by the
JEDEC Board of Directors and was published as a JEDEC standard in June 2000. According
to Managing Director Soo-In Cho of Samsung's DRAM Design Laboratory, by that time,
Samsung had already started its production of DDR SDRAM, Rambus DRAM and PC133
SDRAM, and was the first manufacturer to have both developed and mass-produced the
products.42 Samsung's contribution and leadership has continued in the effort to develop new
standards for DDR2 and DDR3, the subsequent and advanced versions of DDR-SDRAM.
In sum, Samsung Electronics has managed to move beyond being a standards follower to
become a standards leader in the semiconductor industry. The firm first became a market
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leader of DRAM in 1991, then became a technology leader of 1G DRAM in 1996, and finally
became a standards leader of DDR-SDRAM in 1997. Its standards leadership is demonstrated
through its influence on standardization outcome, which often includes Samsung's proprietary
technologies, as well as its employees assuming leadership positions in standards forums.
Standards leadership for sustaining competitive advantage
Standards leadership contributes significantly to Samsung's competitive advantage. One
important channel is through product development. Our interviewees, both from Samsung and
other firms in JEDEC, suggest that there is indeed a strong relationship between leadership in
standards development and product development.
Samsung was the first to produce DDR-DRAMs and DDR2-DRAMs in 1998 and 2001
respectively. As a result of its leadership in DDR2 standardization, Samsung has the broadest
DDR2 product line in 2005, and has shipped more DDR2 products than any other
manufacturer. Samsung maintains its leadership in the DDR market, holding more than 50
percent market share of DDR333 SDRAM. The company expects to continue its leadership in
DDR memory by being first-to-market with leading-edge devices in a wide range of
configurations and densities. Its standards leadership is indeed closely related to its continuing
market leadership.
More recently, in February 2005, Samsung announced its 512Mb DDR3 prototype, which
would enable ultra-fast computer application processing with reduced power consumption.
According to IDC, a semiconductor market research firm, the first DDR3 DRAMs are
predicted to be sold in 2006 and the chip will represent 65% of the entire DRAM market in
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2009.43 Samsung's leadership in standardization indicates high possibility that the firm will
also become a leader in the future DDR3 market.
Standards could be developed in advance long before the products based on such
standards are developed, produced, and sold in the market. For instance, in 2002, JEDEC
began drafting the first DDR3 industry standard even though DDR2 for PC and server main
memory had yet to come to market. A final JEDEC standard for DDR3 was completed by the
end of 2005, with sampling starting a year later and production in 2007 (Robertson 2002).
A long and winding road to standards leadership
It takes time for any firm, let alone a late standardizer, to become influential in a
standards forum, even with superior technologies. According to Gil Russell, a former
Samsung's representative at JEDEC, it normally takes at least six months for a newcomer to
learn about what is going on in JEDEC. Then it takes another year to become effective in
participating in standardization activities. One needs at least two years in order to become
proactive and influential in standards development.
The reason behind such a long process has to do with non-technical factors that affect
standardization processes. In fact, technical excellence is not the only factor that makes a
technology an industry standard. Participation in standards development process involves
more than formal meetings of technical committees. Much negotiation and discussion occurs
outside the formal occasions, often in the hallways. As many of our interviewees indicate,
"hallway politics" is an important factor in determining technological standardization.
Technical superiority could be a determining factor as to which technologies are adopted as
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standards. However, it is often difficult to determine which technologies are absolutely better
than others, partly because there are many criteria by which technical superiority can be
measured. It is thus often left to negotiation and politics between parties involved.
As several interviewees at JEDEC have told us, politics within standards organizations
makes it critical for participating firms to make a continuous and strong presence in
standardization activities. Many firms send the same people who already have extensive
knowledge about the standards forums. In fact, they often hire away standards experts from
other firms that participate in the same forums. As Gil Russell puts it, "the company names
[on the name tags] may change but the faces don't". In other words, many standards experts
represent different companies in the same standards forums throughout their careers.
Quality management and standardization for R&D
During the stages of technological catch-up and keep-up, Samsung focused its quality
control efforts on manufacturing processes. Several of the quality standards and certification
mentioned above, including ISO9000, QS9000, and TL9000, are implemented primarily to
improve production processes. However, as firms attempt to develop R&D capabilities, other
standards become useful. One of those is Six Sigma. Pioneered by Motorola in the mid-1980s,
Six Sigma is a quality management tool used to improve operational performance by
identifying and correcting defects in processes and products. Six Sigma can be implemented
on a wide range of new functions and processes, including transactional activities.
Samsung started implementing Six Sigma in 1999. Samsung's Advanced Business
Planning and Strategy Department was convinced that Six Sigma would be a good process
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tool for its development and manufacturing of products (Stratton 2002). The company started
to integrate Six Sigma into its entire business process, namely, research and development,
procurement, manufacturing, logistics, marketing, sales, and services. The focus of
Samsung's Six-Sigma implementation was on products as well as human resources
development. Samsung subcontracted the task of training for management and other
employees responsible for deployment planning to Juran Institute, a Connecticut-based
consulting firm specialized in quality control and management. Every employee in Samsung
is required to take the Six Sigma training. As an indication of how seriously Samsung invests
in Six Sigma, the firm completed 3,290 Six Sigma projects in 2001 and 2002, and another
4,720 projects in 2002. After only three years of implementation, the number of Samsung
employees with Six-Sigma certification, i.e., Master Black Belt (MBB), Black Belt (BB), and
Green Belt (GB), was more than 15,000 (Yun and Chua 2002), that is, approximately one of
every three employees in Samsung. Its corporate goal is to have 100 MBBs, 3,000 BBs, and
30,000 GBs by the end of 2004.
The implementation of Six Sigma has contributed significantly to Samsung's competitive
advantage. According to Yun and Chua (2002), Six Sigma projects implemented at Samsung
Electronics played a major role in the firm's recent growth, contributing to an average of 50
percent reduction in product defects between 1999 and 2001. According to Keith Kim,
Samsung's senior vice president for Corporate Quality, quality has improved about 20-30
percent since Samsung started Six-Sigma training for its employees.
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OTHER LATE STANDARDIZERS IN SEMICONDUCTOR
We have selected Samsung Electronics as the main case study of our research in the
semiconductor industry because of its outstanding success in the past few decades. We have
also selected a couple of other late standardizers from Korea and Thailand as our "shadow"
case studies. The objective is to generalize the findings from the Samsung case. Hynix
Semiconductor in South Korea is another late standardizer that has attempted to move beyond
technological catch-up and become a technology and standards leader. We discuss the Hynix
case in detail in this section.
HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR
Based in Ichon, South Korea, Hynix Semiconductor is a world's top-tier memory
semiconductor supplier offering Dynamic Random Access Memory chips (DRAMs), Static
Random Access Memory chips (SRAMs), and Flash memory chips to a wide range of
established, international customers. Hynix Semiconductor was founded in 1983 as Hyundai
Electronics Industries as part of the Hyundai Group. In the 1980s and 1990s, Hynix was
mainly focusing on manufacturing and marketing DRAM, and then later SDRAM. The
company was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, having to restructure its
businesses and corporate structure. The company merged with LG Semiconductor in 1999,
and changed the company name to Hynix Semiconductor in 2001.
Hynix's technological development
Hynix's technological development is similarly impressive as that of Samsung. It has
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significantly improved its technological capability in the past two decades. Hynix's process of
technological capability has also developed through three distinct stages of catch-up, keep-up,
and forge-ahead. Starting from relying on mature technologies acquired from foreign sources,
the company continuously improved its manufacturing capability. The company invested
heavily in enhancing its in-house innovation capability so as to become a fast follower of
advanced technologies. Hynix implemented several strategies for technological development
and acquisition. The company's Semiconductor Research Institute was established as early as
1986. The company also joined the research consortium established by the Korean
government aiming at developing domestic DRAM technologies. Before the financial crisis
started in 1997, Hynix had acquired equity stakes in several firms in the United States as part
of its strategy to acquire advanced technologies (Kim 1997).
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Table 5.6: Technological Milestones of Hynix
Year Milestones
2004 Developed the industry's first ultra-high speed DDR SDRAM 550MHz
2004 Developed NAND flash memory
2003 Developed the world's first DRAM 1Gb DDR2
2003 Developed the world's first ultra-high speed DDR500
2003 Introduced the world's first commercially applicable mega-level FeRAM
2002 Developed 0.10-micron 512MB DDR
2002 Developed the world's first high-density, wide-bandwidth 256MB DDR
2002 Developed the world's first 256MB SDR SDRAM for high-end consumer application
2002 Developed IG DDR DRAM module
2001 Developed the world's first 128Mb DDR SDRAM for graphics
2001 Acquired customer validation of DDR 333 from Taiwan's SiS
1998 Developed 64M DDR synchronous DRAM
1997 Developed the world's first IG synchronous DRAM
1995 Developed the world's first 256M SDRAM
1993 Acquired ISO 9001 certification on semiconductor category
1992 Developed 64M DRAM
1991 Developed 16Mb DRAM
1989 Completed construction of FAB III
1989 Developed 4M DRAM
1988 Developed IM DRAM
1986 Established Semiconductor Research Institute
1985 Started mass production of 256K DRAM
1984 Completed construction of FAB II-A
1983 Founded Hyundai Electronics Industries Co., Ltd.
Sou:rce: Adapted from Hynix website: www.hynix.com
Hynix's manufacturing and innovation capabilities improved rapidly in the early 1990s. In
1994, the company became one of the first companies to have mass-produced 16M DRAMs.4
By the end of the 1990s, Hynix was able to develop several DRAM technologies for the first
time in the world (Table 5.6). In some technical areas, Hynix not only has caught up and kept
up with technology forerunners in the United States and Japan, as well as Samsung, but has
also forged ahead. These technological achievements include, among others, the world's first
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1G synchronous DRAM in 1997, 128Mb DDR SDRAM for graphics in 2001, and DRAM
1Gb DDR2 in 2003.
Hynix's late standardization
Hynix has increasingly become more active in external standardization activities.45 The
firm participates in various committees and conferences organized by JEDEC and other
standards organizations in the semiconductor industry. Its participation and contribution in
JEDEC, however, is not as extensive as that of Samsung. The number of delegates to
technical committees is smaller; about seven Hynix engineers are involved in JEDEC
standards activities. Currently, there are no Hynix employees on the JEDEC Board of
Directors. Judging from Hynix's current participation and contribution to external
standardization activities, we would argue that the company is not yet a standards leader, even
though it has become a technology leader in several technical areas.
According to our interviews with Hynix engineers, the company's limited contribution to
JEDEC standardization is due to its current emphasis on process technologies, rather than on
product design. Hynix has achieved a high level of manufacturing capability, which directly
affects the yield rates and the resulting profits. The recent financial trouble was another
problem that had forced the R&D teams to focus on relatively short-term projects that were
aimed to increase its revenues and profit. Standards-related projects tend to be long-term, and
require substantial amount of resources.
Nonetheless, our interviewees expect that Hynix will increase its effort in standardization
activities, partly because the company has recovered from the financial problem and earned
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high profits in the past couple of years. They also acknowledge the various benefits of being
part of the standards clubs. These benefits include the glimpse into competitors' technology
and product development plans, the knowledge about emerging standards, which will help
shape its internal product and production design, and the influence that the company can exert
on standardization outcomes. As process technologies are considered to be Hynix's source of
competitive advantage, Hynix's engineers who participate in external standards activities
often hold meetings with process engineers to maximize the benefits from their participating
in standardization forums.
In fact, Hynix now considers external standardization in JEDEC as an important element
of its technological and business strategies. In November 2005, Hynix announced the
availability of the industry's first JEDEC-standard 8GB DDR2 Registered Dual in-line
Memory Modules (R-DIMMs). In developing such a product, Hynix benefited greatly from
its proprietary multi-die stacking technology. Hynix's development of the JEDEC-standard
8GB DDR2 R-DIMM demonstrates the company's technical expertise and strong
competitiveness built upon its manufacturing capability.
HANA SEMICONDUCTOR
Hana Semiconductor is a subsidiary of Hana Microelectronics Public Co.,Ltd., an
Electronic Manufacturing Service (EMS) producers and one of Thailand's leading high-tech
companies. Headquartered in Bangkok, Hana is a subcontractor company with several
multinational and leading OEM companies in the electronics industry, such as Texas
Instruments. Hana's semiconductor products include customer-specific packages, such as
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assembly of Light Emitting Diodes (LED), optoelectronic packages (OPTO), and hybrid
devices on a captive line basis. 46
Our case study of Hana Microelectronics of Thailand reveals that the company's external
standards effort is very limited compared to those of Samsung and Hynix. The company is
participating in only a few standards committee, including the JEDEC JC 11 committee on
packaging outline and the JC15.1 committee on thermal characterization. Its participation in
standards activities suggests that the company is trying to become fast followers of new
technologies and standards. Its focus, however, is primarily on internal quality management
standards. Its external standards activity aims primarily at acquiring knowledge that will help
improve its manufacturing processes.
Hana's LED and OPTO operations have followed the JEDEC-standard quality criteria.
Hana has also implemented quality standards and procedures, including SPC, TQM and
ISO9001/2000, ISO9002, QS9000, ISO14001 and TS16949. We would therefore argue that
Hana is a late standardizer in the catch-up stage, which is trying to become a fast follower. Its
standards activities are still limited to quality standardization and management.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown in the chapter how late standardizers in the semiconductor industry have
engaged in standards activities both internally and externally. Our case study of Samsung
Electronics shows that standards and related activities are learning and linking apparatus for a
latecomer firm to leverage their limited resources and capabilities so that it can move up the
ladder of competitive advantage. Samsung's emergence as a leader in the industry was first
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manifested through its market share, then through its technological breakthrough, finally
through its influence on technical standardization. Although the focus on quality standards
and procedures have always been important since the early years, as Samsung moves closer to
the world technological frontier, external standardization activities become a key factor in
determining Samsung's competitiveness. Through standards activities, Samsung has linked
itself with technological leaders and other firms in industry, so that the firm can leverage its
limited resources and capabilities. Also through standards and standards activities, Samsung
learned about new technological and business trends in the industry. Samsung's history of
engagement in standards activities corresponds to the staged model of late standardization and
technological catch-up that we have proposed earlier. Samsung is now clearly a standards
leader in the semiconductor industry, as indicated by its active participation in standards
forums, its influence of standardization directions and outcome, and its personnel in
leadership positions in standards forums. We now turn our attention to the case studies of late
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Mobile communication is another industry in which late standardizers have emerged as
standards leaders. A few Korean late standardizers, notably Samsung Electronics, LG
Electronics, and KT, have been able to lead standardization activities for certain mobile
telecom technologies both domestically and internationally. 47 In this chapter, we discuss the
late-standardization process of these firms. We first give an overview of the different
generations of standards and technologies for wireless telecommunication. This overview is
essential to the subsequent analysis of the developmental phases of late standardizers in
mobile communication services in Korea. Then, we discuss the case studies of Samsung
Electronics, LG Electronics, and KT. We pay attention to their general standards activities
during the course of technological development, the organizational structures for standards
activities, and the use of standards as part of the strategies and policies for protecting and
utilizing intellectual property.
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MOBILE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES
In this section, we give an overview of mobile communications technologies and services
in general and in Korea in particular. This serves as the background the following analysis of
Korean late standardizers in the mobile telecom sector. We first focus on the generations of
wireless communication technologies and standards. Then, we discuss the development of
mobile technologies and services in Korea.
GENERATIONS OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
The mobile communication services took shape as an industry around the early 1970s. In
the past four decades, the industry has experienced at least four main generations of
technological shifts in terms of core technologies and standards that underlie the services and
business (Funk 2002). As summarized in Table 6.1, several technologies were competing to
become the industry standards for each generation of mobile communications.
Before cellular technologies were introduced as the technologies for wireless
communication, mobile telephones in the 1970s were mostly installed in vehicles, although
briefcase models were available in the market. This pre-cellular mobile telephony is referred
to as OG (0-Generation) technology. 0.5G technologies are basically OG technologies with
improved features. The cellular concept was later introduced in 1G standards, including the
Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) standard, the Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS)
standard, and the Total Access Communication System (TAGS) standard. These 1G
technologies made possible mobile communication possible at the large scale.
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Table 6.1: Evolution of Main Technologies and Standards of Mobile Communication
Generation Main Standards Generation Main Standards
OG PTT Push to talk 2G cdmaOne Code Division Multiple Access
(cont.) Technology
MTS Mobile Telephone System PDC Personal Digital Cellular
IMTS Improved Mobile Telephone TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
Service
AMTS Advanced Mobile Telephone 2.5G GPRS General Packet Radio Service
System
0.5G Autotel/ Public Automated Land Mobile WiDEN Wideband Integrated Dispatch
PALM Enhanced Network
ARP Autoradiopuhelin, Car Radio Phone 2.75G CDMA2000 A TIA standard (IS-2000)
lxRTT evolving from cdmaOne
HCMTS High Capacity Mobile Telephone EDGE Enhanced Data rates for GSM
System Evolution
IG NMT Nordic Mobile Telephone 3G W-CDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple
Access
AMPS Advanced Mobile Phone System UMTS Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System
TAGS Total Access Communication FOMA Freedom of Mobile Multimedia
System Access
JTAGS Japan Total Access Communication CDMA2000 CDMA2000 with lxEV
System lxEV technology
2G GSM Global System for Mobile TD- Time Division Synchronous Code
Communications SCDMA Division Multiple Access
iDEN Integrated Digital Enhanced 3.5G HSDPA High-Speed Downlink Packet
Network Access
D-AMPS Digital Advanced Mobile Phone 3.75G HSUPA High-Speed Uplink Packet Access
System based on TDMA
Source: Adapted from Network Dictionary at www.networkdictionary.com (accessed January 28, 2006); Funk (2002)
The basic concept of cellular phones began in 1947 when researchers looked at crude car
phones and realized that by using small cells, i.e., ranges of service areas, with frequency
reuse could substantially increase the traffic capacity of mobile phones. Yet, the technology to
do it was nonexistent back then. By 1977, AT&T Bell Labs built and tested a prototype
cellular phone system. In 1978, public trials of the new cellular phone system started in
Chicago with over 2000 trial customers. In 1979, the first commercial cellular phone system
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began operation in Tokyo. In 1981, Motorola and American Radio Phone started a second U.S.
cellular radio-phone system test in the Washington/Baltimore area. By 1982, the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission finally authorized commercial cellular phone services. In 1983,
the firm Ameritech offered for the first time in the United States a commercial service of
AMPS (Advanced Mobile Phone Service) in Chicago.48
While 1G standards were based on analog technologies, second-generation (2G) mobile
standards were developed with digital technologies, which resulted in significant
improvement in terms of quality and reliability of the wireless communication. The main 2G
standards are Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA) and Code Division Multiple Access technology (cdmaOne). 2G technologies
were primarily developed for voice communications, although some of the 2G standards, such
as GSM, allow for data transmission in the form of short-message services (SMS). 2.5G and
2.75G standards are based 2G standards with improved features and larger capability to
transfer more data communications.
As 3G technologies, such as W-CDMA and CDMA2000-1xRTT, were developed and
increasingly became industry standards, data communication became the main focus. There is
now an increasing convergence between data and voice communications, with more and more
voice, data and multi-media communications being carried out over broadband wireless
networks. The industry is now working on the 4G technologies and standards.
DEVELOPMENT OF MOBILE COMMUNICATION SERVICES IN KOREA
We categorize the development of mobile communication services in South Korea
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according to the generations of main wireless technologies. As summarized in Table 6.2,
Korean late standardizers were latecomers to the OGa and 1G standards until around the late
1980s. They managed to keep up with the technological change and became fast followers
during the era of 2G standards. Since the late 1990s, the Korean late standardizers have
become the forerunners in the 3G standards.
Table 6.2: Timeline for Mobile Service Operations in South Korea
Standards First Generation (1 G) Second Generation (2G) Third Generation (3G)
(Analog Technologies) (Digital Technologies) (Broadband Digital Technologies)
Service CDMA 2000 lx
Provider AMPS IS-95a CDMA IS-95a CDMA CDMA 2000 Ix EVDO
SKT 7/1988 1/1996 8/1997 10/2000 11/2002
(world first) (world first) (world first)
KTF 4/1984 10/1997 7/1999 5/2001 5/2002
(world first)
LGT n.a. 10/1997 n.a. 5/2001 n.a.
Source: Yoo et al. (2005)
Catch-up as latecomer: OG and 1G mobile standards (1984-1989)
Mobile communication services were offered for the first time in South Korea in 1984.
Korea Mobile Telecommunications Service (KMTS), a subsidiary of state-owned Korea
Electricity and Telecommunication Corporation (KET, later changed to Korea Telecom then
KT), offered primarily car-phone services in the Seoul area, which were later expanded to
cover the whole country in 1991. (Lee and Han 2002)
In establishing the domestic mobile communication infrastructure, KMTS relied on
foreign venders for the 1G mobile technologies. Because KMTS chose the AMPS standard,
the de facto U.S. standard, for the Korean market, the service provider imported most of the
equipment from Motorola and AT&T (Yoo et al. 2005). The heavy reliance on foreign
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technologies was also evident in the handset industry. Korean firms mostly imported handsets
or most of the components from foreign partners and sold them in the domestic market. For
instance, Samsung Semiconductor imported handsets or the components from Toshiba,
Kumsung Electricity from NEC, Daeyoung Electronics from Motorola, and Hyundai
Electronics from Novatel. Motorola dominated the Korean market throughout the period of
the first-generation technology. However, its dominance started to decrease around 1995,
when the industry began shifting to the CDMA standard, which Korea adopted for its 2G
services (Lee and Han 2002).
During the first generation of mobile services in Korea, domestic late standardizers played
a limited role. The market was dominated by foreign firms, such as Motorola. The Korean
state played a critical role in establishing KMTS as the service provider, which eventually
became SK Telecom, the largest mobile carrier in Korea. In the early 1980s, the Korean
government identified telecommunications as one of the nation's strategic industries (Lee et al.
1994). 49 The Korean state played a critical role in nurturing the domestic market not only by
establishing the domestic provider, but also by restricting the monopoly power of foreign
firms (Lee and Han 2002). In addition, the Korean state also controlled the direction of
industry development by selecting specific standards for the domestic market. We will discuss
this issue in detail in Chapter Seven.
The prominent roles played by the state and foreign firms do not mean that this period was
not important for the development of late standardizers. In fact, this period was very
important as domestic firms were building up their technological capability. Without much
technology transfer from foreign firms, handset manufacturers, such as Samsung and LG,
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together with the state, started manufacturing mobile handsets locally, even though their
market shares remained low and most of the components were imported from overseas (Lee
and Han 2002).
Technology transfer from research institutes, such as the Electronics and
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), was an important factor that laid a foundation
for latecomer firms' subsequent technological development. For instance, in the late 1980s,
the Ministry of Communication and the Telecommunication Development Task Force (TDTF)
transferred the TDX-1 technology from ETRI to four domestic manufacturers, including LG
Semiconductor, Samsung Semiconductor and Telecommunication, Daewoo
Telecommunication, and Oriental Electronics and Telecommunication. The TDTF research
consortium became successful in improving technological capabilities of these latecomer
firms in the field of telecommunication, particularly in digital switching systems (Lee et al.
1994).
Keep-up as fast follower: 2G mobile standards (1989-1996)
The second generation of mobile services was when the Korean late-comers started to
emerge as important players, first in the domestic market, then the global market. The
emergence of these latecomers was driven mainly by the efforts of the Korean government
and ETRI. As the domestic mobile telecom industry was seeking ways to reduce its
dependence on foreign technologies for the first-generation mobile services, the MIC
launched the Digital Mobile Telecommunication System Project 1989, which aimed to
develop a total mobile service system for Korea, including base systems, switching stations,
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and handsets (Lee and Han 2002). Although the original project plan was to develop a new
system based on the IS-54 TDMA standard, the negotiations with the developers of the
standard, including AT&T, Motorola, and Northern Telecom, were without success. The
intellectual-property holders of the technologies contained in the TDMA-based GSM
standards were reluctant to transfer technologies to the Korean agencies and companies. The
Korean government and ETRI were thus forced to look for alternative standards.
After some extensive research, an ETRI research team found out that a U.S. start-up
company named Qualcomm had the core technologies for the Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) standard, which could be adopted to develop the new system for Korea. The CDMA
standard had shown greater efficiency in frequency utilization and higher quality and security
in voice transmission than other systems (Lee and Lim 2001).
The collaboration between Qualcomm, ETRI, and Korean latecomer firms thus appeared
to be a win-win solution for the parties involved, as their resources and capabilities
complement one another. While Qualcomm had the core CDMA technologies, ETRI had a
strong competence in switching systems. Korean latecomer firms, on the other hand, had built
up manufacturing capabilities for mass production from their early experiences during the
first-generation technologies. The CDMA collaboration project started in 1991, with the
agreement that ETRI would develop the switching stations and base stations, the handsets, as
well as the technological standards for Korea. Under the agreement, Qualcomm would
develop the whole CDMA system, the base systems, and the basic design for handsets (Lee
and Lim 2001; Lee and Han 2002).
In 1993, the Korean government designated CDMA as the only standard for the second-
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generation mobile communication services in Korea. Three years after that, in January 1996,
SKT became the first service provider in the world to offer commercial CDMA cellular
services in the Korean cities of Inchon and Buchon. 5so By this time, the Korean late
standardizers had already established themselves as the global leaders in CDMA mobile
communication services. They became the world leader, not only in terms of technological
development but also in terms of standards development. By adopting the CDMA standards
earlier than other leading firms and countries, the Korean late standardizers, as well as the
Korean government and research institutes, were able to quickly improve their production and
design capabilities.
Forge-ahead as leader: 2.5G and 3G mobile standards (1997-present)
Once the Korean late standardizers have established their foothold as leaders of CDMA-
based handsets and network equipment, their successful technological efforts continue in the
2.5h and 3rd generation of mobile technologies. In October 2000, SKT started to offer the
broadband mobile services based on CDMA 2000 1x standards for the first time in the world.
KTF and LGT also started their 2.5G services half a year later. However, in order to cope
with large volume of data transmission, the mobile industry started to experiment with 3G
standards and technologies. After a long discussion and negotiation, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) designated a set of technologies called IMT-2000 to be the
global standard for the third-generation mobile communication. The two standards that Korea
has adopted, that is, W-CDMA and CDMA2000, are both included in the IMT-2000 standard.
While CDMA2000 evolved from the 2G CDMA technology that the Korean consortium
developed with Qualcomm, W-CDMA evolved from the GSM standard.
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LATE STANDARDIZATION OF KOREAN FIRMS
In the following section, we discuss in detail the late-standardization process of three case
studies: two handset and equipment manufacturers, Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics,
and one service provider, KT Corporation.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
In addition to the semiconductor industry, Samsung Electronics has become a global
player as well in the mobile telecom industry. Since the establishment of Samsung
Semiconductor and Telecommunication in 1977 (later merged into Samsung Electronics), the
firm has transformed itself from being a low-cost manufacturer of simple electronic and
communication products, such as black-and-white televisions, into a technology and standards
leader of the global telecom industry. Samsung is now a market leader in the CDMA mobile
phone business, with the market share of 28 percent for 2004. It is ranked third overall for the
mobile phone business, behind Nokia and Motorola (Table 6.3).
Table 6.3: Top Vendors in Worldwide Mobile Phone Shipments and Market Share
Shipments (in millions) Market Share (%) Growth (%)Rank Vendor Growth (%)
3Q2005 3Q2004 3Q2005 3Q2004
1 Nokia 66.6 51.4 32.0 29.4 29.6
2 Motorola 38.7 23.3 18.6 13.3 66.1
3 Samsung 26.8 22.7 12.9 13.0 18.1
4 LG 15.5 11.8 7.4 6.7 31.4
5 Sony Ericsson 13.8 10.7 6.6 6.1 29.0
6- Others 46.9 55.0 22.5 31.4 -14.7
Total 208.3 100.0 174.9 100.0 19.1
Source: Adapted from IDC Press release, October 20, 2005, www.idc.com
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Samsung's catch-up stage (1984-1993)
As shown in Table 6.4, Samsung's telecommunication business has undergone consistent
and rapid expansion in terms of technological expertise and sophistication. Although
Samsung had started its electronics and computer businesses in the late 1970s, the entry of
Samsung into the mobile communication industry did not start until 1983 when the firm
started manufacturing basic telecommunication networks and devices. A new business unit
named the Wireless Development Team was established with forty engineers, whose
experiences had been in the wireless telephone or facsimile machine divisions. The team first
focused on reverse-engineering car phones from Japan. The team finally produced and sold its
first built-in car phone in 1986. However, the quality of the product was not satisfactory, and
the firm decided to reduce the number of engineers in the Wireless Development Team to
only ten. (Lee and Lee 2004)
Despite the setback, Mr. Ki Tae Lee, who was the team leader and now President of
Samsung's Telecommunications Division, decided to keep trying on the mobile business. This
time, the team tried reverse-engineering Motorola's mobile phones. Their efforts started to
bear fruit in 1988, when Samsung developed the SH-100, the first cellular phone to be
designed and produced in Korea. Despite the improvement in quality, Samsung's mobile
phones were still regarded to be inferior to Motorola's mobile phones. (Lee and Lee 2004).
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Table 6.4: Technological Milestones of Samsung's Telecommunication Businesses
Year Milestones
2005 World's Ist Demonstration of Mobile WiMAX (802.16e)
2003 Providing W-CDMA Systems for SKT World's Ist Demonstration of CDMA2000
IX EV-DV at ITU Geneva 2003
2002 World's 3rd Major Handset Manufacturer
World's First CDMA2000 lx EV-DO Commercialized in Korea
DSLAM (1.16M Lines) Deployment for Chunghwa Telecom in Taiwan
2001 Commercial CDMA2000 systems Launch at SprintPCS (USA)
CDMA2000 IX Deployment for China Unicom (China)
World's 6th Major DSLAM Manufacturer
2000 World's First CDMA2000 IX System Commercialized
DSLAM Deployment for Korea Telecom in Korea
1999 Developed World's First IMT-2000 Handset, System and Core Semiconductor Chips
World's First CDMA2000 Video Telephony
ESS Deployments exceeded 10M Lines
ATM Switch (STARacer) Commercialized in Korea, U.S.A(Teligent Networks)
1998 CDMA Systems Deployment in Hutchison (Australia)
1997 Signed Worldwide Olympic Partnership contract and Sports marketing
CDMA Systems trial in Shanghai, China
1995 World's First CDMA systems Commercialized in SKT, KTF
1988 Mobile phone, SH-100, developed, based on Motorola's mobile phones
1986 Built-in car-phone, SC-100, developed, based on Japanese car phones
1985 ESS (TDX- A) commercialized in Korea
1983 Wireless Development Team established
1977 Samsung Telecommunication established
Source: Adapted from Samsung website: www.samsung.com; Lee and Lee (2004)
Samsung as fast follower (1993-1996)
The significant breakthrough for Samsung's mobile business occurred in 1993, after two
important decisions. First, the Wireless Development Team shifted its focus onto improving
connectivity, such that the mobile phones could function well in Korea's mountainous terrains
and topography. Another significant decision was prompted by the so-called "Fukuda Report"
written by Fukuda Shigeo, a Japanese design advisor to Samsung's Chaiman, Kun Hee-Lee.
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The report focused on Samsung's problems in design and development practices and
processes. This report led Chairman Lee to launch "Samsung New Management", an initiative
that focused on corporate change, especially on quality improvement. As part of the New
Management, the mobile phone business was given an ultimatum to "produce mobile phones
comparable to Motorola's by 1994" (Lee 2002). Finally in November 1993, Samsung
unveiled its new model, the SH-700, and the improved model, SH-770 in October 1994. Soon
after that, Samsung started to show its technological breakthrough in 1993, when it developed
the lightest mobile phone of its era, the SCH-800. This series of developments laid a strong
foundation for Samsung to become a leading manufacturer of mobile phones with reliable
quality and connectivity. By the end of 1995, Samsung surpassed Motorola to become the
market leader of mobile phones in the Korean market. (Lee 2002; Lee and Lee 2004)
Although Samsung was a minor player during the first-generation mobile technology,
during the second-generation stage, the company emerged as one of the main partners in the
Digital Wireless Telecommunication System Project, led by the Korean Ministry of
Communication (later changed to Ministry of Information and Communication) and managed
by the Electronic and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI). Other domestic firms
that participated in the project include LG Information and Communications (later merged as
part of LG Electronics), Hyundai Electronics, and Maxon Electronics. A US-based firm,
Qualcomm also participated in the project as the provider of CDMA technologies.
Samsung as leader (1996-present)
After building its technological capabilities in the OG and 1G technologies, Samsung
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surged ahead as a leading manufacturer of the 2G CDMA phones. Samsung released its first
CDMA cell phone, the SCH-100, in March 1996, the same time as the launch of CDMA
mobile services offered by SKT and Shinsegi Telecom. Within a year of the release, Samsung
captured a 57% world market share in the CDMA market and 58% in the PCS market.5 1
Since then, the telecommunication business became increasingly more important for
Samsung. Although Samsung had been successful in the semiconductor business, the firm
faced difficult times during the mid-1990s, with poor performance particularly in the
appliance businesses. The financial crisis in 1997 further worsened the situation. In response
to the downturn, Samsung started to overhaul its management and operation. As part of the
restructuring and reorganization, Samsung allocated more of its resources and efforts to the
telecommunication and LCD businesses to diversify its revenue sources. (Lee and Lee 2004)
Building on its domestic success, Samsung expanded into the global market, first in the
CDMA-based U.S. market, and then the European GSM market. Its first deal with Sprint, an
American CDMA service provider, became the springboard for Samsung to expand into other
emerging CDMA markets, such as Hong Kong and Brazil. By 1999, Samsung became the
world leader in the global CDMA handset market. (Lee and Lee 2004)
Samsung continues to demonstrate its technological capability and leadership into the
third-generation era. As the 3G CDMA2000 lx EV-DO services were first commercially
available in Korea in 2002, Samsung was the leader in providing the 3G handsets. Samsung
also provided W-CDMA Systems for SKT when the service provider demonstrated its
CDMA2000 IX EV-DV system at the ITU in Geneva in 2003. In 2005, Samsung launched
the world's first Mobile WiMAX. 52 Samsung's remarkable technological success is a
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manifestation of its relentless R&D activities, and, more recently, its standards efforts.
Samsung's participation in mobile telecom standardization
During the catch-up and keep-up stages of Samsung's technological development in
mobile communication, its main standards activities focused mainly on learning the
specifications and requirements of existing standards developed by technology and standards
leaders. When mobile communication services were first launched in Korea, Samsung
imported handsets from Toshiba in Japan, based on the U.S. AMPS standards.
Samsung's standards activities became more evident and important during the time of the
2G CDMA standards. Samsung became one of the main partners in the CDMA consortium
led by the Korean government. It became more active in participating in standardization
activities first in the consortium and later in other domestic and international standards forums.
The number of standards organizations in which Samsung participates has increased
dramatically since the firm increased its efforts in developing handsets and other equipment
based on the 2G CDMA standards. According to our interviews with Samsung engineers,
Samsung Electronics participated in only about a few standards forums in the early 1990s, and
fewer than 10 organizations by the end of 1990s. 53 As of April 2005, Samsung Electronics
participates in approximately 70 standards organizations at the regional and global levels,
including industry consortia, alliances, and formal standardization bodies. This figure
accounts for all of the five main business units of Samsung Electronics, namely,
Semiconductor, Telecommunication Network, Liquid Crystal Displays, Digital Media, and
Digital Appliances. The Telecommunication Network Business alone accounts for
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approximately 20 standards organizations, including standardization forums in other countries
and regions, such as Japan-based ARIB and France-based ETSI. This does not include another
31 domestic forums that have been arranged and facilitated according to the IT839 Strategy of
the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) and the Korean Telecommunication
Technology Association (TTA). Samsung participates in most of the 31 domestic forums.
Samsung Electronics has now become a standards leader in various telecommunications
areas. For instance, the company is a co-sponsor of WiBro (Wireless Broadband) Standard, a
wireless broadband internet technology developed by the Korean telecom industry. WiBro is a
rival to WiMax, the current U.S. Wireless Wide Area Network (WAN).54 In September 2005,
Samsung signed a deal with Sprint Nextel to provide equipment for a WiBro trial. This
indicates Samsung's leadership in mobile telecom standardization. 55
Samsung's personnel in leadership positions in standards forums
We have demonstrated earlier the leadership roles that Samsung's engineers and
executives play in the standardization activities of semiconductor industry. Similarly,
Samsung's leadership in telecommunication standardization is indicated by its personnel
holding important leadership positions in international SDOs. Notably, Dr. Young Kyun Kim,
Senior Vice President in Global Standards and Research of Samsung Electronics, has been a
prominent figure in telecommunications standardization at the global level. Since 2001, he
has served as Vice Chairman of ITU-T SSG on IMT-2000 & Beyond. He has also served as
Vice Chairman of the Asian Asia-Pacific Telecommunity Standardization Program (ASTAP)
for the standard activities of the Asia-Pacific region and also as a Chairman of APT IMT-
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2000 Forum promoting mobile communication services (2G/3G) into this region. In addition,
he has been a Steering member of other standards consortia, including 3GPP PCG/OP, 3GPP2
SC/OP, CDG, OMA and WWRF. At the domestic level, Dr. Kim serves as a Vice Chairman
of Technical Committee and Chairman of Program Evaluation Committee and an Advisory
Board member of the Korean Telecommunication Technology Association (TTA).
Dr. Young Kyun Kim has been Senior Vice President of Global Standards and Research at
Samsung since 1999. He is responsible for overall global standards and strategy development
within Samsung Electronics. Under his supervision is the team Beyond 3G, which works on
system research & standards and optical and IP networking standards research. With his
leadership, in 3G standards both 3GPP and 3GPP2, Samsung Electronics has achieved a
worldrecognized technology standards position.
There are several reasons why Samsung, and for that matter, other Korean late
standardizers, have increased their engagement in telecommunication standardization. One
reason is the competition from low-cost latecomers, especially from China. Although Korean
latecomers were successful in low-end, low-technology products, technologies are maturing
quickly and other latecomer firms started to compete directly against them. This forces
Korean latecomers to move up the technological ladder quickly enough to avoid the lower-
cost competition. Meanwhile, in order to compete against the technological forerunners, they
need to be able to acquire advanced technologies for new products. At the beginning, this
meant they had to license proprietary technologies from the forerunners.
One strategy for Samsung was to diversify into higher-end products. Standardization helps
achieve this goal. This may seem paradoxical, as standardization normally propels
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commoditization of products, thereby lowering profit margins. Yet, for first movers who are
quickly and constantly developing new products, standardization could allow them to utilize
the limited windows of opportunity to reap profits before their competitors. Standardization
means rising demand at the earlier production stages, which give the first movers the chance
to reap profits before other latecomer firms. In many industries, particularly ICT industries,
profits decrease sharply after products are standardized, so leader firms have a greater chance
to reap profits if they know beforehand what "the next big things" are going to be.
Again: Quality standards are the key
As with the case of semiconductor businesses, quality standards and management play a
key role in successful late standardization and technological catch-up process in the Korean
mobile communications sector. The growth and transformation of Samsung Electronics into
one of the top global brands is its continuous effort on quality standardization and control.
Another indication of Samsung's commitment to product-quality improvement is its policy to
recall and destroy whole production lots of mobile phones when defects are found.56
An important set of quality standards and tools for the telecommunications industry is TL
9000 standards. TL 9000 was developed by the Quality Excellence for Suppliers of
Telecommunications (QuEST) Forum, which is the telecommunications industry's extension
to ISO 9001:2000. TL 9000 defines the quality system requirements for design, development,
production, delivery, installation, and maintenance of telecommunications products and
services. It adds additional stringent requirements to the basis for quality provided by ISO
9001.57 In addition to ISO 9000 series, TQM, TPM, etc., Samsung became TL 9000-certified
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producer of fiberoptic products with the certification through the US-based National Quality
Assurance, Inc. Samsung achieved TL 9000 certification for optical fiber and cable,
connectors in July 2000, for optical modules in November 2001.
Figure 5.1: Samsung's Leadership Sequence in Semiconductor
Mature roduct Technology leader Standards leader New prduct
lead-er I " J I I I l e a d e r
R&D ~ Standards activity . Strategic planning
LG ELECTRONICS
Another outstanding Korean late standardizer is LG Electronics. The firm is now a leading
global firm in the LCD and telecommunication industries, in addition to its stronghold in
home-appliance sectors. Similar to Samsung, LG Electronics has in recent years demonstrated
technological and standards leadership in the ICT sector. In this section, we examine LG's
standardization activities and discuss how the firm uses standards activities as the linking and
learning mechanism to move from a latecomer position to a fast-follower position and finally
a first-mover position in the mobile communication and other related industries.
Overview LG Electronics
LG Electronics was established under the name Goldstar in 1958, and later changed to the
current name in 1995.58 LG Electronics was indeed the pioneer in the Korean consumer
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electronics market, having produced Korea's first radio in 1959, first telephone in 1962, and
first black-and-white television in 1966, first air conditioner in 1968, and first washing
machine in 1969. Its strength has continued to these days in the consumer electronics sector.
Particularly in the liquid crystal display (LCD) market, LG has gained and sustained its
reputation as one of the global leaders in terms of market share and technology, since it
formed a joint venture with Philips, LG-Philips LCD, in 2000.
LG Electronics is now a global company in electronics, information and communication
products with the annual sales of US $38 billion in 2004. LG Electronics is ranked fourth in
terms of both shipment and market share in the global mobile handset market (Table
6.3).With more than 66,000 employees working in 76 subsidiaries in 39 countries, LG is
comprised of four main business companies, including Mobile Communications, Digital
Appliance, Digital Display, and Digital Media.59
LG's technological development in mobile communication
LG is rapidly becoming a global leader in mobile handsets, especially in CDMA, GSM
and 3G mobile phones, exporting its products to approximately 70 countries worldwide. LG's
technological capability has improved significantly in recent years. LG is now striving to lead
the global mobile service industry with development of cutting-edge, trendsetting mobile
handsets. It was in fact the world's first company to unveil a CDMA platform-based digital
mobile phone. In 2003, LG developed the world's first synchronous-asynchronous IMT-2000
mobile phone for 3G mobile technologies. As a result, LG is now ranked fourth in the global
mobile handset market, in terms of total annual shipment and market share (Table 6.3).
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Particularly for CDMA handsets, LG is ranked second behind Samsung with a 19% market
share, ranked second as well for WCDMA handsets with a 22.8% market share, and ranked
sixth for GSM handsets with a 3.8% market share.60 Within the U.S. market, LG is ranked
first in terms of sales of CDMA phones in the United States for the fourth quarter of 2003.61
LG's successful late standardization
LG Electronics has been participated actively and successfully in standardization activities
in several technological areas. One of the most notable is in Digital Television (DTV)
standards. LG has developed the enhanced vestigial sideband (EVSB) standard for the next-
generation DTV transmission technology. This EVSB technology was chosen in 2004 to be
the US/Canada DTV transmission standard by the Advanced Television Systems Committee
(ATSC), which is the voluntary standards forum for digital television in North America. This
adoption indicates that LG has, at least in this area, become not only a technology leader but a
standards leader at the technological frontier.62
LG's technology and standard leadership has become eminent as well in the area of digital
media broadcasting (DMB).63 Currently, there are four mobile broadcasting standards in the
world: South Korea's DMB, Europe's Digital Video Broadcasting-Handhel (DVB-H), Media
Forward-Link-Only (FLO) of the United States, and Japan's Integrated Services Digital
Broadcasting (ISDB-T). South Korea is considered the leader in this area, with its first
satellite and terrestrial DMB services being offered for the first time in the world, respectively,
in May and December 2006. LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics are two of the main
parties behind the DMB standardization and implementation in Korea.
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In preparing for the launch of DMB services, LG developed the world's first Digital
Media Broadcasting (DMB) phone in 2004. In January 2006, both LG and Samsung launched
the first handset models based on the DVB-H and Media FLO mobile broadcasting standards
for the European and U.S. markets. The fact that both LG and Samsung are able to produce
products across different standards for digital mobile broadcasting indicates their advanced
technological and standards capabilities. In addition to the R&D capability, their participation
in standards forums enables both firms to forge ahead as the standards leaders in this technical
area. Both companies participate in the FLO Forum, which supports the Qualcomm-conceived
FLO standards, and the DVB Forum, which supports the DVB standards.
Another indication of LG's standards leadership is its initiative to found new standards
forums that serve the firm's technological portfolio and strategic interests. One of the
standards forums that LG has founded is the LnCP Consortium for standardization of Living
Network Control Protocol (LnCP). This is the world's first management standard for the home
network. The LnCP members include home network developers and manufacturers, such as
Daewoo Electronics, SK Computer & Communication, and Honeywell Korea. As an
indication of LG's leadership in the initiative, other consortium members have adopted LG's
application programming interface (API) technology to develop their networked appliances.64
LG personnel in leadership positions in standards forums
As argued earlier, late standardizers' standards leadership is manifested through its
employees being selected for leadership positions of standardization forums. This is also the
case for LG Electronics, which has demonstrated its leadership in setting the global standard
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of 3G CDMA mobile communications. Dr. Byung-kwan Lee, an Executive Researcher (Vice
President) at LG Electronics Telecommunication Equipment & Handset Business, was
appointed as a chairman of TSG-C (Technical Specification Groups - CDMA2000) in the
3GPP2 meeting in China in 2004. He led TSG-C in developing the global standard of
CDMA2000 handset and networks, and represented 3GPP2 in its meetings with 3GPP or
other UMTS/WCDMA standard development organizations. As described in the previous
chapter, 3GPP2 was established in 1999 with a goal of setting global standards of 3G CDMA
system or CDMA2000 mobile technologies. By working with various standards forums in the
United States, Japan, China, and Korea, 3GPP2 has worked on the global standards for
improving wireless connection technologies, applying new multimedia services such as MMS
and developing IP systems for all the networks.
The appointment of Dr. Lee means that the world mobile communication industry has
recognized LG Electronics for its active development of CDMA mobile communications'
standards and will consolidate Korea's position as the world's first developer of CDMA.
Lucent Technology has chaired 3GPP2 TSG-C for the last four years. For the new
chairmanship, LG Electronics was selected after an uphill battle with Ericsson.65
KT CORPORATION
Korea's successful late standardizers are not limited to handset and equipment
manufacturers, such as Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics. The service providers,
notably SK Telecom (SKT) and KT Corporation, are also the key players and therefore
important players in the Korean late standardization process. In this section, we discuss KT's
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late standardization process in the mobile communication industry.
Overview of KT Corporation66
KT Corporation is South Korea's largest telecommunication company. The company is
one of the largest telephone companies in South Korea, and one of only two companies
licensed to provide local telephone access. KT"s mobile communication business is operated
by its subsidiary, KTF (Korea Telecom Freetel). The company boasts thousands of locations
and 12 million subscribers in South Korea.
KT was established as a state-owned telecommunications company in 1981 through the
enactment of the Korea Telecom Act. The company officially took over the
telecommunications business being operated by the government through the Ministry of
Information and Communication (MIC - formerly Ministry of Communication) in 1982. In
1997 the Korea Telecom Act was repealed and Korea Telecom became a corporation with
limited liability under the Commercial Code of 1997. The company was fully privatized in
2002 and changed the name to KT Corporation.
During its initial stage of development, KT focused on supplying general-purpose
telephone facilities and services to the domestic market. By 1984, KT was successful in
developing the world's 10th electronic switch TDX-1 for domestic use. Meanwhile, the
number of telephone lines in Korea increased from 4.5 million in 1982 grew to over 20
million in 1993. Such an increase was the harbinger for the era of "informatization" for South
Korea. KT has since become Korea's leading telephone service provider with nationwide
coverage for fixed-line communication networks and over 20 million subscribers.
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In 1994, for the first time in Asia, KT laid up-to-the-second Internet and satellite
communication networks that served access points across the world. After KT was converted
into a government-invested corporation in 1997, it went through a substantial reform, shifting
its focus onto wired-wireless-Internet businesses. To that end, the Asymmetric Digital
Subscriber Line (ADSL) service was introduced to the nationwide information superhighway
infrastructure. This positioned KT as the leading high-speed Internet service provider. In
addition to its extensive wired coverage, the acquisition of Hansol M.com in 2000 and joint
services with KTF, a KT subsidiary, further enhanced wireless communications services.
KT entered the high-speed Internet market as a late bloomer in 1999. In June 2000, just a
year later, KT seized the number one position in the same market. This was followed by a
landmark achievement in September 2000 when KT subscribers surpassed the one million
mark, the highest number ever reached among local telecom players. KT established itself as
one of the world's best broadband service providers when its number of subscribers grew to
four million by March 2002 and five million by January 2003.
Since 1999, KTF has expanded its operations to overseas. In 2003, KTF received an order
from PT Mobile-8 Telecom of Indonesia for a comprehensive consulting service. The firm
also signed a contract for the export of its CDMA network management system and invested
US$10 million in the Indonesian provider. In India, KTF completed the first stage of its
contract with Reliance for US$2.65 million worth of the CDMA network construction. KTF
also holds a 25% stake in CEC Mobile of China, after investing a sum of 4.5 billion won in
2002.67 These overseas projects indicate not only KTF's marketing capability but also ithe
underlying technological capability and experiences in CDMA technologies.
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Standards Activities of KT
KT has become increasingly active in domestic and international standardization. As of
April 2005, KT participates in 12 international standardization forums, seven of which are
industry consortiums. On the other hand, KT participates in 16 domestic standards forums,
including the TTA, which is the official standards development organization for information
and communication technology in Korea. KT's engagement in international standardization is
measured in terms of its participation and contribution. As of 2005, KT has annually about 20
experts in 40-50 meetings and contributes around 40-50 proposals and technical opinions in
international standardization initiatives.
Table 6.5: KT's Standardization Activities, as of April 2005
International Standards Forum Domestic Standards Forums
Formal SDO Consortium Formal SDO Consortium
International Tele- - Multiservice Switching Telecommunication - BcN Forum
communication Union ( ITU) Forum (MSF) Technology Association - Wireless LAN Forum
Asia Pacific Telecommunity - DSL Forum (TTA) - DRM Forum
(APT) 
- IPv6 ForumISO/IEC/JTC1 - IPv6 ForumISO/IEC/JTCI 
- Optical Networking Forum 
- LBS AssociationIETF (OIF)
IEEE - MPEG-Korea




(TMF) - Optical Internet Forum
- VoiceXML Forum - Voice Recognition &
Processing Association
- Web Korea Forum
- Internet Telephony Forum
- Future Broadcasting Forum
- Future Mobile Service
Forum
- Korea Bluetooth Forum
- Korea RFID/USN
Association
Source: KT's internal document, and interview with a KT standards expert, April 2005
Note: SDO stands for Standard Development Organization
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Meanwhile, KT's personnel have assumed leadership positions in international SDOs. Not
only has KT increased its participation in international standardization, but the company has
also become more active in assuming leadership role at these standards forums. This indicates
its standards leadership at the international level. The SDOs that KT's personnel assume
chairmanships include ITU-T SG2 (as Vice Chairman and Associate Rapporteur), ITU-T FG
NGN (as Chairman), ITU-T WG3 (as Co-chair), ITU-T SG13 Rapporteur, and Multiservice
Switching Forum (MSF) (as a Board Member).
KT's standards activities are conducted within the New Business Planning Group, a de
facto R&D Group of the company (Figure 6.1). It is within this Group that several new
standards and technologies have been developed and tested, including ADSL Service, IMT-
2000 systems, and NESPOT (WLAN) technology. During the 1980s, KT's R&D efforts were
spread across all domains of telecommunication services. KT adjusted its R&D strategy in the
mid 1990s, putting more emphasis on technical areas closely linked with the businesses. Since
2000, its R&D efforts have become more strategic, focusing on exploring new business
opportunities and customer-oriented services. Standards activities at KT have become even
more important since the mid 1990s, and have become a crucial element of R&D activities.
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Figure 6.1: KT's Organizational Structure, as of 2005
R&D and standards
Source: Adapted from KT presentation document "Value Networking KT", 2005 activities
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR STANDARDS ACTIVITIES
Successful late standardizers accommodate standards activities through appropriate intra-
firm organizational structure. They organize their R&D teams in such a way that standards-
related activities are a key part of their corporate strategy, not to mention a core part of their
R&D strategy. In all of our case studies, successful late standardizers centralize standards-
related R&D units within the R&D headquarters close to top decision-making. They also
adjust their internal human resources structure, such that standards personnel stay longer in
one department, rather than changing roles from one department to another.
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CENTRALIZED R&D FOR STRATEGIC STANDARDIZATION
Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, and KT centralize their standards units in their
R&D headquarters near Seoul, even though both companies have R&D labs and centers in
other countries. These units work on standardization activities, which involve mostly the
engineering design activity that eventually leads to new products or processes.
Samsung Electronics, for example, has formed the Global Standards & Research Team
within the Telecommunication R&D Centre in Suwon city, outside Seoul. Its standards
activities are an important element of its R&D activities. The standards activities for
telecommunications are located in the Samsung Electronics Digital Research Center. The
R&D center is claimed by the company to be the largest R&D center in Asia, with
approximately 5,000 in-house researchers. Many of its R&D labs, shown in Figure 6.2, are
located in the Digital Research Center in Suwon.
Another important organization that plays a crucial role in Samsung's standards activities
is the Samsung Advanced Technology Training Institute (SATTI). Established in 1990,
SATTI has been taking charge of R&D in Samsung Electronics. In 1998, SATTI also went
through reorganization in accordance with the company's long term strategic goals. Since then,
training has been on-site, problem-solving and trainee-centered, and it has systematically
trained core engineers of the company. SATTI now focuses on training engineers in the areas
of 3S (software, systems and service) and basic technology, which is common to all products
manufactured by Samsung.
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Figure 6.2: Samsung Electronics' R&D Organizational Structure
Source: Lee and Lee (2002) from Samsung Electronics Business Report 2003
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In the case of LG, its telecom standards activities are conducted within the Mobile
Communication Technology Research Lab, located in its R&D Center in Anyang City, near
Seoul. One key element of LG's R&D strategy is to map out new standards in newly
emerging areas. Its recent focus is on new standards-based technologies that link the Internet
and other mobile communications. LG's standards activities are often jointly between various
business and technical areas in the company. Yet, most of these activities are located in the
same R&D Center in Anyang.68
Similarly,, KT's organizational structure for standards activities is centralized. Its
standards activities are conducted at the Woomyeon-dong Research Center in Seoul, in which
the R&D headquarters and the Technological Investigation & Evaluation Center are located.
Although KT has recently agreed to build an R&D Center with Microsoft and another one
with Alcatel of France, both R&D centers will be located in Soul. Not only does this indicate
the technological capability of KT, but also the availability of specialized human resources in
Korea in the field of mobile communication.
Our interviewees from Samsung, LG, and KT all agree that standards activities are
strategic in nature. Close proximity to top-decision making and to related R&D activities is
important. There are instances in which experts from various technical and business fields
need to provide their inputs before strategic standards-related decision can be made. The
centralized nature of standards activities thus reflects the need to keep strategic R&D
activities close to top decision-making at its R&D headquarters.
In addition, as many innovative ideas can easily leak or get "stolen" by simple observation,
these companies implement various measures to keep their R&D plans and activities secret. In
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addition to security measures at their R&D centers, they hope to prevent "knowledge
spillovers" by centralizing standards and other R&D activities in single sites.
ALLOCATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES FOR STANDARDS ACTIVITIES
Successful late standardizers adjust their internal human resources structure, such that
standards personnel stay longer in one department, rather than changing roles and
responsibilities from one department to another. The underlying rationale is that
standardization requires constant and persistent external relations with other firms in
standards forums. Personal connections become critical for late standardizers that aspire to
establish their foothold in standardization forums to become standards leaders themselves.
Other people in standardization forums are familiar with each other. They have worked
together for a long time. However, the problem with Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics,
which they are trying change, is that engineers do not stay in the same division long enough
for standards activities. They often move to different units after a few years, and once they are
promoted, they move to other divisions and no longer work on standards-related issues. This
means a new person has to take over the existing standardization projects.
STANDARDS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Standards are often directly tied to intellectual property rights (IPR), especially industry
voluntary standards. Once late standardizers develop more technological capability, they
increase the linkage between standards activities and intellectual property protection. As firms
invest more in R&D and are able to produce more intellectual property, they search for ways
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to generate and appropriate rents from their proprietary technologies. One important
mechanism is to develop standards that include their proprietary technologies. Chances are
that if a firm is involved in R&D of a new technology, there is at least one standards forum
exploring the potential to standardize such technology.
Intellectual property issues affect the development and diffusion of standards in various
ways. By contributing their proprietary knowledge to standards development, firms hope to
gain from the eventual outcome, i.e., standards, either by having such technologies
incorporated in their new products or by licensing such technologies to other firms that want
to adopt the standards. Such an expectation is assured only when it is guaranteed that their
proprietary knowledge will be protected. This is when legal protection in the form of patents
and trade secrets becomes critical. Meanwhile, during the process of standards development,
there are usually uncertainties regarding intellectual property rights associated with the
technologies contributed by forum members. One general uncertainty is whether patent
owners will actually grant licenses to other firms once their technologies are included in the
final standards. Then, another question arises as to how much the license costs will be and
whether they will affect the diffusion of such standards. There is also a possibility of patent
infringement in standards development, due the timing of patent application and assertion by
firms whose technologies are included in standards. All the uncertainties related to intellectual
property often result in litigation among parties that are involved in standards development.
Legal capabilities, especially those related to intellectual property, thus become an
indispensable part of standards capabilities. Legal capabilities include not only the ability to
deal with litigation and lawsuits, but also the ways in which technical experts should
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participate in standardization activities.
Even though there are always risks involved, firms often gain from participating in the
standardization of new technologies. For instance, even when technology owners follow the
requirements to disclose their intellectual property to other members in standards forums, they
still benefit from having their proprietary technologies included in standards. A good
indication is the increasing participation in international standardization by three major
Korean firms in the mobile communications industry, namely Samsung Electronics, LG
Electronics, and KT. As several scholars argue (e.g., Lee and Lim 2001; Yoo et al. 2005), one
major reason for their increasing efforts in standardization is their large royalty payment to
Qualcomm for the core CDMA technologies used for mobile communications. Most of the
royalty payments by Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics are based on sales volume.
This means an increase in total sales results in greater royalty payments. As with the case of
leading firms, such as Intel and IBM, successful late standardizers, such as Samsung, have
established intellectual property licensing within their profit-and-loss businesses, not just a
part of their legal department.
Our interviews with executives in mobile communications businesses of Samsung, LG,
and KT, confirm this argument. 69 According to these executives, royalty payments are an
important factor that motivates the firms to engage more in technological standardization. It is
reported that Qualcomm receives 5.25 percent of annual domestic sales of handsets in
royalties and 5.75 percent of exports from Korean manufacturers. 70
According to its Audit Report for Year 2004, Samsung Electronics spent a total of 1.28
trillion won (1.3 billion USD) on royalty payments to other domestic and foreign companies
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in 2004, an increase of 5.6 percent from 2003. The figure has increased significantly from
772.1 billion won (772 million USD) in 2001 to 965.7 billion won (966 million USD) in 2002
and further to 1.2 trillion won (1.2 billion USD) in 2003. While the increasing rates in royalty
payment have somewhat subsided, in 2004 the amount still accounts for 11.8 percent of its net
profit of 10.7 trillion won (10 billion USD). Although the rise in royal payments indicates its
sale growth, it also implies the continued reliance on other companies for advanced
technologies. The efforts and engagement in standardization is one way in which these late
standardizers attempt to become more technologically independent.
CROSS-LICENSING, PATENT POOLS, AND STANDARDS
Another important outcome of participating and contributing to standardization is that
late-standardizing firms are able to join a patent-pool for a standard or a cross-licensing
agreement with technological leaders in the same standards clubs. A cross-licensing
agreement allows the two parties to grant a license to each other for the use of the subject-
matter claimed in patents. Cross-licensing is thus the mutual sharing of patents between
companies without an exchange of a license fee, providing that both patent portfolios are
deemed about equal in value. A patent pool, on the other hand, is a group of at least two
companies agreeing to cross-license patents and other intellectual property rights relating to a
particular technology. By creating a patent pool, technology sellers (patentees) and
technology buyers (licensees) could save time and money.
There are four common features of patent pools (Kulbaski 2002). First, a patent pool is
appropriate for a definite and well-defined technological standard. Second, there is an
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evaluator or an independent expert to determine which patents are essential to the standards in
question, thereby defining a group of essential patent holders. Third, essential patent holders
draft and approve a license which allows others to license technology on a reasonable and
nondiscriminatory basis. Fourth, the essential patent holders appoint a patent-pool
administrator to handle the administrative tasks. Finally, essential patent holders reserve the
right to license the patents outside of the patent pool.
Patent pools reduce search and transaction costs for both licensors and licensees. Patent
pools facilitate efficient transactions, as a firm using the technology does not need to negotiate
separate licenses with every company owning a patent that is essential to the standard. Both
licensors and potential licensees are able to identify quickly what patents are essential to the
standard in question. Pool members may also be able to control IPR cost-element in certain
products based on the standards in the patent pools. Patent pools thus reduce operational costs
and allows members to receive more licensing revenues. In addition, patent pools also reduce
the possibility of litigation regarding IPR infringement (Shapiro 2001). A potential problem
that may occur regarding IPR derived from standards is the issue of collusion and antitrust
violation 71 Participants in patent pools generally seek antitrust approval from relevant
regulatory agencies in important markets, particularly the United States, the European Union,
and Japan.
In the case of Samsung, the increase in cross-licensing agreements with other foreign
firms offsets the increase in the company's royalty payments in 2004. Many of Samsung's
patents were licensed by other firms, because they were essential to certain standards.
Certainly, patent-pooling and cross-licensing would not be possible without latecomers' self-
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owned patents, which in turn are an outcome of its intensive R&D efforts. Cross-licensing and
patent pools are ways for late standardizers to gain access to larger pools of intellectual
property with reduced costs, and to generate revenues from their proprietary technologies.
The revenue-generating benefit of participating in standards development is well
recognized by Samsung and LG executives. One LG executive mentioned that participation in
standards development is a logical step for the company. The firm had invested substantially
in R&D, and, as a result, has generated new ideas, innovations, and finally secured patents. In
other words, participation in standardization is a way to recoup R&D investments.
As late standardizers develop technological and standards capabilities, IP licensing gains
significance as a separate profit and loss business. Organizationally, it becomes a distinct unit
within the finn, not just within the legal department.
Generally, patent pools do not include every firm that participated in developing a
standard. They include only a group of firms that hold "essential" patents to the standard.
Essential technologies included in standards are, therefore, the core technologies that underlie
the directions of the related technologies both in the present and the future.
The use of patent pools is not new. Currently, several patent pools have been formed that
are linked directly to standards, including the MPEG Licensing Administrator (MPEG LA)
pool for MPEG technologies and the DVD 7C pool for DVD standards. The MPEG LA
provides a license to those requiring the essential patent rights to MPEG-4 technology. Using
MPEG LA is the easiest, most cost-effective way to obtain the rights to complex and highly
developed technology. The MPEG-4 Patent Portfolio Licenses currently include patents
owned by more than twenty companies, including LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics.
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The intent of this patent pool is to provide users worldwide access to all MPEG-4 essential
intellectual property through one organization that grants licenses and collects royalties.72
Thus, there is a different license to make and sell a product meeting the standards, from
the license to use the product in certain commercial applications. MPEG-LA established the
precedent for use fees with the MPEG-2 license, which requires DVD manufacturers to
collect a small royalty on each DVD they manufacture that uses MPEG-2 compression.
IPR holders in standards may offer one license to make and sell a compliant product or
service and a separate license for the use of the product or service. The AVC Patent Portfolio
was recently issued by the MPEGLA. The AVC/H.264 license sets conditions for one of the
highly competitive and state of the art video compression systems. Multiple patents are
required to implement the AVC standard. Table 6.6 shows details of the two patent pools. In
the MPEG LA patent pool, Korean late standardizers show strong presence in terms of
number of licensors and patents. Samsung and LG are two Korean firms among 25 licensors
of the MPEG 2 standard, holding a total of 17 patents. The two firms and Curitel, another
Korean firm, hold a total of 27 patents in the patent pool for the MPEG 4 visual standard.
Table 6.6: Number of Patents Held by Korean Late Standardizers in Patent Pools
Number of Total Number Number of Patents Held by Korean
Licensors of Patents Companies
MPEG LA MPEG 2 25 709 Samsung (17), LG (1)
MPEG 4 visual 23 245 Samsung (14), Curitel (10), LG (3)
MPEG 4 system 8 64 Samsung (14), ETRI (20)
DVD 7C DVD 7 1,686 None
Source: Adapted from MPEGLA and DVD6 websites: www.mpegla.com and www.dvd6cla.com
Notes: (1) MPEG LA: Moving Picture Experts Group Licensing Administration
(2) DVD 7C LA: Digital Video Disk 6 Company Licensing Agency
(3) ETRI: Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
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3G Patent Platform
Another noteworthy initiative to deal with proprietary technologies included in standards
is the 3G Patent Platform, first established in 1998 to deal with patent concerns associated
with third-generation (3G) mobile technologies. During that time, a large number of firms
owned patented technologies deemed "essential" to the 3G mobile standards. The number of
such firms was much larger than the case of 2G GSM standards, for which there were about
20 firms. Several standards development organizations working on the 3G standardization
recognized the needs to establish an industry-wide arrangement to deal with the complexities
and uncertainties of the intellectual property situation associated with 3G standards. As a
result, 41 major international telecom companies jointly formed a working group within the
UMTS Intellectual Property Association (UIPA) to define the specification for the 3G Patent
Platform, which deals specifically with the IMT-2000 3G standard. 73
During the implementation phase, a group of 19 major operators and manufacturers
("Partners"), four Promoters and two Associate Partners formed the 3G Patent Platform
Partnership to seek antitrust approval from relevant authorities, including the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, and the European
Commission. They also set up institutional and legal frameworks for the Patent Platform. In
January 2003, the 3G Patent Platform started its commercialization phase, by offering
services to evaluate, certify, and license patents that are technologically essential for the
manufacture and operation of 3G mobile communication systems. The W-CDMA Patent
Licensing Program has become operational since January 2004. Table 6.7 shows the list of
member firms in the 3G3P.
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Korean late standardizers constitute a large group in the 3G3P. LG Electronics, Samsung
Electronics, KT, SK Telcom, and ETRL are partners of the group. This reflects the strength of
Korea's technological capability in the area of 3G mobile communication as well as their
effort to find ways to utilize their proprietary technologies.7 4
LEGAL CAPABILITIES
Because of the increasing importance of intellectual property and potential antitrust
lawsuits, late standardizers need to improve their legal capability, which we consider to be an
essential element of standards capability. Samsung Electronics, for instance, has a very
capable legal department. Each of Sumsung's five major business divisions has its own
intellectual property department. There is also an independent legal department whose task is
to coordinate with each IP department concerning how to deal with any patent litigation. 75
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Samsung sometimes hire outside counsels to deal with intellectual property issues. The
decision on the choice of outside counsel is usually made in a manager-level meeting.
Each company has its own guidelines and procedures regarding intellectual property
generated by R&D activities. In Samsung, for instance, the intellectual property department in
each business unit usually sets up a patent evaluation committee to review any possible
inventions that its engineers have produced. The committee is to decide whether or not to file
a patent or other intellectual property protection for an invention, where to file, and which
route to take.. The committee is usually made up of patent engineers, R&D personnel, and
business managers. Samsung's local patent agents then draft the specifications and associated
patent claims. Finally, the company files the applications both in Korea and other countries
and regions that they deem important, such as the United States, Europe, and Japan.76
Standards engineers are always involved in this process. According to the standards
experts from Samsung, LG and other firms that we interviewed, engineers who participate in
standardization meetings often have to consult with lawyers about the details of specifications
being discussed and possibly included in future standards. One interviewee goes further to say
that the teams representing his firm at technical meetings often consists of at least one lawyer
or patent engineer, who is responsible for intellectual-property issues that may arise in the
meetings. It is commonly understood among technical experts that they should not reveal any
proprietary invention and information during technical discussion in working groups. Yet,
during participation in standards development activities, engineers may not be careful enough
or may be tempted to unintentionally reveal the company's recent inventions.
Legal capabilities can be improved and sustained by recruiting new talents. Successful late
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standardizers, such as Samsung, realize the importance of having competent lawyers on its
legal teams. Samsung has around 110 lawyers in 2005 and plans to increase the number to
over 300 within 5 years. Similarly, Samsung aims to increase the number of patent experts
from the current 250 to 450 by 2010. With its reputation and compensation structure,
Samsung is able to attract the best legal talents.7 7 This is an impressive pool of lawyers,
considering that Kim & Jang, the biggest law firm in Korea, employs about 270 lawyers.78
Samsung's plan to enlarge its legal team is driven by the need to enhance its legal ability to
cope with the rapidly changing global economy and to strengthen its competitiveness by
reducing legal risks.79
In fact, in February 2006, Samsung Electronics introduced a Chief Patent Officer (CPO)
position in an attempt to reinforce the patent management within the firm. As Samsung is
involved more in strategic alliances and large-scale patent conflicts, the patent management
system with CPO has been established to cope with the changing environment in organized
and consistent way. The CPO will take charge of the whole process of patent management
from strategy planning and execution to professional training and patent quality improvement.
The CPO will also coordinate different opinions from related divisions and deal with
problems from external sources regarding intellectual property. 80
THAI LATE STANDARDIZERS IN MOBILE TELECOM
The Thai domestic mobile telecom industry is characterized by oligopolistic competition
between a few large service providers.8' Unlike the Korean case, there are few, if any, Thai
telecom equipment and handset manufacturers. This means the Thai government does not
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have as much incentive to nurture and develop domestic standards to support the domestic
industry as in the cases of Korean and Chinese governments.
Our case studies focus on two of the most important mobile operators in Thailand:
Advanced Info Service (AIS), the largest domestic mobile operator, and TOT, a former state-
owned telecommunication firm which granted AIS a concession for mobile services.
From our empirical investigation, we find that latecomer firms in the mobile
telecommunication industry in Thailand are in between the first and second stages of our late-
standardization model. They are still far behind the successful Korean late standardizers, such
as, Samsung, LG and KT, which have already entered the third stage of late standardization.
The Thai firms have implemented various organizational quality standards and management,
such as ISO-9000 series and Six Sigma. But their engagement in technological
standardization is rather limited. In the following section, we discuss the late standardization
efforts of these two firms.
ADVANCED INFO SERVICE (AIS)
Advanced Info Service (AIS) is Thailand's largest mobile service operator. In early 1990,
the company was granted an exclusive 20-year concession by the Telephone Organization of
Thailand (TOT) to provide mobile phone services using a 900 MHz system. AIS launched its
first 900 MHz analog system services later that year. In 1994, AIS launched the Global
System for Mobile Communication services. Later in 1996, AIS was granted an extension on
the concession period from 20 years to 25 years by TOT, in exchange for a new agreement
that TOT could also grant licenses to other operators besides AIS. AIS continued to expand its
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network for both the Cellular 900 and Digital GSM System to cover the whole country.
In 1999, AIS signed a business partnership agreement with Singapore Telecom
International. In 2000, AIS improved its non-voice application services. Its mobileLIFE
service enables subscribers to utilize a wide range of business applications with mobile
phones. In 2000, AIS launched its GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) Technology, the
service that facilitates hi-speed data transmission and connects mobile phone subscribers to
the Internet. AIS also established its leadership in the domestic market by launching General
Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE). These
are 2.5G protocols that support much higher data transfer rates than previous technologies. In
early 2002, the company started to introduce the 3G technologies, although the varieties and
ranges are still very limited.
From the above account, we see that AIS has constantly demonstrated its responsiveness
in terms of technology applications. Yet, the company still has limited R&D capabilities.
From our interviews with a vice president and a senior engineer, there are currently about 20
engineers working in its R&D division, the "Future Lab." Most of the activities, however, are
in the development phase, rather than in the research phase. The Future Lab focuses primarily
on adapting imported technologies to the domestic market. As customer satisfaction is the
main goal of AIS' services, consumer preferences are the main criteria that often determine
the directions of its technical-development effort. The development team focuses mainly on
new services and applications that the firm can offer to the users. Currently, the firm holds
about 2-3 domestic patents for the application technologies developed by AIS engineers.
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Standardization efforts at AIS
As of April 2006, AIS is participating in at least three international standards development
consortia. One is the GSM Association, a global trade association representing more than 690
GSM mobile phone operators around the world. 82 The other is the GSM User Group - Asia
Pacific (GSMUG - AP) led by Ericsson. AIS is also a sector member in the ITU-D. The
number of consortia that AIS participates has not changed in the past decade; AIS has been
involved in both GSMA and GSMUG-AP since the early years of its operation. The company
participates in a few domestic standards forums, such as Thailand IPv6 Forum.
AIS has limited involvement in standardization activities. Other than participating in the
above consortia, the company has not participated in founding standards consortia, and has
currently no plans to do so. This is not unexpected, considering that its current business
strategies focus on technological applications and adoption, as well as its limited innovation
and standards capabilities. Internally, the firm does not have a division or department devoted
to standards activities. Most of the standards works are done by engineers in the Future Lab.
They are involved in external standardization activities on an ad hoc basis. There are no
specific guidelines or policies regarding standardization, although the company has a policy to
review intellectual-property-right issues before joining a new standards forum.
In terms of sources of standards and related information, AIS relies mainly on its vendors,
mostly European, such as Nokia and Ericsson. The selection of European vendors was
determined greatly by the fact that AIS is a GSM-based operator. Engineers from AIS
participate in forums for user groups organized by these vendors, and learn about new
technologies and standards in such events. Because AIS do not participate directly in
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international standardization, it acquires information through the major vendors. For instance,
AIS engineers learned about new ETSI standards proposals and approved standards for 3G
technologies through GSMUG-AP forums, when representatives from Ericsson presented new
technologies and applications. The firm also acquired some technical knowledge from its
Singaporean business partner, SingTel.
AIS also receives technical support from the Thai government in terms of testing and
calibration services. The firm expects the government to function as the contact point or
clearing house for information on standards, particularly in the areas of safety and security.
From our interviews with the AIS employees, we have the impression that AIS is adopting
a "follower" approach to standards-related issues. The AIS executives often mentioned the
benefit of not having to "reinvent the wheel" by adopting vendors' standards and
specifications. The AIS executives believed that, although standards issues are important, they
are not the main focus of AIS' current corporate strategy. Rather, it is the role of the
government to engage in international standardization and diffuse the information and
knowledge to the private sector.
TOT
TOT was founded in 1954 as Telecommunication Organization of Thailand, a state
enterprise under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. It was later transformed into
a public company named TOT Corporation in 2002, and renamed to TOT in 2005.
Although TOT's main products were fixed-line services, the company entered the mobile
phone market by offering mobile services based on the 470 MHz and 1900 MHz frequency
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ranges. TOT operates the 1900 MHz mobile service jointly with and CAT Telecom, another
formerly state-owned firm, Communications Authority of Thailand (CAT). TOT plans to
develop the 1900 MHz system into the 3G system.
TOT's standardization efforts
Because of its previous status as a state-owned telecommunication enterprise, TOT has
been representing the country in various standardization activities at the international level.
According to our interview with a TOT Vice President, TOT engineers have participated in
meetings and conferences organized by formal standardization organizations and consortia.
These organizations include the ITU, the Asia Pacific Telecommunity (APT), GSM
Association, TeleManagement Forum (TMF), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and
IPv6 Forum. TOT also participates in a few local forums that exchange information on new
technologies and standards, including Thailand-IPv6 Forum.
Compared to AIS, TOT is a larger organization, with more resources and capabilities
devoted to R&D and standards activities. Approximately 200 TOT engineers work on various
types of R&D projects. Many of its R&D activities, however, are limited to adapting and
adjusting foreign technologies to local environmental and market conditions. Although TOT
has sent its engineers to various standardization forums, its contribution to standards
development is rather limited. The main objective of its involvement is to acquire information
on new technologies and standards.
TOT also acquires information and knowledge on new standards and technologies through
its major vendors, such as NEC, Ericsson, Siemens, and Cisco. Lately, TOT has become more
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interested in Chinese manufacturers, such as Huawei Technologies and ZTE. TOT has
recently bought Huawei's equipment as part of its plan to expand its network for broadband
data backbone transmission.83 Although Huawei is not yet a world technology leader, the firm
has made significant progress technologically due to its aggressive investment in R&D.
According to the TOT vice president, TOT has purchased the equipment from Huawei, not
only because of its low prices compared to other vendors, but also because of its technical
reliability and support. Considering that the Chinese firm is engaging actively in international
standardization, they could be another source of information and knowledge on standards and
standardization for TOT.
In summary, latecomers in the mobile telecom sector in Thailand are still far behind the
successful Korean late standardizers, in terms of level of contribution to, and influence on,
international standardization. They still rely on foreign vendors that are standards leaders for
information and knowledge related to standardization. Our interviewees all agree that the state
should play a more active role in standardization activities.
TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION IN THAILAND
Various governmental agencies are in charge of telecommunication standardization in
Thailand, including the Telecommunication Standard Division in the Post and Telegraph
Department under the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology and the Thai
Industrial Standards Institute (TISI). In addition, because of their former status as state-owned
telecommunication enterprises, TOT and CAT are involved in certain aspects of telecom
standardization, particularly in testing and calibrating telecom equipment and products.
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Another agency that has become active in technical standardization in Thailand is the
National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC). Researchers from
NECTEC represent the country in several standards meetings, both in formal SDOs and
industry consortia. NECTEC also hosts a few domestic consortia, in which researchers and
the private sector exchange information on new standards and technologies.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The case studies of latecomer firms in the semiconductor and mobile telecommunication
industries demonstrate how standards and related activities enable latecomer firms to improve
their competitive positions. Quality standards and standardization are the first step for
latecomer firms to move up the ladder of competitive advantage. Then, latecomer firms may
become the leader in a market segment, in terms of market share, without being a standards-
leader. But it has to join standards-development clubs to upgrade its competitive positions.
The types of standards organizations and forums in which latecomer firms participate are also
related to their levels of technological and standards capability.
Late standardizers' emergence as a leader in certain industry is generally first manifested
through market share, then through technological breakthrough, finally through the influence
on technical standardization. The focus on quality standards and management is the first step
for late standardizers to move beyond catch-up. As they move closer to the world
technological frontier, external standardization activities become a key factor that affects their
strategy and competitiveness. Our case studies suggest that standards and standardization are
at the heart of these firms' R&D strategies and their competitive advantage.
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These successful late standardizers also adjust their internal organizational structures, such
that standards activities become a core component of R&D strategies and policies. Human
resources policies need to accommodate the career growth of standards engineers, such that
they are continuously involved in standards activities.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE STATE'S ROLE IN LATE STANDARDIZATION
PROVIDING INFRATECHNOLOGIES FOR QUALITY CONTROL .
ESTABLISHING STANDARDS INSTITUTIONS * PROMOTING NETWORKING .
MITIGATING TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET RISKS * STANDARDS DIPLOMACY FOR OVERSEAS
MARKET EXPANSION m PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Through the case study of the Korean government and standards institutions, we find that the
state plays a critical role throughout the process of late standardization and technological
catch-up. Yet, the nature of the involvement changes as latecomer firms gain more
technological capabilities and move closer to the technological frontier. As late standardizers
enhance their technological capabilities, the sources from which they capture economic rents
change from cheap input factors to production capabilities then to innovation capabilities.
During such a process, the state adjusts its roles from being the main developer and enforcer
of standards to become a mediator and coordinator of standardization efforts both
domestically and internationally. The main goal is to help late standardizers improve internal
standards capabilities, so that they can leverage external resources through linking and
learning.
As late-standardizing firms move from the positions of late adopters to fast followers, and
eventually to technology and standards leaders, the state implements various standards
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policies and programs so that firms can capture greater technological rents. The state plays
significant roles in six key ways: (1) supplying basic standards as infratechnologies, (2)
securing demand by mitigating market risks, (3) promoting knowledge diffusion through
facilitating networking, (4) reducing technology risks through technology search and forecast,
(5) lobbying and negotiating with other states for market expansion of domestic standards,
and (6) establishing institutional and legal frameworks to protect intellectual property.
As part of the supply-side standards policy, the state provides firms with
"infratechnologies," such as basic and reference standards, throughout the late-standardization
process. These infratechnologies are the basis for industrial standardization and quality
control, which are the main elements that allow latecomers to move beyond catch-up. The
Korean state has regarded quality standardization and control as an essential part of its export-
oriented industrial policy since its early years of industrialization. During the catch-up stage,
the state not only searches for and/or develops standards but also maintains, and diffuses
standards for latecomer firms. Experts from state agencies participate in international
standardization. The state assumes the leading role not only in the field of non-product
standards but also product-element standards, especially in the areas of infratechnologies and
generic technologies that lead to market applications in the forms of products and services.
Infratechnologies are generally beyond the financial and technological capabilities of
individual latecomers. They have strong public-goods characteristics, resulting in under-
provision by the market. The state hence assumes the prime role in producing and providing
infratechnologies from the early stages of late standardization. Throughout the late-
standardization process, particularly during the catch-up stage, infratechnologies are essential
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to latecomers' efforts in quality management and standardization. Even at the stage where late
standardizers are already at the technological frontier, the state remains crucial in providing
even more sophisticated infratechnologies for firms.
As part of the demand-side standards policy, the state plays an important role in mitigating
initial market risks associated with new standards. The state may be able to do so by declaring
or mandating certain standards as national standards, by becoming a first and a model user
through public procurement policies, and/or by protecting the domestic market through
protectionist trade and industrial policies. Before standards are developed, prices are often
determined by product value. Once standards are developed and products are standardized,
prices are determined by costs. Through case studies of South Korean standards institutions,
we observe how the state uses different policies and programs to increase the value for the
targeted technologies. The state may also mitigate the risks associated with market creation by
cooperating with other countries to adopt the same standards. This "standards diplomacy"
effectively creates a regional bloc based on common technical standards. Korea's cooperation
in standardization with Japan and China is the case in point. The Korean state has recently
pursued active standards diplomacy in order to expand its export markets in Asia.
The state plays another important role in reducing technology risks associated with
selecting the right technologies and standards. By supporting R&D activities conducted by
research and educational institutes, the state could reduce the technology risks that firms face
by searching and identifying which technologies and standards to be adopted. As late
standardizers move closer to the world technological frontier, the state plays a more critical
role by identifying and predicting the future trends of standards and technologies.
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The state can also facilitate information and knowledge flows between firms, especially
when late-standardizing firms have limited search capability. State-led networking is crucial
to standardization at the domestic and international levels. Even though consortia increasingly
become important for standardization of new technologies, formal standards organizations,
such as the ITU and the ISO, are still the major forums for international standardization. In
these forums, late-standardizing states, such as the Korean government, still participate as the
member body. The state remains active in deciding the directions and strategies of
standardization. It retains its role as the representative negotiator on behalf of latecomer firms.
In this chapter, we discuss the roles of the state in the process of late standardization,
based on the empirical evidence of the Korean government and standards institutions. We
first pay attention to the roles of the state in providing standards as infratechnologies. Our
focus is on the standards policies and programs for improving product quality and quality
management. We then turn our attention to the role of the state in establishing standards
institutions, focusing on its role in developing and enhancing national systems for
measurement and documentary standards. Then we discuss the role the state in mitigating
technology and market risks. We then discuss "standards diplomacy," in which the Korean
state has been particularly active in recent years. This is followed by its role in protecting
intellectual property rights related to standards. We use the case of the Korean state in the
mobile telecommunication industry to examine such roles. Throughout the chapter, we
illustrate the changes in the roles of the state, as late standardizers move towards and beyond
technological frontier. Specially, we examine what standards activities and responsibilities the
state assumes and focuses on in each stage of the late-standardization process.
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PROVIDING INFRATECHNOLOGIES FOR QUALITY CONTROL
Throughout the late-standardization process, the state plays an important role in providing
firms with standards that are "infratechnologies," such as basic and reference standards.
Infratechnologies are the basis for quality management and control, which in turn is the
foundation for manufacturing and innovation capabilities. Latecomer firms can use
infratechnologies as the basis for their efforts to enhance product quality and to improve
quality control and management throughout their late-standardization process.
STANDARDS AS INFRATECHNOLOGIES
Basic and reference standards are infratechnologies, which are technical tools that include
scientific and engineering data, measurement and test methods, and practices and techniques
for wide industrial application. Infratechnologies are critical to the development of generic
technologies and subsequent proprietary technologies, which in turn are developed into
market applications in the forms of products and services (Figure 7.1). Infratechnologies often
appear as non-product standards, which form a basis for a whole product or service. Non-
product standards are usually competitively neutral within an industry. By contrast, product-
element standards involve one or a few attributes of a product, and create direct competitive
advantage for the owner of the technology underlying such attributes (Tassey 2000).
Infratechnologies play an important role in technological development in at least three
important ways (Tassey 1997). First, infratechnologies increase production efficiency and
enhance product characteristics by providing tools for quality control and management, as
well as real-time process control. As we argue in previous chapters, internal quality
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standardization and management is the key factor that enables latecomers to move beyond
catch-up. Infratechnologies in the forms of measurement standards and reference materials are
thus the essential element of technological catch-up and beyond.
Second, infratechnologies promote technology adoption by reducing transactions costs.
Infratechnologies increase the speed of market penetration by providing a language for
communicating the characteristics and quality of a new product, process, or service. Third,
infratechnologies increase R&D efficiency. With common measurement technologies, test
methods, technical standards, and standard practices, researchers are able to conduct and
exchange R&D results, which allow for the replication and verification of research results.
Figure 7.1: Standards as Infratechnologies
Source: Adapted from Tassey (1997) Figures 1 and 3
As discussed in Chapter Two, standards have public-goods characteristics. This means
standards as infratechnologies are generally underprovided by private markets, as compared
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to the socially optimal levels of provision. The private sector may under-invest in
infratechnologies, because its technology base is different from the core technology that
industry draws on to develop its product or processes (Tassey 1997). This is especially true
for non-product standards, which are developed from different scientific and technical bases
from those of product-element standards. Non-product standards, such as measurement and
test methods, and interface standards, demonstrate the current, most-accurate statement of the
fundamental laws of physics (Tassey 1982). The state thus normally assumes the role to
provide these basic standards to correct the perceived market failure.
The involvement of the state is not limited to non-product standards, but often includes
product-element standards. If large economies of scale are present or early market entry is
regarded crucial to national economic development, the state may directly specify product-
element standards (Tassey 2000). This is, in fact, the main rationale and focus of the Korean
government in its involvement in recent standardization efforts in the ICT sector.
From our case study of South Korea, we find that the roles of the state remain crucial
throughout the late-standardization process. Yet, the roles of the state change as late
standardizing firms enhance technology and standards capabilities. As latecomer firms
develop closer to the world technology frontier, they rely less on the state for the development
and provision of product-element standards. Particularly, advanced late standardizers at the
forefront of the technological frontier become more active and influential in both domestic
and international standardization activities. The increased direct involvement of the private
sector and the decreased role of the state may be explained by the interactions between the
following three factors: (1) technological distance of standards from the frontier, (2) public-
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goods characteristics of standards, and (2) appropriability of rents generated by standards.
Traditionally, formal standardization organizations develop "reactionary standards" to
standardize technical features that have been implemented by firms. One major objective is
that standards generate benefits that firms and consumers can all enjoy, as in the case of
public goods. Most national standards organizations are pubic agencies. However, the
processes tend to be time-consuming; the technologies often become mature by the time the
standards are developed. However, many critical standards in fast-changing fields, such as
information technology, are increasingly developed by standards consortia when the
technologies are relatively new. These "anticipatory standards" define the technical features
that firms later adopt. This means the technological distance of the technologies embedded in
the standards are closer to the frontier. As the technologies underlying standards tend to be
proprietary to firms, there are clear incentives for firms to adopt standards strategies that
allow them to appropriate the rents induced by standards. Instead of relying on the state to
develop standards as before, firms opt to develop standards by themselves, preventing the
"club goods" from becoming "public goods".
This does not mean, however, that the state plays less important roles regarding standards
and standardization. Basic and reference standards remain important for R&D and quality
control and management, regardless of how technologically advanced the private sector is.
Because these standards are infratechnologies, the state still plays the major role in providing
them. Furthermore, institutional arrangements affect how firms adopt standards strategies and
activities. We now turn our attention to the role of the state in setting up standards institutions.
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ESTABLISHING STANDARDS INSTITUTIONS
Throughout the process of late standardization and technological catch-up, the state is the
main actor that sets up and maintains the institutional framework for standards activities.
Standards institutions include not only the organizations that deal with standards activities but
the policy and legal frameworks that shape the standards systems. One can think of a
country's institutional arrangements for standards activities in terms of a national standards
system. In most countries, the central governments are responsible for setting up and
maintaining the national standards systems.
NATIONAL STANDARDS SYSTEMS
A national standards system (NSS) includes not only standard-setting organizations, but
includes product-testing laboratories, certification and accreditation bodies, which operate
within certain policy and legal frameworks designed specifically for standards activities.
These institutions constitute important technological infrastructure that supports technological
capability building. The national system for product and process standards is a critical
element of a national production and innovation system. The sophistication and performance
of a national standards system is, in fact, an indicator of technological and innovation
capability of a country. The adequacy of these standard institutions not only raises the actual
quality of domestic products and processes, but also improves the perception and confidence
on the quality of local products and processes in the domestic and international markets.
A national standards system is thus a system in which different entities within a nation
develop and utilize objective criteria to comprehend and solve commonly existing, recurring,
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or new technical problems within certain policy and legal institutions. Because standards
systems function as a medium for technological transfer across space and time, they serve as
the basis for ensuring the quality and performance of industrial goods and economic
transactions. At the national level, the development of sophisticated standards systems goes
hand-in-hand with the development of production and innovation systems. The ability to set
and assess standards is thus closely related to technological capability, and standards facilities
are an important element of production and innovation systems.
Legal foundation for standards activities
A well-functioning national standards system operates within legal frameworks designed
specifically for standards activities. This is the case for the Korean national standards system.
As shown in Table 7.1, since the beginning of its modem standardization in the early 1960s,
the Korean state has enacted several legislations for standards activities. Major legislations
include the Industrial Standardization Act (1961) and the Weights and Measures Act (1961),
the Export Goods Inspection Act (1962), and the Industrial Product Quality Control Act
(1967). Under these legislations, relevant standards organizations were established as part of
the national measurement and documentary standards systems. Since then, some of the
legislations have been revised and new legislations have been added to the standards system.
This reflects the changes in the nature of standards and standardization activities, as well as
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The most fundamental feature of the Korean national standards system is its constitutional
basis. Article 127 of the Korean Constitution specifies the role of the state in developing
science, technology, and innovation. Within the same article, there is a specific paragraph
indicating the role of the state in establishing a national standards system:
(1) The State shall strive to develop the national economy by developing science
and technology, information and human resources and encouraging innovation.
(2) The State shall establish a system of national standards.
(3) The President may establish advisory organizations necessary to achieve the
purpose referred to in paragraph (1) 84
The provision on standardization was added to the Constitution on October 27, 1980,
when the constitution was amended.85 Although many countries have provisions related to
standards in their constitutions, most focus on standards of weights and measures. Building on
a table reported by Kim (1986), we compile Table 7.2 to show the standards provisions in the
constitutions of select developed and developing nations. We find that many developed
countries have provisions regarding weights and measures in their constitutions. In contrast,
very few latecomer countries have such provisions in their constitutions, even though some of
them, such as Thailand, explicitly indicate the importance of science and technology.
The Korean constitution is particularly unique. It does not provide an explicit statement on
weights and measures per se; rather it calls for an establishment of the national standards
system. This is certainly more comprehensive, because it includes areas of standards and
standardization other than weights and measures. As noted by Kim (1986), many developing
countries stipulate the promotion of science and technology without stipulating any provisions
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for national standards. This indicates the lack of understanding about the fundamental role of
standards in technological and economic development.
Table 7.2: Standards-Related Provisions in Constitutions in Select Countries
Country Article Content
U.K. (Magna Carta) Section 35 There shall be one measure of wine throughout our whole realm, and one measure of ale
and one measure of corn--namely, the London quart;--and one width of dyed and russet and
hauberk cloths--namely, two ells below the selvage. And with weights, moreover, it shall be
as with measures.
U.S.A. Article 1-8 The Congress shall have Power...To...fix the Standard of Weights and Measures
Germany Article 73 The Federation has the exclusive power to legislate on: ...weights and measures, as well as
computation of time
Switzerland Article 125 Legislation on weights and measures is a federal matter.
Austria Article 10-1 The Federation has powers of legislation and execution in the following matters:
5. ... the weights and measures, standards, and hallmark system;
Canada Article 91 the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to ... Weights and
measures
Taiwan Article 107 The Central Government shall be competent to legislate and execute the following
matters: ... Weights and measures
Brazil Article 22-VI It is incumbent exclusively upon the Union to legislate on ... measures system
Mexico Article 73-18 The Congress has the power...to adopt a general system of weights and measures
South Africa Section 44-2 Parliament may intervene by passing legislation ... to maintain essential national standards
South Korea Article 127-2 The State shall establish a system of national standards.
Sources: Adapted from Table 58 in Kim (1986) with additional and updated information from International Constitutional Law
Project Information at website: http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/info.html, accessed in April 2006.
The standards provision became part of the Korean constitution during the time when the
country was drafting a new constitution to replace the so-called Yushin Constitution.86 The
National Assembly Committee on Constitutional Amendment was calling for public proposals
to gather inputs for the new constitution. Responding to that request, Dr. Zae-Quan Kim, the
then President of the Korea Standards Research Institute (KSRI) submitted a proposal,
suggesting that the new constitution include a clause on the establishment of a national
standards system. This proposal was well received by the government and the National
Assembly. After maneuvering through political hurdles and several revisions, the proponents
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of the standards clause managed to have it included in the new Korean Constitution, which
was confirmed by the national referendum on October 27, 1980. (Kim 1986)
The constitutional provision for the national standards system has important implications
for the late standardization processes of Korean latecomers. The concept of national standards
system in the constitution is much broader than merely having laws for standards of weights
and measures and/or for industrial standardization. It specifies the fundamental and holistic
characteristics of standards activities.
KOREAN NATIONAL STANDARDS SYSTEMS
In general, a national standards system is categorized broadly into two sub-systems, that is,
national measurement system and documentary standards system. The national measurement
system comprises activities and institutions dealing with measurement and reference
standards. On the other hand, the national documentary standards system deals with legal
metrology and documentary standards, which deal with industrial specifications as well as
health, safety, and environmental regulations. Each sub-system is further categorized into two
main activities: standardization and conformity assessment.
As defined earlier in Chapter Two, standardization is the process by which standards are
developed and recorded. Conformity assessment, on the other hand, refers to activities of
complying with standards, such as product testing, product certification and quality system
registration. Although conformity assessment is not a standard per se, it is a critical part of
standards efforts. Firms not only have to comply with standards but have to verify that their
products and processes meet such standards. Conformity assessment not only depends on the
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existence of clear standards, but also affects the value of standards by increasing the
confidence that firms and consumers have on standards. Conformity assessment is especially
important in international trade, as credible certification and accreditation systems can
demonstrate the quality of the traded products.
Conformity assessment is possible at three different levels (National Research Council
1995). First, assessment ability refers to the evaluation of products and processes, which can
be done by manufacturers, testing laboratories, certifiers, or quality system registrars. These
entities are also evaluated to make sure they are competent in conducting specific tests using
specified methods. This second level of conformity assessment is referred to as accreditation.
The third level of assessment is recognition, in which accreditors are evaluated. The activities
at the three levels necessarily require active participation of both the pubic and private sectors.
National measurement standards system
A large component of a national measurement standards system is metrological activities.
Specifically, metrology includes theoretical and practical problems related to measurement
units, measuring instruments, methods and execution of measurement, and estimation of their
characteristics (ISO 1987). A measurement standard could be a material measure, a measuring
instrument, a reference material, or a measuring system, which is intended to define realize,
conserve or reproduce a unit or one or more values of quantity to serve as a reference.
Metrology is a critical component of technological infrastructure, as it is the foundation of a
quality system. Transactions of goods in both domestic and international markets rely on
accurate measurement. 87 The overall capability to measure, test, calibrate, and certify products
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and processes, as well as to develop and maintain standards, are important elements of
technological capability (Hawkins et al. 1995).
A reference standard is the data and information on measurements made available to the
public, with the accuracy and reliability that has been obtained through scientific analysis and
evaluation. Reference standards include physical constants, recognized property valued and
scientific and technology data. As science and technology develop, more data and information
on the property of a substance or system of substances become necessary. These data and
information could be distributed uniformly and reliably through reference standards.
Reference standards are important for industrial and technological development in various
ways. Not only do they facilitate the design and production of industrial goods, but they also
promote product quality and provide the basis for environmental control and other services. A
national measurement system comprises activities and institutions dealing with measurement
and reference standards. Figure 7.2 shows an example of a national measurement system,
based on the model proposed by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards (now NIST).
The state's presence in a national measurement system is strengthened by its direct control
over legal metrology. Legal metrology deals with legal requirements for establishing,
reproducing, conserving, and disseminating measurement units, as well as for examining and
verifying measuring instruments (ISO 1987).
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Figure 7.2: An Example of a National Measurement Standards System
Conceptual _ Basic Technical Realized Dissemination and End-Use
Foundation Infrastructure Measurement Enforcement Measurements
Source: Adapted from NBS (1975)
Korean standards systems: the focus on quality improvement and control
The Korean state has played an important role throughout the late-standardization process
of latecomer firms. Yet, the focus of its standards policy and programs are different in each of
the three stages of late standardization. During the early stages, the Korean state focused its
standards activities mainly on two aspects, that is, the development of measurement standards
system and the industrial standardization for export-oriented industrial development. By
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engaging directly in industrial standardization, the state aimed to achieve various goals,
including consumer protection in terms of safety and health. However, the most important
objective was to enhance the quality of industrial manufacturing by Korean firms. The
development of national standards systems was an essential element of Korea's export-
promotion policy and a crucial part of its broader goal to industrialize the economy. The focus
on quality improvement was reflected in the enactment of the Industrial Product Quality
Control Act (1967), while the focus on quality for export products was reflected in the Export
Goods Inspection Act (1962). As part of the development, the government implemented
several standards policies and programs and established various institutions devoted to
standards development, enforcement, and R&D.
As a number of Korean firms increase production and innovation capabilities, the Korean
state shifts its attention to strategic standardization for product elements. As shown in Table
7.1, the nature of standards activities implemented by the Korean state evolves, which we
discuss in detail below. The main feature of the strategy is to increase institutional
complementarities between domestic and international institutions. Specifically, the Korean
state has changed its domestic standards institutions in such a way that Korean firms enjoy the
externalities generated from international standardization.
Korean measurement standards system: the basis for quality improvement
An essential element of any national standards system is the measurement standards and
legal metrology systems. Measurement standards are the cornerstone of quality control and
management, the basis for industrial development. In Korea, some forms of measurement and
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reference standards were available before the nation embarked on its modem industrialization
efforts in the early 1960s. The Korean state established institutions for basic measurement
standards, including the Analysis and Testing Laboratory of the Mint Office (1883), the
Central Testing Institute under the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry (1912),
and the Central Industrial Research Institute under the Ministry of Trade and Industry (1945).
However, it was not until the early 1960s that the modem measurement standards system
started to take shape. The Korean state started to recognize the importance of modem
standards system at the national scale as part of its industrial-development efforts. This
recognition was evident in the first and second economic development plans (1962-1966 and
1967-1971). When South Korea entered the stage of heavy and chemical industrialization in
the 1970s, the importance of standards became even more pronounced (Kim 1986).
The first modem legislation for the Korean national measurement system was the Weights
and Measures Act in 1961. The Act was later revised in 1992, and now includes a broad
range of technical areas, such as specification of legal units for measuring physical quantities,
national calibration system, and provisions for establishing a national accreditation system for
testing/inspection laboratories. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE)
maintains the: Act, and is responsible for establishing related policies and programs. The
actual responsibilities for administering metrological policies, however, are entrusted to the
Korean Agency for Technology and Standards (KATS), previously known as the Korean
National Institute of Technology and Quality (KNITQ). The Weights and Measures Act and
the Industrial Standardization Act were effectively the major tool that provided the Korean
government with the control on the quality of industrial products produced and sold in the
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country. Under the Weights and Measures Act, KATS manages the legal metrology system in
Korea, and coordinates the national calibration system for measurement instruments. KATS is
also the national standardizing body for industrial standards (KS standards), and represents
Korea as the national member body in the ISO and the IEC.
Standards capability
The state's standards capability affects firms' standards capabilities. Standards capability
is simply defined as the capability of an actor (individual, firm, or institution) to deal with
standards (Vries 1999). At the firm level, standards capabilities generally include the
capability to identify the needs for standards, to search for and select appropriate standards, to
acquire and assimilate standards into the production process, to adapt standards to local
conditions, to modify standards in response to changing economic conditions, and to develop
new standards for internal and external uses. In addition to these capabilities, the state's
standards capability includes the capability to develop national standards, to disseminate such
standards to the private sector, and to represent the country in international standardization
forums. The state may also play an important role in tracing relevant standards, especially for
firms that have limited resources and capabilities for standards activities.
Standards capability is not merely a technical capability to develop standards and
technical specifications, but include institutional and organizational capabilities.
Standardization involves more than technical exchanges among engineers. It includes political
maneuvering and negotiation among participating parties. As demonstrated in the study of the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) by Krasner (1991), the participating states
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often lobby to have the technical preferences of their firms be included in international
standards. Even when the states are not directly involved in the actual technical
standardization and delegate the task to the private sector, they can still exert influence on the
private sector to reflect the interests of the states in standardization. 88 The state's standards
capability is thus an important indicator of the capability level of a national standards system.
Despite the enacted laws and the established institutions, the overall measurement
capabilities in Korea did not develop fast enough to accommodate the needs of the growing
modern industries in the country in 1960s and 1970s. The government responded by
increasing its effort in improving measurement standards capability by establishing R&D and
testing labs devoted to measurement and reference standards. (Kim 1986)
An indicator for measurement capability is the so-called realized measurement capability,
which is the accuracy with which an element is measured. Korea's realized measurement
capabilities have improved significantly in the past 40 years (Table 7.3). Even though its
overall capabilities still lag behind the United States., its capabilities are much more advanced
that those of Thailand in 2004.
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Table 7.3: Realized Measurement Capabilities of South Korea
Unit Accuracy (1985) Accuracy (2004) Cf. US (2004) Cf. Thailand (2004)
Length m 10 10-9  0.05 x 10 0.7 x 10-6
Mass kg 10-7  2.8 x 10-7  2.4 x 10-7  n.a.
Frequency Hz 1012 2 x 10 2 x 10 "3 n.a.
Electricity (DC) V 10-6 0.5 x 10-6 0.14 x 10 0.5 x 10-6
Temperature K 5 x 10-3  4x 10-' 0.15 x 10- 3 x 10-3
Luminous cd 2 x 10 2% 3 x 10 2% 1.5-0.5 10 n.a.
Intensity 2%
Note: South Korea's accuracy figures are based on those maintained at Korea Research Institute of Standards and Science(KRISS). US
accuracy figures are those of National Bureau of Standards (NBS), now the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Thailand's accuracy figures are from the National Institute of Metrology of Thailand (NIMT). n.a. = data not available.
Sources: Kim (1986), NIMT (2004), NIST Technology Services website at: ts.nist.gov, Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM)
website: www.bipm.org
National documentary standards system
The other main component of a national standards system is the documentary standards
system. A documentary standards system generally involves industrial standardization, which
produces documentary specifications and codes, including terminology, symbols, and signs.
Documentary standards are technical documents that describe technical characteristics of
products, processes, services, or systems. As with measurement standards systems,
documentary standards systems comprise two main activities, namely, standardization and
conformity assessment. Generally a core component of a national documentary system is a
national standards body, which oversees industrial standardization activities. Some national
standards bodies may also be in charge of conformity assessment activities, particularly those
in developing countries where standards capability is limited and the state assumes most of
the standards-related activities.
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Industrial standardization is conducted either by the government, the private sector, or
both. The institutional arrangements for industrial standardization vary, according the political,
economic, cultural, and legal characteristics of each country. In the United States., for
instance, the private sector, led by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), takes
charge of industrial standardization in all industrial sectors. The federal government, through
the work of NIST, assumes supportive roles by conducting research and diffusing knowledge
on non-product-element standards that are infratechnologies (Tassey 2000). In our case study,
the Korean state has continuously played a leading role in industrial standardization and
conformity assessment. Not only did it set up the institutional framework for standards
activities, but the Korean state has also assumed an active and direct role in developing and
diffusing both measurement and documentary standards. The main focus is always on quality
improvement.
Documentary standards systems to promote and control product quality
Another important component of the Korean state's involvement in standardization is in
the development of national documentary standards system. The comprehensive modern
standardization system in Korea started in 1961 when the Industrial Standardization Act was
enacted. It was the first time a consensus-based standards development system was introduced
to Korea. With this Act, the Bureau of Standards was established under the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry. The role of the Bureau of Standards was to establish Korean
Industrial Standards (KS) through the Industrial Standards Committee. Meanwhile, a
voluntary product certification scheme was adopted for the KS system. The Bureau of
Standards was authorized to issue "licenses" to manufacturers that demonstrated the ability to
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produce products that conform to relevant KS and licensing criteria.
The importance of the export markets was well recognized by the Korean government at
the early stage of the country's late standardization process. Indeed, the export market was the
key target for the development and enforcement of standards. The Korean government
enacted and enforced the Export Product Inspection Act as early as 1962. Under the Act, the
National Industrial Research Institute (NIRI) was established, with the mission to inspect
export products so as to assure and improve the quality and credibility of Korean products in
international markets. Meanwhile, the Fine Instrument Center (FIC) was established to inspect
and assure the quality of electrical and electronic products.
Although the five-year economic-development plans have always incorporated some
import-substitution components, export markets were the main target for the Korean industrial
efforts. By developing national standards systems, the government aimed to improve the
quality of industrial products and the uniformity of their quality, such that the Korean
products gained reputation and credibility in the export markets. One important element of
this effort is the development of the Korean Standards system.
The Korean Standards and the "licensing" system contributed significantly to the
development of Korean industries in its early industrialization periods in the 1960s and 1970s.
The development of industrial standards systems in Korea comprised the establishment of
several standards institutions, covering various aspects of industrial standardization.
One important institution established in 1962 under the Industrial Standardization Act was
the Korean Standards Association (KSA). KSA is a non-profit institution aimed to improve
the quality of the industrial products and service through the implementation of industrial
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standardization and quality improvement. KSA provides education and training in the fields
of quality management and control, and quality standardization. KSA is also undertaking the
job of secretariat of Korean Government for national quality promotion activity and has
responsibility on administration of Korean National Quality Management Award.
Korean industrial standards (KS)
Korean Industrial Standards (KS) is a national standard system, which is deliberated by
Industrial Standard Deliberate Council under the Industrial Standardization Act and officially
approved by the administrator of Korean Agency for Technology and Standards (KATS). KS
consists of sixteen categories and is divided into three parts, including:
* Product standards specifying improvement, dimensions, quality of products;
* Method standards, specifying test, analysis, inspection and measuring methods,
work standards; and
* Communication standards for terminology, technology, units, progression.
The KS system comprises two sub-systems: the KS Standard Maintenance System and KS
Marking Sub-.system. Standards are developed, updated, reaffirmed, and withdrawn within the
KS Standards Maintenance system. On the other hand, under the Marking System, the
government grants firms the permission to use the KS marks on the product or production
techniques, provided that they meet the requirement on quality levels and quality management
required by KS. KATS is responsible for establishing the KS standards and operating the KS
Marking System. Until 1998, KATS had also handled the KS marking certification. The
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certification was known as the KS Marking Permit for domestic manufacturers and the KS
Marking Approval for foreign manufacturers. Currently, the private sector handles all
certification work, which is known as the KS Marking Certification (Choe 2003).
The KS Marking System contributed significantly to the improvement in quality and
quality management for Korean industrial products As Figure 7.3 shows, the number of
Korean Standards has continuously increased in the past four decades. Particularly, since the
late 1990s, the number has increased significantly. Both the Korean government and the
domestic industry started to recognize the importance of standards and standardization,
putting more efforts and resources into standards activities. As part of the effort, KATS
undertook a program, from 2000 through 2005, to make Korean standards consistent with
international standards. 89
Several agencies were also established to deal with conformity assessment, including the
National Industrial Standards Testing Institute in 1973 and the National Industrial Testing
Institute in 1976 both under the Industrial Advancement Administration (IAA).
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Quality Management Convention and Quality Management Awards
Both the Korean government and the private sector have long committed to quality and
quality management. One indication of such commitment is shown every year at the National
Quality Management Convention, organized by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and
Energy (MOCIE) and the Korean Standards Association (KSA). The main objective of the
convention is diffuse knowledge and other positive effects of quality managelnent to the
Korean industry. Several sessions are held during the convention to present cases of quality
management and innovation and to confer awards to firms and individuals who have
contributed to quality improvement in the Korean industry.
The fact that this convention has been held every year since 1975 shows the long-tenn
commitment of the Korean government and the private sector to quality standardization and
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control. By 2004, the awards had been given to 332 excellent quality management
corporations, 2,503 excellent decisions, 1,033 quality management masters, 43 proposal
makers, and other 1,107 dignitaries. 90 More than 1,400 people participated in the 3 0 th
Convention in 2004, representing governmental agencies, research and educational
institutions, and enterprises from all industries. 91
Q-Korea Initiative
A number of Korean late standardizers, such as Samsung and LG, have significantly
improved their manufacturing capabilities and quality management up to the world standards.
Yet, many of the successful firms are Chaebol-affiliated firms, while non-Chaebol firms
generally lag behind. In addition, quality management activities have been operated separately
by each firm without much co-operation among them.
To alleviate these problems and to upgrade Korea's innovative quality management, the
Korean government through the KSA started the "Q-Korea" campaign in 2004. The major
components of the Q-Korea initiative includes: (1) Q-Net, a information network; (2) Q-1 19,
a cooperation of major Chaebols that diagnoses quality management problems and provides
solutions to members; and (3) Q-Forum for exchanges among quality-management experts
from all industries and regions in Korea. The government plans to implement the campaign
nationwide. It hopes that this campaign will lay a solid foundation for developing Korea into a
global technology leader with high quality standards. 92
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ROLES OF THE KOREAN STATE IN IT STANDARDIZATION
In Korea, the state has important roles in the late-standardization process of firms across
all industries. The roles of the state are particularly important in the ICT sector for which
standards are indispensable. One critical role of the state in IT standardization is to establish
institutional friameworks. In our case study, the Korean state had played the leading role in IT
standardization during the early stages of the development of its ICT industry. Mainly through
the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) and the Ministry of Commerce,
Industry and Energy (MOCIE), the Korean government has always been in charge of IT-
related standards activities both domestically and internationally.
Under the MOCIE, the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards (KATS) represents
the country in the ISO and the IEC and manages overall standardization policies and
strategies. The Korean Industrial Standards Institute (KISI) plays a role as the domestic
secretariat of Korean standards committees deliberating KS standards in the IT field and
supports the of the standardization initiatives of KATS implementation.
On the other hand, the MIC has been the main agency dealing with telecommunication
standards in Korea, representing Korea in the ITU. Although the MIC and the MOCIE are
both responsible for ICT-related standardization, each is responsible for different technical
aspects and areas. To some extent, there is a clear division of labor between the two ministries,
although some of the responsibilities are overlapping. Both ministries normally meet once or
twice a year to discuss ICT standardization issues. One of the objectives of such meeting is to
map out the important technical areas to which the government should pay attention. Then,
the ministries are to determine which agencies will be responsible for what technical areas,
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and which working groups/committees in the ISO, the IEC, and the ITU they are to participate.
Both ministries usually discuss and jointly decide on the issues. If and when they cannot reach
any conclusion, the Office of the Prime Minister office will have to intervene, coordinate, and
resolve the issues in question.93
The turning point for IT standardization in Korea, especially for the MIC, was in the late
1980s, when the Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA) was conceived and
finally established in 1988 under Article 32 of the Civil Law. The TTA was later expanded re-
incorporated in 1992 under Article 30 of the Framework Act on Telecommunications. 94 The
establishment of the TTA indicates a significant shift from the state-led approach to ICT
standardization to public-private partnership and eventually to private-sector-led approach.
With the TTA establishment, two levels of ICT standards became available in Korea:
TTA standards and Korean Information and Communication standards (KICS), approved by
the Ministry of Information and Communication. TTA standards are industry standards which
may be proposed by individuals or organizations and finally approved by the TTA. On the
other hand, KICS are official government standards. A TTA standard can be proposed as one
of KICS, if it survives as an active standard through one-year field experiments.
Although the TTA was established in 1988, its standardization activity was active until the
year 2000, when the number of standards increased more than fourfold in just one year
(Figure 7.4). The number increased from an annual average of less than 50 standards in the
early 1990s to about 100 standards in the late 1990s, and jumped to more than 500 standards
per year since 2000. The total number of TTA standards that were established and revised
during 1988-2003 is 3,256 standards.
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In contrast to the increase in TTA standards, the MI C has issued very few KICS standards
in recent years. The ministry was active in issuing KICS during 1992-1997, approving as
many as 120 new standards in 1996. However, the number has dropped drastically since 1998.
According to Sanghoon Lee, an MIC official who worked on KICS, the lninistry has
approved only two or three KICS since 1998.95 It was also during this period when the
number of TT A standards started to increase dramatically.
There are various reasons for the sharp drop in KICS and the spike in TTA standards. The
MIC has too few personnel working on KICS to keep up with the rapidly changing ICT
technologies. As a growing number of IT standards are now developed by a large number of
international consortia, the MIC alone does not have enough resources to assume all the
responsibility to develop and maintain IT standards. In addition, governmental standards, such
as KICS, carry important weight and directly affect the strategies and operations of the private
sector. With the rapid technological change, there is huge risk that the govenunent may
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decide too early on certain standards as national standards, and/or choose totally wrong
standards. Because government-mandated standards are more difficult to modify and adjust
than industry standards, the MIC has become more reluctant to issue KICS. Furthermore, the
Korean government has become more cautious in mandating any technical regulations and
standards that may violate the WTO agreements, particularly the Technical Barrier to Trade
(TBT) Agreement. Therefore, the MIC has shifted its role from being the main developer and
issuer of mandatory national standards to supporting the TTA to become the main forum for
ICT standardization in Korea.
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Source: TTA Annual Report, 2004
The TT A thus functions as the central organization for IT standardization in Korea. This
indicates the shift from the government-led approach to industrial standardization to the
private-sector-Ied approach. The TTA works extensively with firms, state agencies and
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research institutes. Although the TTA is legally a non-governmental body, its status became
contentious when the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) claimed that a TTA
standard for Wireless Internet Platform for Interoperability (WIPI) created a trade barrier. In
its letter to the USTR regarding this issue, the Advancing the Business of Technology (AeA),
a U.S. trade association, argues that the TTA is "quasi-governmental", and that:
[t]he TTA is ... a subordinate organ of the MIC, and is chaired by a Korean
Government official who has vice-minister status in the MIC and who is head of
MIC's research and development entity, the Electronics and Telecommunications
Research Institute (ETRI). The MIC is estimated to have contributed, directly and
indirectly, between $11-14 million to develop WIPI96
The Korean government and TTA officials whom we have interviewed argue firmly that
the TTA is not a governmental agency, but a non-governmental organization. This assertion is
understandable. Because of the increasing conflicts among Korea and other trading partners,
as well as the WTO agreements on trade barriers, any organization risks being accused of
receiveing governmental subsidies that constitute trade barriers.
However, the TTA does receive a significant proportion of its operating budget from the
Korean government. As shown in Table 7.4, income from entrusted research projects
constitutes the largest proportion of budget for the TTA. Although this may not be a direct
governmental subsidy, it is a form of state support for standardization activities by the private
sector. Although this is not the place to determine whether this financial support constitutes
"subsidies," it is important to note that the government still plays a significant, though indirect,
role by providing financial support for standardization activities.97
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Table 7.4: TTA Budget Allocation, 2003 and 2004 (million KRW)
Budget Items 2003 % 2004 %
Allotted charges for project participation 566 2 800 3
Interest income 475 2 450 1
Income from entrusted research project 23,231 87 23,360 76
Balance brought forward 964 4 2,064 7
Other 1,545 6 4,003 13
Total 26,801 100 30,677 100
Sources: TTA Annual Reports 2003, 2004
The important roles played by private standardization bodies, such as the TTA,
demonstrate the changing role of the state in the process of late standardization. In the case of
the TTA, this is reflected in its increasing role as the main organizer and facilitator of IT
standardization. In addition to its role as the issuer of TTA standards, the TTA functions as
the main coordinator and facilitator of IT standards-related networks in Korea. How the TTA
and, for that matter the MIC, promote networking among firms and institutions is the main
topic for the following discussion.
PROMOTING NETWORKING BASED ON COMMON STANDARDS
Another important role of the state in the late-standardization process is to facilitate
networking between late-standardizing and forerunner firms, as well as among late-
standardizing firms themselves. As defined by Powell (1990), networks are groups of entities
(organizations or individuals), in which exchanges and transactions are indefinite and
sequential and occur through reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions. Firms
create indebtedness to one another and mutual reliance over the long run. Firms in the same
277
network are dependent on the resources of one another as they see that it is mutually
beneficial to pool resources. Networks are useful in exchanging commodities where value is
hard to measure. Knowledge is a classic example of such commodity. Trust and mutual
dependency often facilitate more rapid flow of information among entities in the same
network.
Networking is an important part of the Linking apparatus, which, we argue, late
standardizers can use to leverage for more external resources so as to progress beyond catch-
up. As shown by Amsden and Chu (2003) in their study of Taiwan, the state plays a
significant role in increasing domestic networks in the electronics industry, even though
relationships among domestic networks are not as strong as those between domestic and
multinational firms. Networks in the form of subcontracting are an important mode by which
latecomers gain technological capabilities by linking with multinational firms. Another
important model of government-led networking in Taiwan is to develop and invest in
governmental research institutes and then to create spin-offs from the institutes.98 Such spin-
offs then serve as the lead firms for other smaller firms in the country.
In our cases of the Korean semiconductor and mobile telecommunication industries, we
find that the Korean government has been active in facilitating and creating networking
among local firms in addition to creating linkages between local and foreign firms. The aim of
recent government-led networking is not so much to create buyer-seller networks through
subcontracting. Rather, the goal is to facilitate the exchanges of information and knowledge
on new technologies and businesses among domestic firms. The government has directly and
indirectly supported the establishment of domestic forums and consortiums, in which local
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firms participate to exchange information on new technologies and standards. Some of the
forums actually take on the role of developing and diffusing industrial standards within Korea.
The role of the Korean state in enhancing domestic networking is particularly important in
the ICT sector for which standards are indispensable. One important institution that has
functioned as the main actor in creating and facilitating the domestic networks is the
Telecommunication Technology Association (TTA). The TTA is a non-governmental,
statutory organization that was established to improve and develop telecommunication
technologies and standards in Korea.
The number of standards forums and consortia promoted by the TTA has increased
significantly in the past few years, from only 11 forums in 2000 to 33 in 2003, and 35 forums
in 2005.99
Table 7.5: Domestic Forums for IT Standardization in Korea
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005
Number of Forums 10 22 29 33 35
Number of member 820 1,215 3,270 n.a. n.a.
firms/organizations
Number of individuals 2,765 3,250 6,920 n.a. n.a.
involved
Source: TTA Annual Report, various years
The forums cover a wide range of technical areas in the ICT sector, including wired and
wireless telecommunication, internet, broadcasting multimedia, and digital contents. Table 7.6
lists the standards forums promoted by the TTA in 2003. The total number of members in
these forums is astonishing: more than 11,000 individuals from private firms and 3,500
individuals from research and governmental institutes have become members of these forums.
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Some forums are more popular than others, indicating the level of importance and interest in
the industry. For instance, among the largest forums, the VoIP Forum has 185 company
members and almost 3,200 individual members, and the Wireless Internet Standardization
Forum has almost 2,000 firms and 2,500 individuals as members. On other hand, the Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI) Forum has only 8 company members and 120 individual members.
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Table 7.6: Domestic Strategic Standardization Forums Promoted by TTA, 2003
Membership Output
Technical Areas Names of Forum Firms Individuals/ Standards Technical
Institutions Reports
Network and Korea Optical Internet Forum 40 40 25 41
Transmission
Technology Grid Forum Korea 213 820 20 NA
(10 forums) Korea Ethernet Forum 50 100 7 30
Broadband Convergence Network Forum 121 320 48 34
xDSL Forum NA NA 1 3
LBS Standardization Forum 61 4 3
Telematics Forum 79 - 1
Korea UWB Standardization Forum NA 89 NA NA
RFID Forum* 115 50 NA NA
High Speed Wireless LAN Forum 13 100 2 15
Internet IPv6 Forum Korea 79 153 15 92
(5 forums) VoIP Forum 185 3,191 7
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Forum 8 120 10
Wireless Internet Standardization Forum 1,183 2,452 11 7
Web Korea Forum 17 145 6
E-Commerce Korean Electronic Payment Forum 103 48 14
(5 forums) Internet Security Technology Forum 58 114 23 6
Integrated Forum on Electronic Commerce 350 30 33
Korea Biometrics Forum 39 26 25
Business Process Management (BPM) Forum NA NA 7 NA
Broadcasting and Advanced Digital Broadcasting Forum 25 NA 8 8
Multimedia
MPEG Korea Forum 18 1200 9 115(3 forums)
Korea Digital Cable Forum 40 20 3
Digital Contents Digital Rights Management (DRM) Forum 25 120 5 4
(3 forums) Digital Content Forum 41 15 9
Mobile 3D Standardization Forum 25 11
Appliance Home Network Forum NA NA NA NA
(2 forums) IT Accessibility Forum 26 30 1 34
Software Software Component Standardization Forum 109 24 23
(2 forums) Open Source Software Promotion Forum NA NA NA NA
Parts and Others System on Chips (SoC) Forum 13 60 4 0
(1 forums)
Source: TTA Website, URL: www.tta.or.kr, and TTA Annual Report 2003.
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The standards activities in these forums are more broad-based than those in the TTA
committees, in that they are less formal and do not necessarily result in setting standards.
Once technical specifications and standards are developed within the forums, they are then
proposed to the TTA for consideration. The TTA committees accept proposals from the
standards forums, and then evaluate them to determine whether to adopt the proposals as TTA
standards. This procedure facilitates the standardization process within the Korean industry.
The exchanges within the forums allow Korean firms to keep up with rapid technological
change. In the several technical areas where Korean firms are the world's technology leaders,
the standards forums allow firms to standardize the technologies before their foreign
competitors. Approximately 2,500 individuals participate as members of the TTA in its four
technical committees and 48 project groups (Kim 2005).
INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY
As a late-standardizing country, Korea has a variety of options and models to follow when
setting up its institutional framework for standards activities. The options range from the
private-sector-led model as in the United States to the state-led model in France and several
other countries in the European Union. The recent institutional arrangement for standards
activities in Korea indicates that the country is not following a single country as a model.
Rather, the domestic standards institutions increasingly resemble the institutional
arrangements of international standardization.
The goal of such an arrangement is to benefit from institutional complementarity. As
Mattli and Buthe (2003) empirically show, other things being equal, differences in
282
institutional complementarities are a significant determinant in putting firms from different
countries or regions in a first- or second-mover position when standardization becomes global.
If that is indeed the case, the Korean late standardizers certainly will benefit from the
domestic institutional arrangements. As Table 7.7 shows, most of the domestic standards
forums supported by the TTA are aligned with both formal and "informal" standards forums
at the global level. This alignment allows Korean firms and institutions to focus on relevant
issues and participate more actively in international standardization. They also gain better and
more quickly the information about international standards proposals than they would
otherwise.
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Table 7.7: Institutional Complementarity between Korean and International Standards Forums
International Standards Organizations
Technical Areas Domestic Forums
Formal SDOs Consortia and Forums
Network and Korea Optical Internet Forum IUT-T SG13 IETF, OIF Forum
Transmission
Technology Grid Forum Korea ITU-T SG16, ETSI GGF
Korea Ethernet Forum ITU-T SG2, ETSI IEEE802.1, 3, 17
Broadband Convergence Network Forum ITU-T SG13 IETF, MSF, Parley
PKI Forum IETF, IEEE802.1
LBS Standardization Forum ISO TC 211 (GIS) OMA-LOG, OGC
Telematics Forum ISO TC 204(ITS OGSi, AMI-C, 3GT
Korea UWB Standardization Forum IEEE802.15, Wi-media
RFID Forum
ITS Forum Korea ISO TC 204(ITS ITS Forum
Internet IPv6 Forum Korea IETF, IPv6 Forum
VoIP Forum ITU-T SG16, ETSI IETF, IMTC
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Forum ITU-T SG2 IETF, ENUM Forum
Wireless Internet Standardization Forum ITU-T SG2, ETSI OMA, 3GPPs, IETF
Web Korea Forum ITU-T SG2, ETSI W3C, OASIS
E-Commerce Korean Electronic Payment Forum JTC1 SC17 EMVco, VPnC
Internet Security Technology Forum JTC1 SC27 IETF
Integrated Forum on Electronic Commerce UN/CEFACT OASIS, OMG
Korea Biometrics Forum JTC 1 SC37 Biometric Consortium
Business Process Management (BPM) Forum - WfMC, BPMI, OASIS
Broadcasting and Advanced Digital Broadcasting Forum ETSI World ADB, TV anytime
Multimedia
MPEG Korea Forum JTCI SC29
Korea Digital Cable Forum ITU-T SG2 CableLabs, DVB
Digital Contents Digital Rights Management (DRM) Forum JTC1 SC29 IETF, W3C, IDF
Digital Content Forum JTCI SC36 ONIX, DCMI
Mobile 3D Standardization Forum Khronos Group
Appliance Home Network Forum JTC1 SC25 DLNA, OSGI, UNnP
IT Accessibility Forum JTC1 SC35 W3C, WAI
Software Software Component Standardization Forum JTCI SC7 OMG
Parts and Others System on Chips (SoC) Forum VSI-A
Source: Kim (2005)
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Allocation of limited resources
Another role of the state in late standardization concerns allocation of limited resources
for the purpose of standardization. In addition to financial support for standardization
activities, the Korea government plays a direct role in allocating frequency for the
development for WiBro, a wireless broadband internet technology being developed by the
Korean telecoms industry. In February 2002, the Korean government allocated 100MHz of
electromagnetic spectrum in the 2.3GHz band for WiBro. This is an important step, as it
suggests a proactive role that the government played in standardization activities.
Capability enhancement for standards personnel
As with any sector and field of the economy, human capital is an important factor in the
field of standardization. The MIC and TTA have devised and implemented various policies
and programs to enhance Korea's capability in the area of IT standards. For instance, the
government provides approximately 100 people each year with financial and other support for
participating in international standardization meetings. The MIC and TTA also provide a wide
range of training programs for government officials and employees of private firms.
The initiatives sponsored by the Korean government are, of course, not without criticism.
Yet, their effects on the development of indigenous technological capabilities are undeniable.
The government programs lower the cost of basic research and plant modernization. Its
financial support for university and other educational programs improves the availability of
scientists and engineers. This maintains a pool of researchers and technical experts required
by the industry. In addition, government initiatives often facilitate the coordination among
285
different entities. This reduces overlapping and redundancy of effort and contributes to
synchronized development. Last but not least, the government is the main actor behind the
development of a science culture and a strong technological infrastructure within the society.
MITIGATING TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET RISKS
Another important role of the state is to mitigate the risks that late standardizers often face
in their process of late standardization and technological catch-up. As identified by Lee et al.
(2005) in their study of Korean firms in the digital TV industry, latecomers generally face two
types of risks in their catch-up efforts: that is, technological risks and market risks. We argue
that the state plays a significant role in reducing technological and market risks through
various policies and programs, as follows.
TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS
For latecomer firms with limited resources and technological capability, the tasks of
searching and selecting the right technologies for their products and production processes are
daunting, if not impossible. They have to deal with technological uncertainty and risks to a
greater extent than fast-follower and first-mover firms, mainly because of a limited
technological base, as well as inadequate knowledge about technological trends and
trajectories. They may end up choosing inferior technologies or adopting wrong standards that
will not be accepted by the marketplace.
The state can play an important role in assisting latecomer firms in dealing with
technological risks. Through the establishment of R&D institutes, the state can mitigate the
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technological risks faced by latecomer firms by taking the early stage of technological search
and selection. The state can also play a significant role in acquiring new technologies from
foreign sources, then analyze, enhance, and diffuse such technologies to domestic firms. This
role is important, especially for technologies are to become industry standards.
The Korean government has devised and implemented various policies and programs to
deal with technology risks associated with standards and standardization. In our case study of
the mobile telecommunication industry, the government played the leading role by selecting
the CDMA standard as the national standard for mobile communications. Particularly, the
MIC played an essential role in the development of mobile telecommunication industry in
Korea. As the domestic mobile telecom industry was seeking ways to reduce its dependence
on foreign technologies, the MIC launched the Digital Mobile Telecommunication System
Project 1989, which aimed to develop a total mobile service system for Korea, including base
systems, switching stations, and handsets (Lee and Han 2002).
Combining efforts with ETRI, the MIC led the public-private consortium that took charge
in searching, analyzing, acquiring, and eventually diffusing the new technologies that they
acquired from, and co-developed with Qualcomm. The role of the MIC and ETRI was
paramount to the recent success of the Korean late standardizers in the mobile communication
industry. Particularly, ETRI was the main research institution that led to the selection and
development of the CDMA-based mobile communication system. The main task of ETRI was
to acquire and analyze knowledge on technological trajectories, emerging technologies, and
the sources of such technologies. Throughout the process of searching and acquiring new
technologies, the government worked constantly with the private sector, particularly the
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Chaebols, such that their efforts would effectively lead to the development of local
technological capabilities. Such co-operation with the private sector is often done in Korea
through specially designated task forces, working committees, or formally established
consortia. Once the technologies are acquired, the government disseminates the knowledge to
the private sector, often through research institutes, such as ETRI.
For many products and industries, standards are initially developed and even settled
before the markets are formed (Lee et al. 2005). This makes the knowledge of technological
trajectories even more critical to late standardizers' effort in developing new products based
on such standards. It also affects how late standardizers adjust and prepare their production
processes for the new technologies and products. Participation in standards development
allows firms to learn about the directions in which the technologies are evolving. When late-
standardizing firms still have limited resources and standards capabilities, the government
plays a leading role in acquiring, assessing, and then diffusing such information on behalf of
late-standardizing firms. This role of the state remains important even when firms become
more advanced and have adequate resources and capabilities for standards purposes. This is
particularly true for governmental research institutes, which deal with cutting-edge
technologies that are still at the pre-competitive stage and far from commercialization.
MARKET RISKS
Securing initial demand for new products is a critical and difficult task for any firm. For
latecomer finns, such task appears even more daunting, primarily because of small domestic
market and limited knowledge about the lead-user markets in advanced economies. The
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latecomer state may adopt various policies and programs to reduce market risks.
One policy is to choose a specific standard among a pool of potential standards and
designate it as the national standard. By doing so, the domestic market is somewhat
guaranteed for such standard, which effectively reduces the market risk for domestic
manufacturers and service providers adopting such a standard. In addition, the latecomer state
may adopt procurement policies that help build the initial market demand for latecomer firms'
products based on the national standard.
Especially in the network industries, such as telecommunications, firms that can quickly
capture the large market share from the beginning have a greater probability to become
dominant in the market. State intervention greatly affects technological rents during when
product innovation is the main driver of innovation dynamics. One of the most important
determinants of technological rent during that time is standardization. In other words, the state
could potentially create the value for firms.
As the case of the Korean mobile telecommunication industry, the government secures
initial market size for domestic manufacturers and service providers by selecting CDMA as
the national standard. The government's eventual selection of the CDMA standard over other
potential standards was not without controversies and conflicts. Yet, the recent ascent of
Korean manufacturers and service providers as the world leaders in mobile
telecommunication proves that the government's decision was right. By choosing CDMA as
its national standard, the government in effect guaranteed a sizable initial market and
economies of scale for the service providers and handset manufacturers.
The degree of state involvement is not uniform across industries and stages of late
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standardization and technological catch-up. Compared with the public-private consortium for
CDMA development produced remarkable results, a similar consortium established in 1986
by the government to develop 4M DRAM was less successful. Despite the government
contribution of 57% of the total expenditure (USD 110 million), the consortium became a
failure. The main reason was that the participating firms, including Samsung, Hyundai, LG,
were not willing to share knowledge, as they had different technology approaches and enough
resources and technological capabilities to go alone (Kim 1997).
By the late 1980s, the semiconductor industry had somewhat matured; radical innovations
happened less frequently and the technological trajectory became more predictable. On the
one hand, catch-up initiatives at this stage were "path-following" in nature (Lee and Lim 2001)
and less risky. Latecomer firms with adequate resources and capabilities were thus able to
engage in catch-up efforts without relying much on the state. On the other hand, in the
industries where radical innovations are still frequent and standards are yet to be determined,
catch-up efforts by late standardizers have to be "path-creating" (Lee and Lim 2001). Because
technology and market risks are high in such stage, the role of the state to cushion such risks
for the late-standardizing firms is indispensable for their technological initiatives.
Clear visions and strategies: IT839 Strategy
In 2003, the Korea Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) set forth the IT839
Strategy for the development of the Korean IT industry. The strategy aims to develop eight
communication broadcasting services, three infrastructures (networks), and nine IT new
growth engines synthetically. In the case of the IT industry, the introduction and activation of
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new services are closely linked with the expansion of investment in infrastructure and the
development of state-of-the-art machinery, tools and content industries.
ROLES OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTES
As discussed in earlier chapters, the roles of governmental research institutes are critical
throughout the process of late standardization and technological catch-up. In the case of
Korea, the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) was one of the key
actors in the successful development of Korean telecommunication industry. Similarly, the
Korean Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET) was also instrumental in the development
of Korean semiconductor industry.
The roles of these research institutes were not limited to conducting R&D in laboratories.
They contribute significantly to the catch-up process by searching and identifying existing
technologies and standards, as well as in analyzing and predicting future technological trends.
These activities are crucial for late standardizers, particularly during the catch-up and keep-up
periods when their search capabilities are still limited. They contribute mainly to reduce the
technology risks associated with new technologies and standards.
STATE AS THE MODEL USER
As with the role of the state in the late-industrialization process, the state can also become
a role model for the private sector in the process of late standardization. As Amsden (2001)
argues, state-owned firms are often "national champions," which function as the model
producers for other domestic firms. In a similar vein, we argue that, in the late-standardization
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process, the state can become the model user for certain standards by utilizing its procurement
policy and practice. Particularly, in the IT sector, the state can become the model user as part
of the so-called "E-government" initiatives. These initiatives are now being adopted widely in
many countries around the globe.
The Korean state has acted as the model user in the IT sector by using advanced
information technologies in governmental activities. For instance, under the National GIS
Plans (1 st stage: 1995-2000, 2nd stage: 2001-2005), the government completed systems for
topographical and thematic maps. The government also promotes the establishment of a
comprehensive logistics information network. This includes the Intelligent Transportation
System (ITS) 21 Project, which was launched in 2001.
STANDARDS DIPLOMAY FOR OVERSEAS MARKET EXPANSION
As late-standardizing firms improve their innovation capabilities, the state furthers its
standards effort beyond borders. This international endeavor is not limited to participating in
global and regional standardization activities. It includes lobbying and negotiating with other
governments, so that those countries adopt its technologies and standards as their national
standards. Although the main goal is to increase the demand for its technologies and products,
this "standards diplomacy" goes beyond "technology diplomacy. As standardization becomes
more internationalized and globalized, the role of the state as a lobbyist for market expansion
becomes even more pronounced.
In our case study, the Korean government has increased its international standards effort
both in terms of active participation in regional and international standardization and in terms
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of lobbying other governments to adopt Korean technologies and standards. For instance, the
Ministry of Communication and Information (MIC) has actively participated in regional
standardization activities, notably the Asia Pacific Telecommunity (APT) as well as the
China-Japan-Korea (CJK) Standards Meeting. The CJK Meeting is particularly noteworthy,
because it shows the effort to form a regional trade and technological bloc based on standards.
China-Japan-Korea (CJK) Standards Meeting
Another important initiative that exemplifies the role of the Korean state in regional
standardization is the China-Japan-Korea (CJK) Meeting on Information and
Telecommunication Standards. The CJK Standards Meeting is a forum in which standards
development organizations and firms from China, Japan, and Korea exchange views and
information on information and communication technologies and industries. The Meeting was
first conceived and initiated by the Korean Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC)
and the Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA). Other standards organizations
from Japan and China then joined the initiative, including the Association of Radio Industries
and Businesses (ARIB) and the Telecommunication Technology Committee (TTC) of Japan
and China Communications Standards Association (CCSA) of China.
According to Sanghoon Lee, an MIC officer, the Korean MIC first proposed the
collaboration among Korea, Japan, and China in a statement prepared by the Korean MIC for
the ITU. The Korean MIC officers first approached Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications (MIC) and China's Ministry of Information Industry (MII).o10 The proposal
has led to the formation of the CJK Standards Meeting and the three countries have held five
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meetings to date: the 1st CJK meeting in June 2002 in Korea, the 2nd in November 2002 in
Japan, the 3rd in November 2003 in China, the 4th in July 2004 in Korea, and the 5th in
March 2005 in Japan (Maeda et al. 2005).
The CJK Standards Meeting could have potential impacts for latecomer firms and
institutions in Korea and China in various ways. First, although currently the main activities
of the CJK Standards Meeting focus more on information exchange among the members, the
eventual goal of the Meeting is to develop common regional standards. Several standards
development activities are conducted jointly by representatives of firms who participate in the
forums organized by the SDOs as part of the CJK Meetings.
Second, the cooperation between the four standardization bodies increases their individual
negotiation power in standardization activities at the global level. The meetings between the
four SDOs give them opportunities to discuss issues that may be raised in the global forums
such as the IEC and ITU. They may be able to agree to support each other's technical
proposal for standardization at the global level. This strategy has already been used by
European SDOs, which coordinate their standard strategies and actions through the ETSI.
Third, the cooperation enlarges the potential markets for emerging technologies if the
member countries adopt common standards. As the geographical scope for ICT
standardization activities cannot be limited to a country, it is important that technology
holders find more adopters outside their home countries.
The CJK Standards Meeting has already shown concrete results in establishing an East
Asian regional bloc based on technical standards. A good example is the Next-Generation
Network (NGN) Working Group of the CJK. During the 4th CJK Standards Meeting in
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Beijing in June 2005, the representatives from the three countries agreed to construct an NGN
testbed between the three countries. Korea plans to make the most of this arrangement to get
its verified technology accepted as an international standard. In the following 5th CJK NCN
WG Meeting held in Seoul in December 2005, the representatives had concrete discussions on
the proposed testbed structure plus test methods and items between the three nations.
The Chinese, Japanese, and Korean governments have also supported an R&D alliance
that aims to develop open-source software (OSS) programs based on Linux, in order to
become independent from proprietary software developed by U.S. and European firms. The
China-Japan-Korea (CJK) partnership was founded by China Software Industry Association
(CSIA), Japan IT Services Industry Association (JISA) and Federation of Korea Information
Industries (FKII). The partnership aims at enhancing OSS development and deployment, OS
business models, software standardization at the regional level, and training of engineers.10l
Korean-developed technologies in India and China
The overseas lobbying effort by the Korean government is an important effort that helps
expand Korean-developed technologies and standards into overseas markets. This is an
important role, especially when the strategy is to expand its export market first to other
developing economies, instead of developed countries. In most developing countries, the
governments are still the main, if not sole, developer and distributor of standards. It thus
seems logical as a tactic to have the state deal first with the other state before the private
sector enters the foreign market.
A recent example is the satellite Digital Multimedia Broadcasting (DMB) and terrestrial
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DMB (T-DMB) services, which was offered in Korea for the first time in the world in May
and December 2005, respectively. Following the domestic success, the Korean MIC signed an
agreement in January 2006 with the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India
(TRAI), India's largest business conglomerate Tata Group, and its top GSM mobile-phone
service carrier Bharti Airtel to start trials of the Korean-developed T-DMB system in India. 10 2
Meanwhile, the Korean MIC has also cooperated with the World DAB Forum, a London-
based standardization forum for digital audio broadcasting (DAB) technologies, to advance
the T-DMB standard in India.
Although the private sector possesses most of the T-DMB technologies, the Korean
government has been instrumental in lobbying for the Korean standards to be adopted in India.
Both governments has started work-level meetings and signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) that will help for Korean firms to obtain India's permission for full T-
DMB services.
In addition to India, the Korean government has also been successful in exporting the T-
DMB service to China. Also in January 2006, the Electronics and Telecommunications
Research Institute (ETRI) and China's state-funded Beijing Jolon Digital Media Broadcasting
signed an MOU to launch the service in the Chinese market in April 2006. To facilitate the
deal, the Korean MIC has started to hold regular meetings with China's State Administration
for Radio Film and Television for further cooperation on T-DMB.
The agreements between the Korean government and the Indian and Chinese governments
have certainly benefited the Korean manufacturers and service providers. Samsung
Electronics, for instance, already signed contracts to supply 200,000 T-DMB-enabled phones
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to Beijing Jolon and another 300,000 handsets to Guangdong Mobile Television Media. 10 3
As a strategy to expand the export market, the Korean government has sometimes
included the adoption of its domestic technologies and standards as part of the strings attached
to its foreign aid. As an example, Korea has exported its time division switching (TDX)
technologies and systems to the Philippines and other developing countries by attaching the
adoption requirement to its foreign assistance funds.104
The MIC has also set up the International Cooperation Agency for Korea IT (ICA)
specifically to promote Korea's IT products in the overseas market. The activities of the ICA
extend beyond the usual export promotion, in that they incorporate IT-related issues into
international cooperation activities. Through the activities of the ICA, the Korean government
aims to promote its domestic technologies and standards overseas.
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
As late standardizers enhance innovative capability and move towards the technological
frontier, they generate more intellectual property (IP) and standards become more important.
In such a process, the state adjusts its role and policy regarding the protection of intellectual
property rights (IPRs). At the early stage of late standardization and technological catch-up,
the state may not strictly enforce IPR laws. The idea is to allow local firms to take advantage
of technology transfer from foreign firms through licensing and reverse engineering. However,
as latecomer firms become more innovative and possess more proprietary knowledge, the
state has to increase its effort in enforcing the protection of intellectual property rights. The
state may tie its IPR policy to standards policy by adopting national standards that include
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technologies proprietary to local firms. Even if the IPR policy does not directly address
standards issues, IPR policy is an important factor that affects late standardization process of
latecomer finns. In addition to arranging the legal and institutional structures for IPR
protection, the state also plays an important role in providing knowledge and information
regarding IPR protection both in the domestic and foreign markets.
The Korean experience in late standardization is a good example. Historically, IPR
protection in Korea has been weak (Jung 1996). According to the United States International
Trade Commission (1988), Korea was found to have a "large amount of end-user software
piracy, particularly by large conglomerates; lack of recognition of well known trademarks;
failure to protect pre-1987 works under the copyright law; lack of protection for trade secrets
and software and motion picture import valuation"(as quoted in Jung 1996, page 1).
According to Jung, the real problem was not that Korea had no laws for intellectual
property protection. Rather, it was a problem of enforcement. Despite that Article 21(2) of the
Korean Constitution provides the legal basis for IPR protection, the enforcement of this law
has not been effective. Jung argues that the lack of adequate enforcement is due to Korea's
socialist values. Intellectual property rights are greatly affected by the Korean cultural belief,
which hold that the interests of society as more valuable than those of an individual.
Another important reason for Korea's weak IPR protection is related to the effect of IPR
regimes on technology transfer. As Kim (2003) argues, the Korean state did not enforce its
IPR laws, because a strong IPR regime would affect technology transfer and capability
building of local firms. At the early stage of technological catch-up, latecomer firms do not
have proprietary technologies and have to acquire them from foreign sources through various
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modes, including licensing and reverse engineering. A strong IPR regime would minimize the
knowledge spillover in the process of technology transfer. The Korean state recognized such a
possibility, so that it was reluctant to enforce the IPR protection.
However, as successful Korean latecomers generate more proprietary knowledge through
R&D activities, the government has recognized the importance of IPR enforcement. As the
state promotes standards activities, it has become necessary for the state to adjust its IPR
protection policy and enforcement. IPR issues are critical to standardization activities, and the
Korean government has increased its efforts in assisting the private sector in this regard. Each
domestic standards forum often receives advice and support from the Korean Patent Office
regarding its IPR policy. The TTA has full-time staffs who are specialized in IPR issues and
participate in both domestic and international standardization activities. 105
Diffusion of IPR-related knowledge is another important role of the state. Government
agencies and research institutions, such as the Korean Patent Office (KPR) and the Korean
Intellectual Property Research Center, play an important role in diffusing IPR-related
information to domestic firms. They also facilitate exchanges among firms and government
agencies regarding patent and other IPR issues, particularly in the advanced markets, such as
the United States. The KPO, for instance, have organized patent forums in which successful
late standardizers, such as Samsung and LG, participate to discuss IPR issues. 10 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Technical standards are everywhere. They are so prevalent that every firm and country is
involved in standards activities in one way or another. What distinguishes successful late-
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standardizing firms and countries from unsuccessful ones is that the standards activities are at
the core of their technology policies and practices. Particularly, measurement and quality
standards are the most fundamental factor taken seriously by the successful late standardizers.
In our case study of the Korean state, we find that their standards policies and programs
have been not only in line with the overall industrial and technology policy, but also its
central feature. Since the early stages of late standardization and catch-up, the Korean state
has maintained a proactive position with regard to domestic development of advanced
technology. While this is particularly true in the semiconductor and telecommunication
industries, the Korean general technology policy includes other high-tech industries, such as
biotechnology and space and aeronautics.
The Korean state has nurtured the domestic high-tech industries by building up resources,
capabilities, and institutions for standards and related activities. In terms of resources, the
Korean government has maneuvered financial and fiscal regulations and policies, such that
latecomer firms, especially the Chaebols, enjoy low-interest loans, tax incentives, and duty-
free import of targeted capital goods. In addition, the Korean government has built up basic
infrastructure that supports the development of science, technology, and innovation. This
includes physical infrastructure, such as transportation systems, and telecommunication
infrastructure, such as broadband Internet networks. The construction of "science parks," such
the Taedok Science Town, is a concrete example of its effort in providing infrastructure for
science and technological development. In fact, one of the major institutions located in the
Taedok Science Town is the Korea Standards Research Institute (KSRI).
In terms of capabilities, the government has continuously invested in science and
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technology education and R&D for high-tech industry. It provides direct financial support to
public and nonprofit research institutes, universities, and other educational institutions,
primarily through the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE), and the Ministry of Information and
Communication (MIC). The government often forms taskforces, alliances, and consortia with
domestic and, sometimes foreign, firms to share resources and costs in developing new
technologies and/or products.
In terms of institutions, various legal institutions have been set up for supporting industrial
and technological development. Particularly in recent years, as Korean late standardizers
enhance innovative capabilities and produce more intellectual property, the Korean state puts
more effort into building up intellectual property-related legal capabilities and institutions.
To this end, the roles of social and cultural institutions are not negligible. The Korea
government has devised and implemented various cultural and social policies and programs
that promote sophisticated "technoculture" in Korea (Pecht et al. 1997).
In sum, as late-standardizing firms move from the positions of late adopters to fast
followers, and eventually to technology and standards leaders, the state implements various
standards policies and programs so that firms can capture greater technological rents. The
state plays significant roles in six key ways: (1) supplying basic standards as infratechnologies,
(2) securing demand by mitigating market risks, (3) promoting knowledge diffusion through
facilitating networking, (4) reducing technology risks through technology search and forecast,
(5) lobbying and negotiating with other states for market expansion of domestic standards,




GENERALIZABILITY OF THE LATE-STANDARDIZATION MODEL:
OTHER COUNTRIES, OTHER INDUSTRIES, AND OTHER TIME PERIODS .
STANDARDS AS A SOURCE OF TRADE CONFLICTS 0 STANDARDS FORUMS AND COLLUSION .
BRANDING AND LATE STANDARDIZATION m LATE STANDARDIZATION IN OPEN-SOURCE REGIME
Being late is often considered a negative trait. However, our study has shown that it is
sometimes advantageous to be late, as long as the latecomer captures the opportunity to take
advantage of their lateness. The process of late standardization and technological catch-up is,
in many respects, characterized by latecomers' continuous efforts to free themselves from
being late by necessity to being early or late by choice. Successful late standardizers are able
to choose to become either standards followers or leaders, depending on their resources,
capabilities, and strategic interests.
In our model of late standardization and technological catch-up, we argue that internal
quality standardization is the fundamental activity that permits latecomers to enhance their
competitive positions in the world market. Once latecomers advance manufacturing and
innovation capabilities, external standards activities become the key to moving beyond catch-
up. By linking with technology and standards leaders, fast followers learn new technologies
and use them to improve their products and production processes. External linkages through
standards activities allow them to keep up with technological change, to the extent that they
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can enhance ramp-up capabilities. Finally, as fast followers successfully develop innovation
capabilities at the world technological frontier, they actively engage in, and often lead,
standardization activities, such that they can sustain first-mover advantages.
In this concluding chapter, we explore how our research findings may be generalized and
what research should be done in the future.
GENERALIZABILITY OF THE LATE-STANDARDIZATION MODEL
We have developed the model of late standardization and technological catch-up based
primarily on the case studies of Korean latecomers in the semiconductor and mobile
telecommunications industries during the past three decades. In the previous chapters, we
have included discussions of a few Thai latecomers to examine how applicable the Korean
experience may be to a less industrialized and "less standardized" economy.
In the following sections, we further examine the issue of generalizability. We discuss
how the model of late standardization can be generalized in three different dimensions. We
first discuss how the model is applicable to late standardizers other than Korea, then to
industries other than the semiconductor and mobile telecommunications industries, and finally
to time periods other than the past three decades. We also discuss how researchers may tackle
these issues in future research.
LATE STANDNARDIZATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Although the successful late standardizers in Korea are unique in many regards, our model
of late standardization may be generalized to include other latecomer countries, taking into
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account each country's unique economic and political characteristics. Regardless of each late
standardizer' uniqueness, its options in terms of sources and types of standards at the early
stage of late standardization are generally limited to adopting international or foreign
standards developed by advanced firms and countries.
The issue arises as to what modes they use to acquire such standards. Generally, for late
standardizers that are connected to multinational firms, either as suppliers or equipment
buyers, the multinational firms function as an important mode for acquiring information and
knowledge on standards and related issues. Such late standardizers may acquire standards and
related information either as specifications in a packaged form or through special training that
they receive from the multinationals. In this case, the knowledge related to standards and
standardization disseminates very little to other local firms. The standards they adopt also
reflect the requirements and conditions of the export markets more than the local markets.
Because standards are an important means for diffusing technology, limited diffusion of
knowledge on standards means limited diffusion of related technologies.
For late standardizers with no or little linkage with multinationals, the state functions as
the main mode of knowledge transfer, most likely through governmental research institutes
and standards development organizations (SDO). However, in consumer-goods markets in
most developing economies, multinational firms often bypass national standards organizations
and enforce the use their technical standards through the adoption of unique trademarks.
Similar situation occurs in the intermediate and capital goods markets. Only in the case of
mandatory standards for safety, health, and environmental protection do developing-country
SDOs have control over technical specifications of products sold in the domestic markets.
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Regardless of the levels of technological and standards capabilities and the modes of
knowledge transfer, late standardizers have to engage in quality standardization and related
activities in order to catch up with early standardizers. Quality standardization both at the firm
and national levels is not merely the key to survival, but also the first step beyond catch-up. In
order for late standardizers to become part of the global supply and value chains, they have to
focus their internal effort on quality standardization and control. Particularly with the
globalization of trade and investment and international trade agreements, domestic markets
become less protected. Early standardizers that have better products and production processes
will be able to continue their dominance in developing-country markets. This will put
additional pressure on late standardizers to improve their quality standardization and control.
Institutional arrangements at the national level thus have to focus on the development of
national standards systems that aim to improve quality of products and production processes.
Because measurement and reference standards are infratechnologies, they are generally
beyond the financial and technical capabilities of individual late-standardizing firms. The
state, therefore, plays a direct role in acquiring, setting, and diffusing such basic standards.
In generalizing our model, we would hypothesize that the later a latecomer is engaged in
internal quality standardization, the greater the direct role of the state in developing and
providing knowledge on quality standards. A few exceptions may exist when the role of the
state is substituted by multinational firms. These are the cases of domestic latecomers being:
(1) suppliers to multinationals, (2) buyers of production equipments from multinationals,
and/or (3) licensees of proprietary technologies related to production processes. The direct
role of the state may also be less direct, when the international market for knowledge on
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quality standardization and methods enlarges. In that case, late standardizers can hire foreign
consultants to help improve their internal quality standardization and control.
Future research may include other latecomer countries and their experiences in late
standardization and technological catch-up. Among others, China and India are particularly
worth detailed research. In many technical areas, the United States and the European Union
have been able to push its domestic standards as international standards. The rise of China and
India presents an interesting scenario, in which their large domestic markets may dictate not
only domestic standards but also international standards. Strategically, China and India may
not choose to compete directly against more advanced firms in the U.S. and E.U. markets, but
compete in the emerging markets. Lower costs and somewhat advanced technologies from
China have already gained grounds in several areas, including telecommunication equipment.
LATE STANDARDIZATION IN OTHER INDUSTRIES
We have selected the semiconductor and mobile telecommunications industries for our
case studies, primarily because they are standards-intensive industries that have been the basis
for technological catch-up efforts in several latecomer countries. As noted by Amsden and
Chu (2003), late industrializers' technological upgrading since the early 1990s has mainly
taken place in the electronics industry, including the semiconductor, electronic appliances,
and telecommunications industries. Meanwhile, during the period since the 1990s, we have
also witnessed several rapid and major changes at the technological frontier in the electronics
industry, particularly with the rise of the Internet and other digital technologies. This evidence
partially supports Perez and Soete (1988)'s argument that latecomers have greater windows of
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opportunities for technological catch-up when the techno-economic paradigms are changing
than when the paradigms at in stable states. A question then arises as to whether our model of
late standardization is generalizable to other industries.
Non-network industries
Information and communications technology (ICT) industries are not the only industries
that are standards-intensive, even though the types of standards required are different.
Because the ICT industries have strong network effects, compatibility standards are generally
the main issue of contention. For non-network "high-tech" industries, such as pharmaceuticals
and biotechnologies, compatibility among products is less of an issue. Yet, the industries
could still be standards-intensive, in that they are a thicket of mandatory standards and
regulations regarding safety, health, and the environment. Agricultural and food products are
particularly subject to these types of mandatory standards.
The late-standardization effort in these sectors could be more daunting than in industries
in which compatibility standards are the main issue. More often that not, mandatory standards
for safety, health, and environmental protection are set by national agencies. The processes
and results of standardization activities, therefore, are determined less by technical superiority
as a result of competition among technologies than in the case of electronic products.
The institutional arrangements for international standardization in the areas of health,
safety, and environmental protection are also different from the areas of compatibility
standards. National agencies tend to take charge of setting standards and regulations at both
national and international levels. As with international standardization of network products,
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firms and governments from developed economies continue to be influential in international
standardization in the fields of safety, health, and the environment.
An important forum for international standardization in the field of food safety and health
is Codex Alimentarius, or CODEX in short. CODEX is part of the United Nations/World
Health Organization (WHO)'s commission to establish global standards for foods, drugs,
pesticides, etc. and for their distribution and trade. Meanwhile, there is an increasing number
of safety and health-related standards developed by private firms, particularly retailers, in
developed economies. This adds additional pressure on late standardizers, who now face even
more stringent obstacles in the agricultural and food industries, in which safety, health, and
environmental standards are essential. Competitive advantage for firms in these sectors is
greatly affected by the ability to comply with these standards and technical regulations as well
as the conformity assessment procedures.
Arguably, our model of late standardization also applies to these sectors. Late
standardizers have to focus first on the "quality" of their products, such that they meet the
minimum "quality" standards related to health, safety, and environmental protection in order
to sell their products in developed-country markets. They face similar obstacles as latecomers
in the electronics industries, particularly those due to the limited knowledge about standards
and regulations in lead-user markets and limited pool of technical experts on these issues.
Additional barriers against late-standardization efforts also exist due to the nature of
standards in these sectors. Standards and regulations in these fields tend to be "performance"
standards, which usually specify the minimum or maximum performance levels, as opposed
to "design" standards, which indicate the actual dimensions and/or specifications of the
308
products. Late standardizers are able to learn less from performance standards than from
design standards, because they do not specify the actual specifications of components or
products. This prevents late standardizers from learning through reverse engineering. They
have to find other ways to innovate and produce products that meet performance standards.
As standards and regulations in these fields are developed and set mostly by public
agencies, less by the private sector, the state plays an even more important role in acquiring
knowledge related standards and regulations in the advanced markets. Measurement standards
are also critical to latecomers in these industries, and remain as critical infratechnologies. In
addition, the state has to play an important role in demonstrating the levels of compliance that
late-standardizing firms have with standards and regulations in the advanced markets.
Domestic institutions have to be set up such that they respond quickly and appropriately to the
complex and changing requirements in the advanced markets. This requires standards
capability that includes the capability to track and follow changes in standards and regulations.
Once such basic capabilities are in place, late standardizers have to become more involve
in external standardization activities. International standardization in the areas of health,
safety, and the environment still primarily occurs mostly in formal standards organizations
such as CODEX. There are very few "informal" standards consortia in these areas, unlike in
the electronics industry in which standards consortia are now prevalent. However, because
each country tends to have its own sets of standards and standardization procedures,
The WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, therefore, has very important
implications for late standardizers, as it directly relates standards and technical regulations on
food safety to international trade. This could affect how late standardizers develop their
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standards capability in the areas of food safety and health.
Service sectors
The service industries are another area to which our model may be generalizable. In most
economies, particularly industrialized and newly-industrializing countries, the service sector
accounts for the largest proportion of the Gross National Product. For instance, the service
sector contributes to about 55 percent of the Korean GDP in 2005, compared with 41 percent
by the industry sector and less than 4 percent by the agriculture sector.10 7 Although the
contribution of services to exports is still lower than manufacturing industries, with increasing
globalization of trade and investment, the upward trend for global trade for services is
expected to continue. The enormous potential of the services trade as an engine of export and
economic growth cannot be underestimated, as services account for two thirds of world's
economic activity. In fact, trade in commercial services has grown faster than merchandise
trade in the past two decades. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), world
export of commercial services increased more than 200 per cent in the past decade from about
US$ 1031 billion in 1994 to US$ 2,127 billion in 2004. Approximately 60 percent of the
global service trade is concentrated among the top ten developed countries. Among latecomer
countries, Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea are the top earners from global trade of
commercial services.'0 8
As with the increasing importance of standards for merchandise trade, standards will also
become essential to trade in commercial services. Service standards are nothing new;
companies often have guidelines and standards for services provided to customers. Yet, the
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focus has been within firm and sector boundaries, and, at best, national boundaries.
International standardization for services has only attracted attention recently because of
globalization of trade in services. Some sectors have experienced international standardization
more than others. Among others, financial services have become increasingly standardized,
corresponding to the globalization of financial markets. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank's work on financial standards and codes is a prime example of
international standardization in financial services. 10 9
National SDOs in some developed economies, such as Germany, and international SDOs,
such as the ISO, have already started to tackle international standardization in services. For
instance, the DIN, Deutsches Institut fiir Normung, the ISO member body for Germany,
started in 2000 a project entitled "Service Standards for Global Markets," to identify the need
for action and to initiate activities for developing service standards. The European
Commission for Standardization (CEN) has also increased its effort in service standardization.
As for March 2005, the CEN had already published 30 service standards service standards,
covering areas such as tourism, transport and logistics, and healthcare. The CEN expected to
publish another 43 documents related to service standards (CEN 2005).
International standardization of services is often carried out by international organizations
and professional associations specialized in each industry. For instance, the World Tourism
Organization (UNWTO), a United Nations agency specialized in tourism, has set up
committees that work on quality standards for tourism activities. The main task of developing
tourism standards, however, is undertaken by the ISO. An ISO Technical Committee on
tourism standards (TC228) has been formed to standardize tourism terminology and technical
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specifications, as well as to adapt the existing quality management standards (ISO 9000/2000;
ISO 14000) to the specificity of tourism services.
What are the implications of the increase in international standardization in commercial
services for late standardizers? Because international standardization in service trade is
relatively new, there is scant evidence on its effects on latecomer countries. Nonetheless, the
limited standardization in commercial services presents a wide window of opportunity for late
standardizers to be more actively involved in developing and setting service standards. Late
standardizers with existing resources, capabilities, and institutions for standards activities for
merchandise products are particularly well positioned to take on service standardization at
both domestic and international levels. Korea, Taiwan, India, and China are probably capable
of embarking on such efforts, depending of the areas of commercial services.
In fact, some late standardizers have already made headlines for leadership in developing
and setting standards in services. Korea, for example, has recently developed and
implemented the Certification System for Standard Logistics' Facilities. This is considered
the first time in the world for such a logistics standard to be implemented."' 1 In this case, the
standardization effort in logistics services is based on the existing technological capabilities,
resources, and institutions that Korea has in ICT standardization. The success points to the
importance of building up standards-related resources, capabilities, and institutions in one
sector, and then utilizing them as the basis for diversification into other sectors.
In sum, in generalizing our model to include the service industries, we would hypothesize
that the less standardized an industry is, the more opportunities for late standardizers to
benefit from engaging internally and externally in standards activities. The bottom-line
312
argument remains that internal quality-standards activities are the basic factor on which late
standardizers have to focus. As they develop standards-related resources, capabilities and
institutions, they can and should engage more actively in external standardization at the
international level. Because international standardization of commercial services is still not as
prevalent as in merchandise products, late standardizers have more opportunities to influence
the directions and outcomes.
LATE STANDARDIZATION IN OTHER TIME PERIODS
The third generalizability issue concerns whether the late standardization is applicable to
time periods other than the past decade. Successful late standardization by some Korean firms
has happened during the time when there are significant changes in techno-economic
paradigms in the electronics industry. Analog technologies are being replaced by digital
technologies, while global production chains are becoming more fragmented and globalized.
This means late and early standardizers face similar technology and market barriers. The
shifting paradigms thus create windows of opportunity for late standardizers to enter the new
technological systems and eventually the new markets.
Therefore, in generalizing our model of late standardization and catch-up, we would
hypothesize that a late standardizer is more likely to be successful in its late-standardization
effort during the time when there is a change in techno-economic paradigm. Future research
may test this hypothesis by examining the time periods in the past when a late standardizer
caught up, kept up, and forged ahead of its forerunners. Japanese firms during the 1960s-80s
are potential candidates for such a study.
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OTHER ASPECTS OF LATE STANDARDIZATION
In this study, we focus mainly on the strategic, organizational, and institutional aspects of
late standardization and technological catch-up, as well as the generalizability of the late-
standardization model. There are, however, several other aspects of the late-standardization
process that deserve more detailed investigation in future research. We list a few of them here.
STANDARDS AS A SOURCE OF TRADE CONFLICTS
The use of national standards policy as a way to nurture domestic industries will continue
to be a contentious issue. This applies not only to successful late standardizers, such as Korea,
but also to other developing countries in general. Particularly, large late standardizers, such as
China, India, and Brazil, have shown attempts to use standards policies as part of their
technonationalistic agenda.
We predict that trade disputes related to standards and technical regulations will increase
within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and beyond. As countries reduce the number of
tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports, they find other ways to protect domestic
industries. Compared to quantitative restrictions, standards and technical regulations are more
subtle as a protectionist too and more difficult to measure with regards to their impact on
trade. Nonetheless, standards policies based on protectionist agenda may not necessarily be
beneficial for latecomer countries, mainly because of technological globalization.
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Technonationalism and technoglobalism
The policy of unique national standards could potentially backfire, if the rest of the world
adopts other standards. It is thus important that the standards policies and strategies are not
based solely on technonationalism, but the have to take technoglobalism into account.
Standards policies and strategies based on technonationalism may reduce the technology and
market risks faced by domestic firms by identifying and supporting specific national standards.
Yet, technological globalization has now intensified, in which the generation, collaboration,
and exploitation of scientific and technological knowledge occurs in various locations around
the globe. Individual firms and countries no longer tackle scientific and technological efforts
alone. This technoglobalism, therefore, has to be taken into account in devising and
implementing standards policies and strategies.
Technonationalism and technoglobalism are inherently not without contradictions. As
with any public policies, while some may gain from self-reliant national standards policy,
others may lose. In the case of China, for instance, local manufacturers that are mainly
technology users generally prefer superior performance of foreign technologies to domestic
technologies. On the other hand, the domestic technology producers, including research
institutes and governmental agencies, prefer domestic technologies, even with inferior
performance, in order to nurture the development of a national innovation system (Suttmeier
2005). Some manufacturers may prefer international standards to domestic ones, if their
markets are primarily overseas.
These contradictions were evident in several cases in Korea, in which the government
adopted the technonationalistic approach to its standards policy. When the Korean
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government opted for CDMA technologies as the national standard for 2G mobile
telecommunication services, several interest groups and experts, both in the government and
the private sector, were opposed to the selection. The government stuck to its gun and focused
its efforts on developing CDMA as Korea's national standard. The policy has borne fruit, and
the success in CDMA became the springboard for the subsequent success in GSM as well.
As we take a closer look at Korea's national standards policy, it is apparent that, while the
policy aimed to develop self-reliance in terms of standards and technologies, the policy was
not simplistic technonationalism. In the case of CDMA, technoglobalism was manifested
through the constant search for foreign technologies by Korean engineers and government
officers as well as the significant involvement of Qualcomm.
STANDARDS FORUMS, CARTELS, AND COLLUSION
Another aspect of late standardization worthy of detailed research is the potential problem
of cartels and collusion both at the national and international levels. This problem may arise
when late standardizers participate in R&D and standards alliances. Standardization
organizations normally try to avoid any cooperation that may violate antitrust regulations. Yet,
there are several instances, in which members of standardization forums are found to have
colluded. For instance, in 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that Samsung and
some other DRAM manufacturers, which were member of JEDEC, participated in
"international conspiracy to price fixing". This allegation led Samsung to plead guilty and pay
a $300 million fine. 1 Although the allegation did not indicate that the collusion was directly
related to the technical collaboration among firms, the fact remains that these firms were all
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members of a particular standards club.
The potential problem of international cartels and collusion raises the question of how the
regulatory regimes at the international level deal with technical collaboration initiatives that
have competitive implications. So far, antitrust agencies in developed economies, particularly
the United States, the European Union, and Japan, have been diligent in investigating the
antitrust implications of standardization efforts by industry consortia. However, in emerging
and less developed economies, this issue is hardly dealt with. In fact, some collusion as part of
standardization efforts may be ignored and condoned. Firms may "cooperate" by picking
industry standards that benefit the participating firms. These standards may become national
standards, as in several cases of mobile telecom standards in Korea. Some of these initiatives
may be considered as collusion in developed economies, but are regarded as part of national
strategy to nurture local firms. Future research may reveal how legal institutions deal with the
antitrust aspects of the late-standardization process.
BRANDING AND LATE STANDARDIZATION
Standardization leads to less differentiation of products offered in the market (Swann
2000). As products become less differentiated, brand identity becomes more crucial to
attracting buyers. In the process of late standardization, latecomer firms are faced with the
challenge of how to create brand identities while engaging in standardization activities.
The successful cases of late standardization of Korean firms, particularly Samsung and
LG, indicate the paramount importance of branding. Samsung Electronics, for instance, has
been implementing aggressive branding strategies while developing production, innovation,
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and standards capabilities. So have LG and other late-standardizing firms in Korea. More
detailed research is necessary to disentangle the strategies involved in branding and
standardization.
LATE STANDARDIZATION IN AN OPEN-SOURCE REGIME
We have discussed late standardization and technological catch-up in a proprietary regime,
in which technological knowledge is mostly proprietary to firms in advanced economies. A
question arises as to whether late standardization and catch-up would happen in a similar way
in an open-source regime, in which knowledge is more publicly accessible. There is now
increasing evidence and literature on the contribution of open-source software development to
technological development in developing countries. The issue of open source regime may be
unique to the software industry. However, as the industry is particularly standards intensive,
what we learn from future research on late standardization in an open-source regime may





' "Late standardization" could also refer to the process in which firms participate in standardization processes
after some level of market stability is achieved. The opposite is "early standardization" in which standardization
efforts start before the market is stable. Although the definition adopted in this dissertation includes that meaning,
it is more inclusive. It is also in line with the term "late industrialization", the difference being that the focus is
on standardization in instead of industrialization.
2 Infratechnologies are technical tools that provide the technical basis for industry standards, which underlie
efficient R&D, process and quality control, and the transactions of technology goods and services.
Infratechnologies include measurement methods, science and engineering data, and specifications for open
systems. In most developed economies, government laboratories play a leading role in providing
infratechnologies, for instance, the Measurement and Standards Laboratories of the U.S. National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). (Tassey 1997)
3 For detailed accounts of how standards develop, see Krislov (1997); Verman (1973).
4 According to Rumelt (1987) entrepreneurial rents are "the difference between a venture's ex post value (or
payment stream) and the ex ante cost (or value) of the resources combined to form the venture (p.143).
Furthermore, entrepreneurial rents also refer to the addition of value by the combining of resources in new
combinations, or the discovery, or creation of new resources, or modes of organization. They thus apply to the
entrepreneurial discovery of resource value." (Ibid., p.144) Whereas Ricardian or Paretian rents can be earned in
a situation of equilibrium where resource values are widely known, entrepreneurial rents apply to a situation of
disequilibrium when resource value is not widely known or anticipated (Lewin and Phelan 2000).
5 An interface standard allows the exchange of information between two or more different systems or pieces of
equipment. In telecommunications, for instance, an interface standard describes functional characteristics, such
as code conversion, line assignments, protocol compliance, or physical characteristics, such as electrical,
mechanical, or optical characteristics. An interface standard may include operational characteristics and
acceptable levels of performance (Source: www.wikipedia.com).
6 A transaction standard is defined as description of technical or procedural elements that are necessary for
market transactions to take place between two or more entities.
CHAPTER TWO
7 A dynamic model normally represents the behavior of an object over time, where the object's behavior is best
described as a set of states that occur in a defined sequence. The components of the dynamic model are: states,
state transitions, events, actions, and activities (http://www.chambers.com.au/Sample_p/og_dm.htm).
8 For more examples of recent de facto standards, especially those in the information and communication
technology sector, see http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/de_factostandard.htm and www.wikipedia.com,
search for de facto standards.
' An interesting question arises here whether this argument applies to the case of producers of parts and
components who produce products according to specifications ordered by other firms. Empirical researchers
have not yet analyzed this issue systematically.
JO But at some point, congestion occurs and the benefit can actually become a cost, that is, negative network
externalities.
" See Grindley (1995) for cases and stories of standards strategy and policy in various industries, including
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computer systems, high-definition television, and telepoint cordless phone.
12 In the diagram of late standardization in Figure 2.2, we show the second to the fourth steps, omitting the first
step for the sake of graphical presentation.)
~3 Digressing momentarily, we could hypothesize that technological development could be limited by the extent
of the standards, because standards affect the division of labor. As Adam Smith famously argues, division of
labor is limited by the extent of the market. Standards, in many respects, could expand the extent of the market,
which, in turn, increases the division of labor. Assuming technological change and development is correlated
with division of labor, we would be interested in showing theoretically and empirically how standards affect
technological development through market expansion and division of labor. This is, of course, beyond the scope
of this study.
14 This point was confirmed in our interviews with representatives to JEDEC from semiconductor firms that we
considered were in the keep-up stage. These firms include: Hynix (Korea), VIA Technologies (Taiwan), Hana
Microelectronics (Thailand).
15 The above-normal profits here refer to technological rents that a firm can enjoy
16 The term "standards leaders" here does not necessarily mean that the firms have a proprietary de facto
standard, as in the case of Microsoft Windows or Adobe Postscript; rather, it signifies the ability of the latecomer
firms to influence the directions and outcomes of the standardization efforts.
CHAPTER THREE
17 For instance, the U.S. market represents about 37% of Samsung Electronics' total sales in 2002.
18 ITU website, www.itu.org
CHAPTER FOUR
19 Second sourcing refers to the situation when a firm manufactures a product designed and developed by another
firm as a second source of supply for customers.
20 Louis Branscomb, personal communication, December 2004. Branscomb is a former Director of U.S. National
Bureau of Standards.
21 Karen Colye, www.kcolye.net
CHAPTER FIVE
22 "Samsung Ousts Sony as #1 in CE", ETR Weekly, July 28, 2005
23 Information obtained from Samsung website at www.samsung.com
24 Samsung's digital appliance business accounts for 6%, Digital media for 14%, and LCD for 15% of the total
turnover in 2004.
25 From interviews with Samsung former employees and current executives, April 2005, and Choi (1996).
26 As shown in Table 5.1, the top chip equipment makers are chip manufacturers themselves. This implies that
there is no direct competition between the top chip makers and the equipment makers. This creates good
incentives for firms to transfer and share technologies through supplier-buyer partnerships.
27 Information obtained from www.samsung.com
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28 Information on Samsung's participation in JEDEC is obtained from interviews with Gil Russell, Mian Quddus,
Dong Yang Lee in April 2005.
29 Information on Samsung's entry into JEDEC was obtained from our interviews with Gil Russell in April and
November 2005. Russell worked for Samsung as Senior Strategic Marketing Specialist since the beginning of
Samsung's JEDEC membership. He joined Samsung after working as Senior Strategic Marketing Engineer for
NEC, then left Samsung to become Technical Marketing Manager for Infineon Technologies. He represented
both NEC and Infineon in JEDEC.
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32 ibid.
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36 Dong Yang Lee, personal communication, April 2005
37 An important issue worth mentioning is the prolonged series of lawsuits involving the California-based
Rambus and other major semiconductor manufacturers, including Samsung, Micron, and Infineon, over DDR
SDRAM memory technology included in the JEDEC DDR standards. For details, see Stern (2003) and Parloff
(2003).
38 Samsung website: www.samsung.com
39 ibid.
40 JEDEC website: www.jedec.org
41 ibid.
42 Samsung Press Release, February 10, 1999
43 Samsung press release, February 17, 2005.
44 Other first mass-producers of 16M DRAMs were Samsung and Goldstar.
45 Part of the information on Hynix's standards activities is from the interviews with Hynix engineers and
managers during April 2005.
46 Information from Hana website: www.hanagroup.com
CHAPTER SIX
47 Information on the participation of Korean latecomer firms in standardization activities was obtained through
interviews with engineers and managers from those firms in April 2005, as well the follow-up email
communications.
48 http://www.affordablephones.net/HistoryCellular.htm
49 Others strategic industries include semiconductors and computers.
"5 http://www.sktelecom.com/eng/about_skt/corp_milestones/index7.html
51 PCS, or Personal Communications Service, is the 1900 MHz radio band used for digital mobile phone services
in Canada and the United States. CDMA, GSM, and TDMA systems can all be used on PCS frequencies. The
FCC, as well as Industry Canada, set aside the band of 1850-1990 MHz for mobile phone use in 1994, as the
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original cellular phone band at 824-849 MHz was becoming overcrowded (www.wikipedia.com). In Korea, three
PCS providers started offering mobile services at cheaper rates from 1997, with a large amount of subsidy from
the government (Lee and Han 2002).
52 According to the WiMax Forum (www.wimaxforum.org), WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access) is a certification mark for products that pass conformity and interoperability tests for the
IEEE 802.16 standards. Products with WiMAX are capable of forming wireless connections between them to
permit the carrying of internet packet data. It is similar to WiFi in concept, but with better performance and
permitting usage over much greater distances.
53 Information obtained from interviews with Samsung engineers in April 2004
54 Some analysts argue that Wibro has an advantage over the WiMax standard, because it uses licensed radio
spectrum. As the spectrum it uses is licensed and correspondingly protected from un-licensed use, any potential
interference could be negated from other sources using the same spectrum. However, the proprietary nature of
WiBro and its use of licensed spectrum that may not be available across the globe may prevent it from becoming
an international standard. While WiBro is quite exacting in its requirements from spectrum use to equipment
design, WiMAX leaves much of this up to the equipment provider while providing enough detail to ensure
interoperability between designs. (www.wikipedia.com;
http://www.broadbandhomecentral.com/report/backissues/Report050l1_1 .html)
In February 2002, the Korean government allocated 100MHz of electromagnetic spectrum in the 2.3GHz band,
and in late 2004 WiBro Phase 1 was standardized by the Korean Telecommunications Technology Association
(TTA). SK Telecom and Hanaro Telecom have announced a partnership to roll out WiBro nationwide in Korea.
55 In November 2004, Intel and LG Electronics executives agreed to ensure compatibility between WiBro and
WiMAX technology.
56 KSA newsletter, December 2004, page 4
57 http://www.questforum.org/index.htm





63 LG and Samsung are in fierce competition to lead the DMB market, both in terms of technology and standards.
64 www.lncp.org
65 http://www.3g.co.uk/PR/Feb2003/4889.htm
66 www.kt.co.kr; http://www.infocom-de.com/tst/TST_2004_ 11.html
67 China Daily, November 6, 2001. http://www.chinadaily.com
68 LG Electronics website: www.lge.com
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